In this thesis I argue that race, culture and imperialism intersect with gender at the site of refugee law to produce 'racialized and exotic others.' These exotic others are refugee women whose differences from refugee decision makers in destination countries are made crucial to their refugee claims by refugee lawyers, decision makers and the system of refugee determination. I use a comparative methodology to examine the gender guidelines for refugee decision makers and selected key cases from Canada, the United States and Australia. The gender guidelines represent a human rights approach to refugee law. I critique the guidelines and relevant cases from an anti-essential ist perspective informed by postcolonial, feminist and critical race theory. My discussion is organized by contrasting 'exotic harms,' transgression of social mores and female genital cutting, with treatment of 'familiar harms', domestic violence and sexual assault. I aim to show how the distinctions between the exotic and the familiar are founded on orientalist notions about other women in other places. I seek to suggest strategies for refugee advocates, decision makers and academic lawyers to avoid perpetuating orientalist notions of other countries and other cultures. I conclude, however, that refugee law is a limited project whose solutions to the problems faced by refugee claimants can only ever be incomplete. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

<p>This paper sought to discuss the questions whether refugees have the right to return to their country of origin and whether their participation in the political life of that country may be used as a means to realise their right to return.</p>

Through the evolution of international human rights law and policy, gender has become a prohibited ground for persecution. However the international definition of a refugee contained in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not explicitly include gender as an enumerated ground on which persecution can be feared. This omission has required women who fear gender-based persecution to use the Convention's "membership in a particular social group" provision. Traditionally, judicial interpretation of criteria establishing a "particular social group" was not consistent in cases alleging gender-based persecution. In 1993, Canada developed guidelines that attempt to establish a coherent and consistent application of the "particular social group" category. This represents a state policy initiative to recognize the international evolution of policy on gender as a basis for persecution. Although the guidelines challenge theories of state sovereignty in the design and execution of domestic policy, they demonstrate that a coherent and consistent framework for granting asylum status to women who fear gender-based persecution can be developed in such policy.

<p>This paper sought to discuss the questions whether refugees have the right to return to their country of origin and whether their participation in the political life of that country may be used as a means to realise their right to return.</p>

This work offers an analysis of the legal regime for refugee protection in Africa, broadly construed as including both refugee law and human rights elements. The regime is addressed in two parts. Part One analyses the treaty regime, principally comprised of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The latter two regional instruments are examined in depth. This includes the first fulsome account of the 1969 Convention's drafting, and original analysis of the relationships of interpretation and the relationships of conflict that arise between the various treaties comprising the regional refugee protection framework. Significant attention in this regard is devoted to various aspects of the relationship between the international and the regional refugee treaties, and to the relationships between African refugee law on the one hand and African human rights law on the other. Part Two focuses on the institutional architecture supportive of the treaty framework addressed in Part One. The Organization of African Unity is addressed in a historical sense, and the contemporary roles of the African Union, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the various African human rights courts are canvassed. This account of the treaty framework, and the institutional architecture, for refugee protection on the continent is the first broad analytical account of the regional law of refugee protection in Africa.

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This thesis examines the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States from the perspective of Canada's obligations vis-a-vis asylum seekers under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Safe Third Country Agreement requires asylum seekers to lodge their refugee claims in the first country of arrival, as between Canada and the United States. Asylum seekers on the United States side of the border who are seeking to enter Canada for the purpose of claiming refugee status will be deflected to the United States to lodge their claims there. By deflecting asylum seekers in this manner, Canada effectively conscripts the United States to carry out its obligations under the Charter to furnish procedural and substantive protections to asylum seekers. This thesis examines certain features of the United States asylum system to which asylum seekers deflected under the Safe Third Country Agreement would be subjected, in order to determine whether, according to relevant Charter jurisprudence, deflection constitutes a deprivation of security of the person under section 7 of the Charter and whether such deprivation can be justified under section 1.

Kenya like many other countries offers asylum to refugees in fulfillment of the provisions of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention as well as the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. The country, with the assistance of UNHCR, confers refugee status on refugees who meet the qualifications stated by the two treaties as well as the Refugee Act 2006. Rwandan refugees make up part of the refugee community in Kenya. Though refugee status was created to enhance refugee protection in countries of asylum, it was never intended to last a lifetime. The United Nations envisioned an end to refugee status when the reasons for flight as well as persecution no longer continued to exist. The cessation clause marks the end of refugee status and thus facilitates re-establishment in the country of origin. This study endeavours to explore the impact that the cessation clause will have on Rwandan refugees residing in Kenya specifically based on the widespread concern about the human rights situation in Rwanda. There is accordingly a need to explore the nature of the cessation clause, the reasons for its creation and further the qualifications entailed in its application. After understanding what the cessation clause is, there is the need to understand the genesis of Rwandan refugees. This will enhance the understanding of why Rwandan refugees continue to reside in Kenya even after the end of the Rwandan conflict. The study will then expound on the reasons for and against invocation of a cessation clause to provide an analysis of whether the country is indeed safe for return. To enhance this analysis, the study will provide a comparative study with Liberia and Angola, which recently implemented cessation clauses. Through this comparative assessment, the study will seek to ascertain the viability of the concerns raised in reference to Rwanda and further speculate on the outcome of the cessation clause pertaining to the concerns raised. This study will therefore be able to advise on whether the cessation clause applies to Rwandan refugees and thereafter offer recommendations as to whether implementation in the Rwandan context is feasible. It will also endeavor to provide an analysis of whether there is a need to amend the invocation procedure with regard to cessation clauses in general. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2013.

No description available.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to determine what responsibilities democratic states have toward refugees. This problem is stated within the broader framework of the tension inherent in all democratic states: on the one hand, the sovereign right of a state over its territory and, on the other hand, the cosmopolitan or universal human rights norms upon which the state‟s constitution is founded. I argue that this tension is brought to the fore when refugees cross borders and enter into democratic territories, asking for protection and claiming their human rights. The sheer magnitude of the refugee crisis makes this an issue every state should address. My answer to the question of state responsibility is worked out in four phases. Firstly, I give a conceptual clarification of refugeehood, sovereignty, and cosmopolitanism. I show that neither absolute sovereignty (which implies closed borders) nor extreme cosmopolitanism (which implies no borders) is desirable. Secondly, I draw on Immanuel Kant‟s cosmopolitan theory as a possible solution. Kant proposes a world-federation of states in which right is realised on the civic, international, and cosmopolitan level. Kant also insists that every individual has the right to hospitality – a right which foreign states should recognise. Thirdly, I examine three prominent theories which could offer us a way to address the refugee crisis. I argue that the first two – multiculturalism and John Rawls‟ „law of peoples‟ – are not adequate responses to the refugee crisis, but that the third – Seyla Benhabib‟s cosmopolitan federalism – is more promising. Hospitality is the first responsibility states have toward refugees, and Benhabib proposes that it be institutionalised by (i) forming a federation of states founded on cosmopolitan principles, (ii) revising membership norms through the political process of democratic iterations, and (iii) extending some form of political membership to the state to refugees. Lastly, I justify the claim that political membership should be extended by referring to Hannah Arendt‟s argument that the ability to speak and act publicly is part of what it means to be human. If we deny refugees this ability, or if we deny them access to political processes, we deny their humanity. Benhabib proposes institutional measures to ensure that this does not happen, including allowing for political membership on sub-national, national, and supranational levels. Ultimately, I argue that democratic states have the responsibility to (i) allow entry to refugees, (ii) give refugees legal status and offer protection, and (ii) extend political membership to them on some level. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om te bepaal wat die verantwoordelikhede van demokratiese state teenoor vlugtelinge is. Ek plaas hierdie probleem binne die breër raamwerk van die onderliggende spanning in demokratiese state: die soewereine reg van ‟n staat oor sy grondgebied, aan die een kant, en die kosmopolitiese of universele menseregte-norme waarop die staat se grondwet berus, aan die ander kant. Ek argumenteer dat hierdie spanning na vore gebring word wanneer vlugtelinge, op soek na beskerming, grense oorsteek, demokratiese state binnetree en aanspraak maak op hulle regte. Ek bespreek die vraagstuk in vier stappe. Eerstens verduidelik ek die begrippe van vlugtelingskap, soewereiniteit en kosmopolitisme. Ek toon aan dat nóg absolute soewereiniteit (wat geslote grense impliseer), nóg ekstreme kosmopolitisme (wat geen grense impliseer) ‟n wenslike ideaal is. Tweedens kyk ek na Immanuel Kant se kosmopolitiese teorie vir ‟n moontlike oplossing. Kant stel voor dat state saamkom in ‟n wêreld-federasie, om sodoende reg te laat geskied op die plaaslike, internasionale, en kosmopolitiese vlak. Kant dring ook aan daarop dat elke individu die reg tot gasvryheid besit, ‟n reg wat ook deur ander state buiten die individu se staat van herkoms erken behoort te word. Derdens ondersoek ek drie prominente teorieë wat moontlike oplossings bied vir die vlugteling-krisis. Ek argumenteer dat die eerste twee – multikulturalisme en John Rawls se „law of peoples‟ – nie voldoende is om die vlugteling-krisis die hoof te bied nie. Die derde teorie, Seyla Benhabib se kosmopolitiese federalisme, blyk meer belowend te wees. Benhabib stel voor dat die staat se verantwoordelikheid om gasvryheid te toon geïnstitusionaliseer kan word deur (i)‟n federasie van state gegrond op kosmopolitiese beginsels te vorm, (ii) lidmaatskap-norme te hersien deur ‟n politieke proses genaamd demokratiese iterasie, en (iii) politieke lidmaatskap van een of ander aard aan vlugtelinge toe te ken. Laastens regverdig ek die aanspraak op lidmaatskap. Ek verwys na Hannah Arendt se argument dat die vermoë om in die publieke sfeer te praat en dade te kan uitvoer, deel uitmaak van wat dit beteken om ‟n mens te wees. As ons verhoed dat vlugtelinge hierdie twee vermoëns kan uitleef, ontken ons hulle menslikheid. Benhabib stel sekere institutionele maatreëls voor om dit te voorkom. Dit sluit politieke lidmaatskap op ‟n sub-nasionale, nasionale, en supra-nasionale vlak in. Uiteindelik argumenteer ek dat demokratiese state se verantwoordelikhede teenoor vlugtelinge uit die volgende bestaan: (i) toegang tot hierdie state se grondgebied, (ii) wetlike status en beskerming, en (iii) politieke lidmaatskap op een of ander vlak.