Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Texas at Arlington, 2009.

Public criticism of executive pay has increased significantly in recent years. Shareholders express concern that the level of pay to many executives does not match the level of increase in shareholder wealth. The government has even gotten involved in the issue by changing tax laws related to compensation and taking an interest in how compensation is recorded in financial statements. This study investigates the relationship between adoption of compensation components and improved firm performance. Specifically, performance and restricted stock plan adoptions are analyzed for nine industries. Variable change is analyzed pre and post adoption for adopters; these adopters are then compared to non-adopters and to non-adopting peers. Data were gathered from COMPUSTAT and analyzed using four statistical methods; ttests, analysis of variance, multivariate analysis of variance and analysis of means. The study covers 20 years of adoptions and involves 335 adopting firms. Results of the study indicate that, when solely analyzing adopters, adoptions of performance or restricted stock plans improve firm performance for some industries but not for others. The study further indicates for most industry groups, the improvement experienced by adopters is not as significant as the improvement realized by the non-adopting segment of the industry. Lastly, when adopters are compared to non-adopting peers the study finds peers perform as well as or better than adopters. These results imply adoption of restricted stock plans works as intended for some industries by improving firm performance but may not improve performance to the levels reached by the industry as a whole. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-92). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users. Address: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3024508.

This dissertation analyzes the effect of a stock market downturn on executive compensation plans which include stock option contracts. A model is developed to determine sufficient conditions for which the optimal compensation contract exhibits characteristics of a fixed salary plus stock option. If a publicly known shift in the distribution of firm value occurs after contracting and before the agent takes his action, then it can be shown to be in the principal's interest to renegotiate the agent's contract. The resulting contract is again a fixed salary plus stock options with lower exercise prices than in the original contract. It is assumed that the shift in the distribution of firm value is a low probability event that is not contracted upon. To determine whether or not it is optimal to contract on a low probability event the set of original contract and rengotiated contract is compared to a contract that is complete with respect to the event. Benefits to complete contracting exist if the agent commits to stay after information about the event becomes available. However, if the agent can leave at any time, the principal may prefer, initially, not to contract on low probability events and simply renegotiate the contract if a low probability event occurs. Renegotiation can take the form of lowering the exercise price of outstanding stock options or adding a layer of options with a lower exercise price than existing outstanding options. Nonparametric tests on stock option grants in 1985 through 1988 indicate that the size of grants in 1987 and 1988 is significantly larger than in 1985 and 1986. These results support the prediction that stock options outstanding in 1987 were renegotiated following the stock crash in October 1987. / Business, Sauder School of / Accounting, Division of / Graduate

Yes / Guided by academic literature, industry practice and policy recommendations, we analyze a wide range of option and restricted stock plans with exercise and vesting conditions that may be contingent on stock price performance. To assess the effectiveness of these plans at attracting and providing incentives to executives, we create compensation plans with fixed firm cost and executive valuation and calculate their expected total lifetime incentives. We show that performance vesting targets provide the least cost effective incentives, performance exercise targets provide the largest risk incentives, option plans are generally superior to restricted stock plans, and calendar vesting is only efficient up to a maximum of three years. Performance exercise targets can increase the expected total lifetime incentives provided by compensation plans, but in general, standard options with short vesting periods provide the most cost effective pay-for-performance incentives.

It is easy to evaluate unfairly on performance of companies with stock-based rewards in Taiwan, so we use Incentive-Intensity and Mix to evaluate relationship between companies and stock-based rewards. Results documents that employees of 534 companies issuing on TSE and OTC can get NT$ 17.1834 per NT$ 1,000 change in market value of equity over 2002-04 period, and the average ratio of profit sharing and stock ownership rewards to cash compensation is 0.6594. We suggest that the more stocks companies grant, the better performance companies have, especially for electronics industry. The ratio of stock-based rewards to total compensation of employees of companies issuing on TSE is higher than employees of companies issuing on OTC.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [132]-140). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [132]-140). Also available on the Internet.

Accountants agree that nonqualified stock options are compensatory. However, only a limited amount of remuneration cost is recognized on the date that such options are granted; frequently, there is no recognition. Hence, the income numbers reported by grantor firms may be over-stated owing to such lack of recognition. In this regard, the objective of this study is to estimate the value of compensation implied in grants of stock options, and to present evidence pertaining to the materiality of the impact these estimates have on income from continuing operations of selected firms. The Black and Scholes option pricing model was selected to estimate the value of a stock option. This formula provides a probabilistic point estimate of the market value of a call option. A restrictive set of assumptions underlie the derivation of this formula, but empirical studies indicate that alterations of the model to accommodate violations of these assumptions fail to impart greater predictive ability. The standard Black and Scholes formula was used to estimate the compensation implied in grants of stock options during 1978 for a non-random sample of 171 firms. These estimates were adjusted for amounts related to such grants that had already been recorded. Since most firms granted options having exercise prices equal to the market prices of the optioned shares, such adjustments were infrequent. The resulting incremental compensation estimate was divided by income from continuing operations, giving an option compensation index for each enterprise in the sample. Assuming 10 percent, 5 percent, and 3 percent materiality thresholds, income from continuing operations is materially reduced for 16 percent, 31 percent, and 47 percent of the sampled firms, respectively. A statistical analysis suggests systematic association between the magnitude of the compensation index and the classification of the industry in which the enterprise operates. Other statistical tests indicate that estimates of compensation implied in grants of stock options are material for large firms in the manufacturing and retail sectors, and for small firms in the manufacturing, retail, and banking-finance sectors. These statistical results must be interpreted circumspectly owing to the non-random sample. Nevertheless, this evidence supports a re-examination of the accounting methods for stock options.