ABSTRACT This essay aims to study rationality and otherness in J.M. Coetzee’s Foe. Susan Barton, the female protagonist in the book, is rational and struggles for power and independence in the society of the Enlightenment where the story is set. She is seen as non-rational, less valuable and as Other of the white, European male due to her gender.             Friday is male, but non-white and he is perceived as Other as well because of the colour of his skin. Although Friday is mute he tries to communicate, but his ways of communication are often ignored by others.             Through the representation of these characters Coetzee subverts the conventional idea that rationality is linked to the white European male.

This PhD thesis examines the way in which individuals make choices during stated preference experiments (commonly referred subsets of which are called stated choice methods, conjoint analysis and trade-off analysis). Stated preference experiments ask respondents to rank, rate or choose between different product/service options, which are made up of a number of attribute mixes. The responses made by individuals within these experiments allow researchers to estimate consumer preferences. This thesis traces the historical background of stated preference experiments, from the field of utility theory and experimental economics. An understanding of this historical background explains the reliance by practitioners on the assumption that respondents make rational choices during the stated preference experiment (where all the information presented to them within the experiment is traded off in order to come to an overall preference). In light of considerable research evidence within the field of psychology that consumers do not do not conform to this economic concept of rational choice, and recent criticisms within recent stated preference literature, this thesis identifies the choice strategies employed by respondents during three stated preference experiments, where attributes were represented in different ways. Choice based stated preference experiments designed as the context for this research, measure consumers preferences for a newly developed fuel-efficient vehicle, with attributes currently unavailable in the marketplace. The experiments were presented to respondents as a series of choices between the newly developed vehicle and another currently available in the marketplace, described in terms of a number of attributes. The experiments were implemented using 'think-aloud' protocol to allow the identification of respondent's choice strategies. The research successfully identifies the choice strategies employed by respondents during the stated preference experiments, and in support of recent criticisms within stated preference literature, finds significant deviations from the economic concept of rational choice. Furthermore, significant differences between the choice strategies employed by respondents are identified between the experiments where the appearance of the vehicles is represented in different ways. Using response data that is simulated to mirror the respondent choice strategies identified in each of the three stated preference experiments, the research tests the implications of these choice strategies on the estimation of consumer utility models. The research identifies significant differences between the parameter estimates derived from responses simulated assuming different choice strategy profiles. The research also identifies significant improvements in the estimated parameter values when the identified choice strategies are used in the analysis of the response data, rather than using the assumption of rational choice as an approximation. This suggests that stated prelcrence practitioners might improve model estimation by identifying the choice strategies used by respondents to inform the analysis of stated preference response data.

This dissertation investigates whether controversial beliefs concerning a range of topics can be rational or reasonable. It proceeds by developing a series of challenges to the putative rationality of belief in such topics. In chapter 1, the project is introduced and motivated. Several challenges are set out in chapters 2-5. Finally, a thought behind one solution to these challenges is examined in chapter 6.

It is not easy to predict what will happen tomorrow. It is perhaps even more difficult knowing what will occur next year or even two years from today. To put it short we are uncertain about the future. Swedish firms attempting to capture new export markets are also facing uncertainty. If a firm succeeds with predicting customer’s preferences they might be able to create a position for the firm´s products before any competition. It is however almost amusing to study successful marketing cases for export markets in a rear window. It is striking how firms have found winning positions which captured market after market with such apparent ease.  In this thesis the author attempts to present theoretical frameworks including internationalization theory and traditional marketing theory which can support exporting firms attempts to find new positions on export markets.  Previously in traditional marketing theory the solution has been to put trust in the marketing concept. Success in the marketplace was then a result of a careful segmentation process ending up in a positioning-decision supported by the marketing mix. The Nordic school of marketing among others introduced a new track in marketing with the relationship marketing concept focusing on the development of existing customer relationships. Internationalization theory (the process theory of internationalization) suggested that that firms increase commitment on export markets after a gradual learning process. Effectuation on the other hand has offered new perspectives. With its roots in the paradigm of bounded rationality a differing stance is offered for predicting the unpredictable. By following a model of bounded rationality the presented firms manage to craft positions for new and as a matter of fact as presented in the empirical part, also for existing markets. The paper highlights the importance of positioning for Swedish firms success on export markets.  It is a case study of how Swedish firms craft positions on new markets by taking action instead of making formal positioning decisions.  A model of bounded rationality is tested during interviews with five Swedish top-exporting firms. The paper finally presents a revised developed model for how successful firms act on export markets in order to craft positions. The model includes traditional marketing theory based upon a paradigm of bounded rationality. The paper contains however some question marks for the application of the marketing concept and traditional marketing theory. Rather a stance towards bounded rationality is emphasized.The final point of the thesis is the urge for emergence of alternatives in marketing to the marketing concept founded upon bounded rationality. These new models need to capture the actual actions taken by successful exporting firms in a more proficient and graspable way than existing traditional marketing models.

“Cooperation” has distinct meanings in biological and moral contexts. In nature, “cooperation” is commonly equated with “altruism,” and involves an apparent fitness cost to the actor. In the moral context, it is often employed to describe the behaviour required by a particular subset of morality, namely that of distributive justice. The existence of cooperation in nature poses a difficulty for those who seek explain it in evolutionary terms. There is an analogous problem in normative moral theory of reconciling cooperative behaviour with rationality. The constraints imposed by natural selection in the former context and by rationality in the latter make explaining or justifying cooperation difficult. Insofar as the social contract tradition is concerned with articulating or justifying the terms of social cooperation, these two problems are united through the contract metaphor. I examine these two structurally similar problems through the lens of the social contract tradition. In the descriptive arena, I argue that cultural group selection provides the most plausible explanation of the emergence of altruistic behaviours in nature. In the normative context, I argue that David Gauthier’s argument for the rationality of adopting the disposition of constrained maximization provides a defensible route to reconciling morality with rationality. I draw two conclusions with respect to how these two enterprises are connected. First, I argue, contrary to many critics of an empirically informed ethics, that the descriptive and normative projects are very much dependent upon one another. Insofar as culture is required for a descriptive account of the emergence of cooperation, and to the extent that reasoning about which norms ought to govern our interactions plays a role in their transmission, our descriptive account not only leaves room for normative considerations, but in fact requires them. Second, I argue that there is a convergence in the outcomes of both the descriptive and normative projects. I show that the explanation of the existence of cooperation that I favor also provides us with an explanation of the emergence of dispositions that structurally resemble those that Gauthier defends as rational. And thus we arrive at an account that brings together rationality, evolution, and morality.

“Cooperation” has distinct meanings in biological and moral contexts. In nature, “cooperation” is commonly equated with “altruism,” and involves an apparent fitness cost to the actor. In the moral context, it is often employed to describe the behaviour required by a particular subset of morality, namely that of distributive justice. The existence of cooperation in nature poses a difficulty for those who seek explain it in evolutionary terms. There is an analogous problem in normative moral theory of reconciling cooperative behaviour with rationality. The constraints imposed by natural selection in the former context and by rationality in the latter make explaining or justifying cooperation difficult. Insofar as the social contract tradition is concerned with articulating or justifying the terms of social cooperation, these two problems are united through the contract metaphor. I examine these two structurally similar problems through the lens of the social contract tradition. In the descriptive arena, I argue that cultural group selection provides the most plausible explanation of the emergence of altruistic behaviours in nature. In the normative context, I argue that David Gauthier’s argument for the rationality of adopting the disposition of constrained maximization provides a defensible route to reconciling morality with rationality. I draw two conclusions with respect to how these two enterprises are connected. First, I argue, contrary to many critics of an empirically informed ethics, that the descriptive and normative projects are very much dependent upon one another. Insofar as culture is required for a descriptive account of the emergence of cooperation, and to the extent that reasoning about which norms ought to govern our interactions plays a role in their transmission, our descriptive account not only leaves room for normative considerations, but in fact requires them. Second, I argue that there is a convergence in the outcomes of both the descriptive and normative projects. I show that the explanation of the existence of cooperation that I favor also provides us with an explanation of the emergence of dispositions that structurally resemble those that Gauthier defends as rational. And thus we arrive at an account that brings together rationality, evolution, and morality.

No description available.

<p>It is not easy to predict what will happen tomorrow. It is perhaps even more difficult knowing what will occur next year or even two years from today. To put it short we are uncertain about the future. Swedish firms attempting to capture new export markets are also facing uncertainty. If a firm succeeds with predicting customer’s preferences they might be able to create a position for the firm´s products before any competition. It is however almost amusing to study successful marketing cases for export markets in a rear window. It is striking how firms have found winning positions which captured market after market with such apparent ease.  In this thesis the author attempts to present theoretical frameworks including internationalization theory and traditional marketing theory which can support exporting firms attempts to find new positions on export markets.  Previously in traditional marketing theory the solution has been to put trust in the marketing concept. Success in the marketplace was then a result of a careful segmentation process ending up in a positioning-decision supported by the marketing mix. The Nordic school of marketing among others introduced a new track in marketing with the relationship marketing concept focusing on the development of existing customer relationships. Internationalization theory (the process theory of internationalization) suggested that that firms increase commitment on export markets after a gradual learning process. Effectuation on the other hand has offered new perspectives. With its roots in the paradigm of bounded rationality a differing stance is offered for predicting the unpredictable. By following a model of bounded rationality the presented firms manage to craft positions for new and as a matter of fact as presented in the empirical part, also for existing markets.</p><p>The paper highlights the importance of positioning for Swedish firms success on export markets.  It is a case study of how Swedish firms craft positions on new markets by taking action instead of making formal positioning decisions.  A model of bounded rationality is tested during interviews with five Swedish top-exporting firms. The paper finally presents a revised developed model for how successful firms act on export markets in order to craft positions. The model includes traditional marketing theory based upon a paradigm of bounded rationality. The paper contains however some question marks for the application of the marketing concept and traditional marketing theory. Rather a stance towards bounded rationality is emphasized.The final point of the thesis is the urge for emergence of alternatives in marketing to the marketing concept founded upon bounded rationality. These new models need to capture the actual actions taken by successful exporting firms in a more proficient and graspable way than existing traditional marketing models.</p>

The objective of this research is to develop the framework of empirical-evidence equilibria (EEEs) in stochastic games. This framework was developed while attempting to design decentralized controllers using learning in stochastic games. The overarching goal is to enable a set of agents to control a dynamical system in a decentralized fashion. To do so, the agents play a stochastic game crafted such that its equilibria are decentralized controllers for the dynamical system. Unfortunately, there exists no algorithm to compute equilibria in stochastic games. One explanation for this lack of results is the full-rationality requirement of game theory. In the case of stochastic games, full rationality imposes that two requirements be met at equilibrium. First, each agent has a perfect model of the game and of its opponents strategies. Second, each agent plays an optimal strategy for the POMDP induced by its opponents strategies. Both requirements are unrealistic. An agent cannot know the strategies of its opponents; it can only observe the combined effect of its own strategy interacting with its opponents. Furthermore, POMDPs are intractable; an agent cannot compute an optimal strategy in a reasonable time. In addition to these two requirements, engineered agents cannot carry perfect analytical reasoning and have limited memory; they naturally exhibit bounded rationality. In this research, bounded rationality is not seen as a limitation and is instead used to relax the two requirements. In the EEE framework, agents formulate low-order empirical models of observed quantities called mockups. Mockups have unmodeled states and dynamic effects, but they are statistically consistent; the empirical evidence observed by an agent does not contradict its mockup. Each agent uses its mockup to derive an optimal strategy. 1Since agents are interconnected through the system, these mockups are sensitive to the specific strategies employed by other agents. In an EEE, the two requirements are weakened. First, each agent has a consistent mockup of the game and the strategies of its opponents. Second, each agent plays an optimal strategy for the MDP induced by its mockup. The main contribution of this dissertation is the use of modeling to study stochastic games. This approach, while common in engineering, had not been applied to stochastic games.

Moraliska bedömningar har länge ansetts komma från rationellt tänkande, men även andra aspekter har setts ha en inverkan på individers moraliska bedömningar: så som socialt samspel med vänner och föräldrar. I arbetet undersöktes det om två till synes likvärdiga situationer bedöms som moraliskt olika, där ena situationen utspelar sig i verkligheten och den andra på Internet. 276 gymnasielever med en medelålder på 17 år användes i analysen, 137 slumpades till betingelsen verklighet. Det framkom att situationen över Internet ansågs som moraliskt värre än situationen i verkligheten. Vissa inomgruppsskillnader observerades, exempelvis att färre diskussioner om moral med vänner, samt det upplevda förtrycket av kritiskt tänkande från lärare, samvarierade med åsikten att individerna agerade moraliskt bättre. Även om det framkom en skillnad i hur Internet och verklighet bedömdes moraliskt, så går det inte att utesluta om mediet Internet har en komplett likvärdighet i jämförelse med verkligheten. Vidare studier behövs för att undersöka detta.