<p>In recent years the aviation industry is moving towards the use of programmable logic devices in airborne safety critical systems. To be able to certify the close to fail-safe functionality of these programmable devises (e.g. FPGAs) to the aviation authorities, the aviation industry uses a guideline for design assurance for airborne electronic hardware named RTCA DO-254. At the same time the PLD industry is developing ever more complex embedded system-on-chip solutions integrating more and more functionality on a single chip.</p><p>This thesis looks at the problems that rise when trying to certify system-on-chip solutions according to RTCA DO-254. Used as an example of an embedded FPGA, the Actel Fusion FPGA chip with integrated analog and digital functionality will be tested according to the verification guidance. The results show that for the time being, the examined embedded system-on-chip FPGAs can not be verified to be used in airborne safety critical systems.</p>

In recent years the aviation industry is moving towards the use of programmable logic devices in airborne safety critical systems. To be able to certify the close to fail-safe functionality of these programmable devises (e.g. FPGAs) to the aviation authorities, the aviation industry uses a guideline for design assurance for airborne electronic hardware named RTCA DO-254. At the same time the PLD industry is developing ever more complex embedded system-on-chip solutions integrating more and more functionality on a single chip. This thesis looks at the problems that rise when trying to certify system-on-chip solutions according to RTCA DO-254. Used as an example of an embedded FPGA, the Actel Fusion FPGA chip with integrated analog and digital functionality will be tested according to the verification guidance. The results show that for the time being, the examined embedded system-on-chip FPGAs can not be verified to be used in airborne safety critical systems.