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Business innovation and regulatory enforcement: case studies of the big box retail industry and enforcement of RCRAGuard, Misty Ann 15 April 2010 (has links)
The purpose of this research is to examine the following research question: how has enforcement of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) adapted to the Big Box business system innovation? Additionally, the study explored the possible nature of regulatory choke points that may emerge from the enforcement of RCRA in the Big Box retail system. This study used contingency theory to establish a foundation for analysis of the Big Box business system innovation through identification of structural elements, external influences, and their subsequent interactions associated with the Big Box retail system in terms of environmental compliance with the RCRA enforced by the United States (US) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This research employed an embedded comparative case study design using the comparison of two Big Box firms, Walmart Stores, Inc. and Target Corporation, nationally and for the following states with opposing enforcement strategies: Arizona, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas. The data used was obtained from third-party federal or firm-maintained sources.
Findings indicate Walmart adheres to the structural models developed using contingency theory principles and incurs more impacts from regulatory agencies due to the enforcement of RCRA. Furthermore, it was observed that inspections of the firms are not distributed throughout the organizational structural elements by all states. Additionally, the use of different enforcement strategies resulted in the emergence of regulatory choke points by Arizona, Kentucky, and Texas; however, Missouri appears to balance enforcement without causing a regulatory choke point.
This research has identified that the enforcement of RCRA has not universally adapted to the demands of the Big Box business system innovation. Agency implications, firm implications, directions for further research, and continued development of a regulatory choke point theory are discussed.
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Novel approaches in determining baseline information on annual disposal rates and trace element content of U.S. coal combustion residues : a response to EPA’s June 2010 proposed disposal ruleChwialkowski, Natalia Ewa 14 February 2011 (has links)
Although products of coal combustion (PCCs) such as coal ash are currently exempted from classification as a hazardous waste in the United States under the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is now revising a proposed rule to modify disposal practices for these materials in order to prevent contamination of ground- and surface water sources by leached trace elements.
This paper analyzes several aspects of EPA’s scientific reasoning for instating the rule, with the intent of answering the following questions: 1) Are EPA’s cited values for PCC production and disposal accurate estimates of annual totals?; 2) In what ways can EPA’s leaching risk modeling assessment be improved?; 3) What is the total quantity of trace elements contained within all PCCs disposed annually?; and 4) What would be the potential costs and feasibility of reclassifying PCCs not under RCRA, but under existing NRC regulations as low-level radioactive waste (LLRW)?
Among the results of my calculations, I found that although EPA estimates for annual PCC disposal are 20% larger than industry statistics, these latter values appear to be closer to reality. Second, EPA appears to have significantly underestimated historical PCC disposal: my projections indicate that EPA’s maximum estimate for the quantity of fly ash landfilled within the past 90 years was likely met by production in the last 30 years alone, if not less. Finally, my analysis indicates that while PCCs may potentially meet the criteria for reclassification as low-level radioactive waste by NRC, the cost of such regulation would be many times that of the EPA June proposed disposal rule ($220-302 billion for PCCs disposed in 2008 alone, versus $1.47 billion per year for the Subtitle C option and $236-587 million for Subtitle D regulatory options). / text
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