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Tax Treatment of Revenue Based PaymentsWiedermann-Ondrej, Nadine January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
The influence of taxes on financing decision has long been discussed and different opinions exist concerning this subject. However, the importance of tax shield must not be underestimated because taxes can alter the effective interest rate of an instrument significantly. Generally it is assumed that payments of instrument that provide for revenue based compensation are not tax deductible because these instruments are normally qualified as equity. However, a detailed analysis of the various tax laws shows that this need not necessarily be the case. Payments that depend on the profits of a corporation can obtain an interest treatment if an instrument is structured according to the qualification criteria of a specific tax law. The deductibility can then decrease the effective interest rate of the issuing corporation. If a debt treatment can be obtained the question of the timing of interest payments has to be answered. In contrast to dividend distributions interest payments generally are not deductible as they occur but as they accrue. Especially in the case of fluctuating payments it is normally obligatory to determine the deductible amount in each accrual period. The time value of money aspect of interest payments is implemented differently in the various tax laws and can therefore change the effective tax rate. However, it is of great importance to consider these aspects before the issuance of a specific instrument. The first part of the paper analyses the necessary requirements for a debt treatment and possible obstacles to an interest deduction. In order to qualify for a debt treatment it is important to consider these facts before the issue of an instrument because a later reclassification of the instrument might change the cost of capital substantially. Even if an instrument is qualified as debt an interest deduction can be denied due to various limitations and restrictions. The second part of the paper examines the timing of revenue based payments that are considered as interest. Depending on the situation the taxpayer may or may not choose one of the described methods. However, it is important to know the impact of each method in order to able to determine the cost of a specific instrument. Another question raised in this paper concerns the discount rate used for the net present calculation and if the method used by IRS is of economic substance. This paper demonstrates the influence of the different methods of taxing revenue based payments and shows that the preferable method depends on the development of the profits. This paper emphasizes the impact of taxes on revenue based payments and the importance of the various approaches of tax authorities to execute such compensations. (author's abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination
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Taxation of Cross border Hybrid Finance. A legal Analysis.Eberhartinger, Eva, Six, Martin January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
(no abstract availabel) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination
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Hybrid Finance in the Double Tax TreatiesSix, Martin January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
The compartmentalisation of company finance into equity and debt does not truly capture the enormous diversity of financial instruments available. A wide variety of hybrid instruments incorporate elements of both equity and debt. From a fiscal point of view the classification of such hybrid instruments as equity or debt is crucial for two reasons. First of all, the issuer can treat interest on the latter as tax-deductible in most cases, and secondly, for the investor the classification determines whether the payments received from the respective instrument is treated as a dividend or as interest. One important question in this context is how hybrid instruments are treated in the tax treaty between the source state and the residence state. It is the aim of this paper, to show how the yield on hybrid financial instruments can or must be qualified as either dividend or interest in the double tax treaties, irrespective of the treatment in contracting states. / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination
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Hybrid Instruments and the Indirect Credit Method - Does it work?Wiedermann-Ondrej, Nadine January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
This paper analyses the possibility of double non-taxation of hybrid instruments in cross border transactions where the country of the investor has implemented the indirect credit method for mitigation or elimination of double taxation. From an isolated perspective a double non-taxation cannot be obtained because typically no taxes are paid in the foreign country due to the classification as debt and therefore even in the case of a classification as a dividend in the country of the investor no indirect credit can be given to the taxpayer. Using this as a starting point this paper investigates the impact of asymmetric tax treatment of hybrid instruments on the indirect credit method and the potentials for minimizing the tax burden or even the possibility of obtaining a double non-taxation. On this basis the paper develops a formula that identifies the optimal investment strategy based on given tax rates. Special interest is given to the limitations and possible barriers to hybrid transactions. This paper intents to initiate a scientific discussion concerning the tax impact of hybrid instruments in countries where the indirect credit method is employed. (author's abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination
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Conduit Companies, Beneficial Ownership, and the Test of Substantive Business Activity in Claims for Relief under Double Tax TreatiesJain, Saurabh, Prebble, John, Bunting, Christina January 2014 (has links) (PDF)
If interpreted in a strict legal sense, beneficial ownership rules in tax treaties would have no effect on conduit companies
because companies at law own their property and income beneficially. Conversely, a company can never own anything in a
substantive sense because economically a company is no more than a congeries of arrangements that represents the people
behind it. Faced with these contradictory considerations, people have adopted surrogate tests that they attempt to employ in
place of the treaty test of beneficial ownership. An example is that treaty benefits should be limited to companies that are both
resident in the states that are parties to the treaty and that carry on substantive business activity. The test is inherently illogical.
The origins of the substantive business activity test appear to lie in analogies drawn with straw company and base company
cases. Because there is no necessary relationship between ownership and activity, the test of substantive business activity can
never provide a coherent surrogate for the test of beneficial ownership. The article finishes with a Coda that summarises
suggestions for reform to be made in work that is to follow. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series
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Choosing between the UN and OECD Tax Policy Models: An African Case StudyDaurer, Veronika, Krever, Richard January 2014 (has links) (PDF)
This paper reports on a study of the tax treaty policy of a group of eleven East African countries. African tax treaties tend to follow one of two model treaties, an OECD model treaty that favours the interests of capital exporting nations and a United Nations model treaty that allows capital importing countries to retain more taxing rights. The study compares the policy outcomes in treaties signed by these countries with African nations, with relatively wealthy OECD countries, and with non-African countries that are not members of the OECD. It also compares selected outcomes in African-OECD treaties with those results in treaties between a group of Asian countries and OECD members to see whether African countries have been more or less successful at wringing preferences from wealthier nations. The study suggests the African countries studied have not been as successful in retaining taxing rights in treaties with OECD countries as have Asian countries. On the other hand, OECD countries are often more generous to African countries than are other African countries. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series
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The Consequences of Hybrid Finance in Thin Capitalization Situations. An Analysis of the Substantive Scope of National Thin Capitalization Rules with special Emphasis on Hybrid Financial Instruments.Klostermann, Margret January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
The choice of corporate finance is an important source of tax planning opportunities for multinational companies. Investing companies have to be aware of inconsistent tax classification of equity and debt between countries in particular. Additionally, thin capitalization rules have to be taken into account. In response to changing corporate needs the present paper focuses on the tax consequences of hybrid financial instruments. Only some literature exists on cross-border hybrid finance. Especially the linkage between the two areas - hybrid finance and thin capitalization - both on a national and international level had to be dealt with academically. The paper analyses the substantive scope of thin capitalization regimes in general and in detail. The main finding is that the tax consequences of hybrid instruments reverse when used in thin capitalization situations and that traditional tax policy has to be reconsidered. (author's abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination
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Cross-border Intra-group Hybrid Finance and International TaxationEberhartinger, Eva, Pummerer, Erich, Göritzer, Andreas January 2010 (has links) (PDF)
In intra-group finance hybrid instruments allow for tailor-made form of finance. Hence hybrid finance is often used for international tax planning in multinational groups. Due to a lack of international tax harmonization or tax coordination qualification conflict can arise. A specific hybrid instrument is classified as debt in one country, and as equity in the other country. This may lead to double taxation. In the reverse case, double non-taxation can arise. Against this legal background one might expect that cross-border hybrid intra-group finance is advantageous in comparison to classical debt finance in case of double-non-taxation while it can be expected to be disadvantageous in the case of double taxation of the yield. Previous studies do not include qualification conflicts. Thus the question arises how qualification conflicts are affecting an intra-group finance decision. We examine effects of such qualification conflicts, resulting from the use of cross-border, intra-group hybrid finance, on the tax-advantageousness as compared to classical debt finance. The analysis is based on a binomial simulation model including economic and legal uncertainty. We show that the results of our analysis under uncertainty vary significantly when compared to the more obvious results under economic and legal certainty. (author´s abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination
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Are Tax Havens Good? Implications of the Crackdown on SecrecyWeichenrieder, Alfons, Xu, Fangying 07 1900 (has links) (PDF)
The pressure on tax haven countries to engage in tax information exchange shows first effects on capital markets. Empirical research suggests that investors do react to information exchange and partially withdraw from previous secrecy jurisdictions that open up to information exchange. While some of the economic literature emphasizes possible positive effects of tax havens, the present paper argues that proponents of positive effects may have started from questionable premises, in particular when it comes to the effects that tax havens have for emerging markets like China and India. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series
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Tax Information Exchange with Developing Countries and Tax HavensBraun, Julia, Zagler, Martin 30 September 2015 (has links) (PDF)
The exchange of tax information has received ample attention recently, due to a number of recent headlines on aggressive tax planning and tax evasion. Whilst both participating tax authorities will gain when foreign investments (FDI) are bilateral, we demonstrate that FDI receiving nations will lose in asymmetric situations. We solve a bargaining model that proves that tax information exchange will only happen voluntarily with compensation for this loss. We then present empirical evidence in a global panel and find that a tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) or a double tax treaty with information exchange (DTT) is more likely when the capital importer is compensated through official development assistence (ODA). We finally demonstrate how the foreign account tax compliance act (FATCA) and similar international
initiatives bias the bargaining outcome in favour of capital exporting countries. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series
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