This dissertation consists of two theoretical papers on market-based environmental policy. The first paper exploits the correlation between the environmental performance of firms and their economic performance to show that financial markets can be used to help enforce environmental policy and to design more efficient regulations. The results indicate that when markets punish firms for not complying with environmental standards, environmental regulators can exploit this by setting stricter standards. In fact, it is possible for the regulator to use market-driven enforcement to reduce a firm’s emissions and monitoring of the firm simultaneously. The second paper provides a theoretical analysis of the nature of an optimal emissions tax when firms’ emissions are not perfectly observable. The purpose is to examine how the optimal tax is affected by enforcement costs and the market structure. We obtain the result that market imperfections and enforcement costs push the optimal tax lower than the marginal damage when the number of firms in the market is exogenous. However, when the number of firms is determined endogenously enforcement costs generate two countervailing effects on the optimal tax. The overall effect of enforcement costs on the optimal tax depends on the strength of direct relative to indirect effects when there is free entry and exit.

Two relatively new EPA policies encourage the inclusion of pollution prevention in regulatory enforcement settlements. The advantages to a firm include reduction or elimination of environmental problems at the source (thus decreasing reliance on end-of-pipe controls), enhanced prospects for future compliance, and a potential for a reduction in the assessed penalty. We discuss the factors that influence both EPA and firms to include pollution prevention in enforcement settlements, characterize the process in a few exemplary cases, and recommend ways to enhance and expand these activities. The research presented focused on case study analysis of 10 recent EPA-negotiated enforcement settlements that included chemical substitutions, process changes, or closed-loop recycling

交易所在證券市場中的監管乃是對上市公司監督的第一道防線，其紀律處分措施更是警示市場參與者的重要資訊。本文以中國深圳交易所誠信檔案中對上市公司監管的處罰與處分公告進行分析，實證結果發現交易所的紀律處分事件公告後，市場並不會有顯著的反應。再者，企業的監督治理機制能夠補捉與偵查到企業發生交易所紀律處分的可能性。最後，研究進一步發現交易所的紀律處分將有助於改善企業的財務報導品質。 / The first line of defense in firm supervision is a stock exchange regulatory enforcement, and its disciplinary sanctions convey important information to stock market participants. This study thus examines the causes and consequences of the disciplinary sanctions on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This study also uses disciplinary penalties found in credit record files to analyze the effect of stock exchange regulatory enforcement. The results indicate that the firms with disciplinary sanctions have no reaction on stock price. Additionally, this study finds that governance and supervision mechanisms can explain a.) occurrence of disciplinary sanctions in a given firm, and b.) probability of detecting stock exchange regulatory enforcement. Finally, further analysis suggests that disciplinary sanctions significantly improve firms’ financial reporting quality.