The paper to be presented discusses the default in policy coordination or harmonisation in European Social Policy and the emerging private cost borne by migrating individuals. The different designs of national social security schemes imply administrative hurdles and incompatibilities. The latter may also discourage labour movements between EU - countries since migration could bring about a reduction or a loss of social security rights acquired on the basis of past employment and past contributions. The access to new benefits may be hampered as long as some national social security insurance programs demand a minimum coverage period as a prerequisite for benefit claims and disregard preceding insurance periods in other countries. Taking present EU law into account, we design case studies to identify barriers to entry resp. to exit for individuals or households when migrating from one social security scheme to another. Within these scenarios, movements between national systems in Bismarckian tradition and Beveridge systems are of great interest. The paper is based on a research project conducted at the Centre of Excellence of International Tax Coordination at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. (author's abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination