The Eden Narrative (EN) pivots upon humans acquiring הדעת ,טובורע “the knowledge of good and bad/evil” (Gen 2:9, 17; 3:5, 22). This study will offer a revised interpretation of this enigmatic phrase. Although long debated, scholars remain in disagreement regarding a consensus interpretation of הדעת .טוב ורע Proposed interpretations of this phrase include: Mental Faculty of Discrimination (Basic and Moral); Wisdom; Omniscience; Cultural Knowledge; Sexual Knowledge; Maturity; Moral Discernment; Moral Autonomy; and Magic (amongst others).The majority of interpreters agree that because a phrase akin to הדעת טוב ורע (Gen 2:9, 17) only appears in four passages in the EN (Gen 2:9, 17; 3:5, 22), one must turn to other passages in the HB to supply the data needed to interpret this phrase. To which passages anyone interpreter turns varies greatly upon the methodology and interpretation of each interpreter. For example, to confirm the interpretation of wisdom, interpreters turn to the Wisdom Literature of the HB. Some interpreters base their interpretation of הדעת טוב ורע first upon other texts in the HB, as opposed to themes and motifs in the EN. I will begin my exegetical work within the EN before turning to other texts in the HB. That being said, seven of the most oftcited passages from the HB, for any one interpretation of הדעת טובורע in the history of research, come from Genesis, Deuteronomy, and the books of the DtrH, three of which come from the Throne Succession Narrative (TSN; 2 Sam 9–20 & 1 Kgs 1–2). In light of the disagreement of interpretation and varied methodological approaches within the history of research, I contend that there are three parameters that must be employed by any interpreter who wishes to move forward. The first parameter requires that an interpretation must classify הדעת טובורע as divine knowledge; a non-human knowledge that is possessed by YHWH and the divine beings of Gen 3:5 and 3:22. The second parameter requires that an interpretation must show how the Hebrew lexemes טוב and רעע function when YHWH is the subject or causation of these extremes in the EN and its surrounding context (e.g., Gen 1:4; 3:14–19, inferred; 4:7; 6:5). This second parameter is practically missing from the history of research, and it will be my primary contribution to this discussion. The third parameter requires that an interpretation reasonably demonstrate why it is that הדעת טובורע is forbidden on pain of death (Gen 2:16–17) and why human acquisition of הדעת טובורע serves as a threat to YHWH (Gen 3:22–23). None of the interpretations proposed to the present adhere to all three of these parameters. Therefore, I propose that a revised interpretation of this expression in the EN should employ a methodology that adheres to the aforementioned boundaries, which I will accomplish in this study. Beginning with the EN and its surrounding context of Gen 1–11, I will show that certain permutations of טוב and ,רעע when resulting from the will and/or discrimination of YHWH, are a reference to YHWH's blessing (gift/reward) and curse (punishment). In this way, I suggest that הדעת ,טוב ורע in the EN, is best interpreted as the knowledge for administering reward and punishment (retribution). Prior to humans acquiring הדעת טובורע (i.e., Gen 3:6), this knowledge belonged only to YHWH and the divine beings; they alone were able to distribute reward and punishment. There are not enough occurrences of טוב and רעע within the EN, when YHWH is the subject or cause of these extremes, to confirm this interpretation. Some scholars (e.g., Otto, Lohfink, Mettinger) suggest that there are strong resonances between the EN, Deuteronomy, and the DtrH. The divine test of Gen 2:16–17 and the divine curse of Gen 3:14–19 are evidence of these themes and theology. In light of these shared motifs, I suggest that certain permutations of טוב and רעע in the latter (DtrH) can shed new light upon the former (EN). I shall therefore analyse key occurrences of good and evil in Genesis and the DtrH. As we shall see, this data confirms my suggested interpretation of the 'knowledge of good and evil' in the EN as the knowledge that YHWH and the divine beings have to reward and to punish. In other words, what is forbidden to humans in the EN is the divine knowledge for administering retribution. In this way, I will show how certain permutations of טוב and רעע (when YHWH is the subject or the cause), in these narrative texts of Genesis and the DtrH, form a textual reference to YHWH's reward (blessing) and punishment (curse), which together serve as his tools for establishing a particular political and social order in the body politic (e.g., Josh 23:15). As will also be demonstrated, humans likewise enforce a particular social and political order in their use of טוב ורע in Genesis and the DtrH (e.g., 1 Sam 24–25), which confirms human acquisition of הדעת ,טוב ורע at least within the framework of this discussion and topic. Finally, I will apply this analysis of טוב and רעע to the TSN, showing how both humans and YHWH dispense reward and punishment ( טוב ;ורע retribution) for the establishment of order in the body politic. As a result of this analysis of the data in the EN, Genesis, and the DtrH, I submit that the most reasonable interpretation for the phrase, הדעת ,טובורע in the EN, is, the knowledge for administering reward and punishment; a divine knowledge that enables humans to become 'judges' and actively employ retribution in human society, similar to YHWH in the HB and for the purpose of sustaining a particular moral and political order in the social sphere. Thus the Eden Narrative tells a story of how humans partly attain divinity, becoming like YHWH and the divine beings (Gen 3:5; 3:22; Ps 82) in having acquired the forbidden divine knowledge of ultimate power (reward and punishment); albeit, through a transgressive act of moral autonomy.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-105).

International criminal law lacks a coherent theory suitable for its own context. This lacuna has left the International Criminal Court (ICC) – the most prominent global penal institution - without clear theoretical premise(s) to guide prosecution and punishment. In its current incarnation, international criminal draws on Western liberal modalities founded on dominant domestic penal rationales of retribution and deterrence. However, these principles appear incongruous to the crimes the ICC prosecutes. The theoretical rationales of ICC have barely been interrogated against an extant case. In 2012, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo became the first defendant to be convicted and jailed by the ICC for the conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers. The use of child combatants for purposes of war is a pernicious global problem outlawed in international criminal law. However, of the crimes designated as ‘egregious,’ it has historically been under-enforced and inadequately articulated as a mass crime, and allocated lesser gravity. The seminal case of Lubanga provides us with a propitious opportunity, not only to locate child soldiering, but also inquire into the theoretical underpinnings of the ICC with regards to mass crime. Mass crimes are distinct from ordinary crimes. International courts charged with adjudicating them face constraints and can only prosecute a few of the suspected perpetrators. The overarching theoretical and analytic framework for this thesis is premised on the notion that international criminal law needs a plausible theory or rationale suitable for its context and crimes it prosecutes. It is important for the ICC to premise its work on a realistic rationale for it to be purposive. A more logical analysis of international penality would draw on the conceptual underpinnings of the whole project of international law and specific features of the ICC. A good starting point is to note that international criminal justice is largely symbolic. A more plausible penal rationale would consider the inhibitions the ICC faces and the role it can still perform with regards to mass crime. The ICC symbolises contemporary standards of an ‘international community.’ It is this concept from which we can extrapolate viable rationales for ICC penology. How do the trial, conviction and punishment of Lubanga for the ‘mass crime’ of child soldiering serve the collectivist ethos of international law and society? The project that follows proposes a penal rationale that accounts for the ICC’s sui generis character, the nature of crimes it adjudicates and what the court can realistically achieve. The ultimate value of international criminal law may rest not in its functions of retribution or deterrence, but in its role in identity construction, in particular in constructing a cosmopolitan community identity. The overall argument for the thesis is that while retribution and deterrence are valid, the most plausible rationale for ICC penality is the expressive function of law (expressivism). The few cases of mass crime the ICC can prosecute can achieve primarily more realistic aims of expression of global or ‘cosmopolitan’ norms, norm internalisation and the reinforcement of collectivism international law and society. Lubanga provides an illustrative exemplar for this argument.

Recent research has posited that retributiveness is an individual level disposition that can help us understand foreign policy preferences (e.g. Liberman 2006, Liberman 2007, Liberman in press, Stein n.d.). However, previous research is limited in two related respects. First, previous research relies on correlational data, blunting our ability to make clear causal inferences. Also, retributiveness is not made theoretically distinct from general hawkishness. In this paper, I present results from two experiments to refine our understanding of how retributiveness can affect support for use of the military. In the first experiment, I examine how retributiveness affects support for greater military commitment across a number of potential missions. In the second experiment, I examine how retributiveness interacts with different rhetorical justifications for military endeavors (e.g. punishing transgressors versus eliminating a foreign policy threat).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Classics, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 266-273).

Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 123-127).

Thesis advisor: Susan M. Shell / In On the right to punish and grant clemency, Immanuel Kant attempts to resolve a potential paradox in social contract theory. The government is the political authority tasked with execution of the rule of law. On the one hand, the execution of the rule of law is consensual and meant to serve the individual citizen. On the other hand, the execution of the rule of law requires punishment (a nonconsensual action). A consensual condition requires a nonconsensual component. This thesis analyzes Kant’s attempt to resolve this issue through his use of a retributivist framework of punishment. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Retribution Judiciary of Extraordinary People's Courts in the Central Bohemia Goal of this Dissertation is to complement up-to-date literature resources about Retribution with a statistical analysis of two Extraordinary People's Courts in Mladá Boleslav and Kutná Hora, to answer defined research questions, and to develop a novel methodology for assembling name lists of charged individuals, which can serve in the future as a supporting tool for an easier formation of new name lists coming from other Extraordinary People's Courts. Another goal was to determine an influence of a so-called layman element on the court's decisions. Files in eponymous collections deposited in Regional Archive in Prague served as a main source of data. A brief probe into Extraordinary People's Court in Prague is also included in this work. Studies of the files showed that 487 men and 124 women were charged by the Extraordinary People's Court in Mladá Boleslav. Therefore, one fifth of charged individuals were women. Statistical analysis also showed that an average woman had a bigger chance of being acquitted; men were judged more strictly. This Court prosecuted mainly people of Czech nationality. Nationality also had an influence on a length of a sentence, which was almost double among Germans. Whistle-blowing was the most...

Retributive attitudes are deeply held and widespread in the general population and most legal systems incorporate retributive elements. It is probably also the dominant theory of punishment among contemporary philosophers of criminal justice. However, retributivism relies on conceptions of free will and responsibility that have, for millennia, fundamentally divided those who have thought seriously about the subject. Our legal system upholds the principle that the responsibility of the offender has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, before the accused can be punished. In view of the intractable doubts surrounding the soundness of retributivism’s very conception of responsibility, my thesis argues that it is ethically dubious to punish individuals for solely retributive reasons. Instead, my thesis proposes that a person should only be punished if the main theories of punishment agree that punishing that person is appropriate – I call this ‘the convergence requirement’. This approach, I argue, is in accordance with the considerations underlying the beyond reasonable doubt standard. In addition to considering the question of ‘whom to punish’ my thesis considers what methods of responding to criminal behaviour are acceptable. In particular, it attempts to explain, without appealing to the contested notions of free will or retributive desert, what is problematic about ‘manipulative’ methods of dealing with criminal offenders (focussing in particular on the possibility of modifying their behaviour through neurological interventions). The final part of this thesis also gives an overview of some of the practical implications for Scots criminal law of taking doubts about free will and retributivism seriously. Given the severe treatment that offenders undergo within the Scottish penal system (e.g. deprivation of liberty, stigma) and the high rate of recidivism, it is important to consider whether our current penal practices are justified, what alternatives are available and what goals and values should guide attempts at reforming the system.

Remorse can be a powerful source of mitigation at sentencing. However, there is a lack of formal justification for this practice and a paucity of theoretical literature engaging with this issue. Addressing this gap, this thesis offers a comprehensive justification for why an offender’s remorse should mitigate the punishment he receives. It begins by discussing the emotion of remorse – its nature and value. With reference to broadly-retributive theories of punishment, it then considers various arguments that could be offered to justify the mitigating effect of remorse on the offender’s sentence. It rejects two arguments: either remorse constitutes some of the offender’s deserved punishment or remorse reduces the seriousness of the offence. Instead, it develops a justification inspired by philosophical work distinguishing blameworthiness and blaming. The thesis argues that, in the context of sentencing, a broadly-conceived dialogical model of censure is the most legitimate. Remorse, as the offender’s ideal input into the dialogue about the offence, modifies the subsequent censure required. If censure seeks a response, and this response is already forthcoming, to nonetheless continue to seek this response as if it were absent devalues the censure. Von Hirsch and Ashworth’s assertions that censure appeals to the offender as a rational moral agent, and their adherence to certain quasiretributive values, are shown to provide further support for these arguments. If the deserved censure is mitigated, then so is the corresponding punishment communicating this censure. The thesis next explores how this justification for mitigation compares with ‘mercy’ justifications, arguing that the justification offered in this thesis operates more internally to deserved censure, and is more principled, so is preferable on these grounds. In conclusion, the thesis considers the implications of its arguments for sentencing practice and whether it is a concern that they are valid only within ‘censure’ theories of punishment.