This thesis is about potentiality theory and the right to life. It is an attempt to distil the potentiality position into its strongest incarnation in order to see what it has to offer. In Chapter I various attempts to discredit potentiality theory are examined. Particular emphasis is placed on Michael Tooley's defense of abortion and infanticide and his critique of potentiality theory. It is concluded that a well articulated potentiality position need not lead to any obvious absurdity, and can resist the charge of philosophical arbitrariness. Thus, the potentiality position is a legitimate contender in the right to life dispute. In Chapter II, we ask the question whether the potential to become a person is sufficient for the right to life, or is actual personhood necessary? Various attempted resolutions are considered and rejected. It is concluded that the issue is still quite debateable but that some support for the potentiality position can be found in a Rawls-type validation procedure. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Both security and human rights are important to all within the civilized world. Yet there are some serious tensions between the two political norms. For instance, it may not be easy for a state or the international community to reconcile well intentioned acts to maintain security and to preserve human rights. In the recent past, such a difficulty has been played out not only in the events, but also in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The result of the attacks, culminating in the massive loss of lives and property, has been in the adoption of various international treaties and domestic laws that have swiftly been enacted and deployed to counter terrorism, and the development of a concept of a state of “urgency” that appears to shadow the obligation to protect fundamental human rights, particularly the right to life under international law. This thesis thus focuses on the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights, particularly, the right to life with the subsequent declaration of the “war on terror” by the United States. The work targets the debate between security and human rights in the light of terrorism post 9/11, highlights the impact of choosing one ideal over another, and eventually rationing out a balance that would serve as a threshold for upholding standards in both security and human rights in the face of terrorism threats. Essentially, however, this thesis is hinged on the argument that to allow the ideal of security which apparently appears advantageous to a “continuing state of urgency” to overwhelmingly influence the implementation of counter-terrorism measures while paying no attention to the fundamental right to life would constitute a paradox in combating terrorism. I posit that the result of the above exercise, if chosen, implies more tragic consequences when implemented than the singular acts of terrorism in themselves. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2011-10-03 13:40:21.534

Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2008. / Includes vita. Department of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 48-51).

There is only passing reference made to human rights law in United Kingdom armed forces doctrine and military publications. Moreover, there is no reference made to the United Kingdom's right to life obligations in respect of those affected by the actions of the state's armed forces, or armed forces personnel themselves, during international and non-international armed conflict. As a consequence, no formal mechanism exists to ensure that the United Kingdom can comply with its right to life obligations pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, advisory opinions and a judgment of the International Court of Justice, and views of numerous United Nations human rights bodies and rapporteurs would appear to indicate that human rights law can and does, however, apply during armed conflict. The exact nature of how human rights law, and the right to life specifically, apply during armed conflict and the obligations thus created, remain largely unresolved and generate considerable debate. This study therefore aims to consider both the extent to which the United Kingdom has right to life obligations during international and non-international armed conflict and, on the basis of current doctrine and procedures, how far the state complies with such obligations. Implicit in this analysis is a determination of what positive and negative right to life obligations are created by the ECHR and ICCPR, the extent to which these obligations have extraterritorial effect during armed conflict, how these obligations interact with the United Kingdom's obligations pursuant to international humanitarian law, and the effect of a derogation from the ECHR during armed conflict. This study concludes that the United Kingdom has both substantive and procedural right to life obligations during armed conflict, albeit partially modified by reference to international humanitarian law. Adhering to current United Kingdom military doctrine and procedures does not, however, always ensure full compliance with these obligations.

Magister Legum - LLM / There has been an ongoing debate on the abolishment of the death penalty in Zimbabwe. The public, non-governmental organisations and human rights activists need clarity as to the effectiveness, justification and purpose, if any, of the retention of the death sentence in Zimbabwe. Therefore, this paper shall give an insight on whether or not the decision to retain the death penalty in Zimbabwe is line with the country’s international and regional mandate of protecting and promoting human rights.

This dissertation deals with the moral permissibility of abortion. It is argued that abortion is morally justifiable when the pregnancy is a result of rape (but only during the first trimester of pregnancy), when the pregnancy threatens the woman's life or long-term health, or when tests indicate to a high degree of scientific certainty that the foetus will be abnormal to such an extent, so as never to be capable of acquiring any human characteristics other than basic biological properties. Potential is adopted as a suitable criterion by which a being acquires a serious right to life. Rationality is examined closely, but shown to be inadequate since it leads to inconsistencies and does not accord with our general belief and sentiments. It is argued that all living beings have some right to life, but that sentient beings have more moral standing than nonsentient ones. Potential is argued to be the suitable comparison criterion when comparing beings of different species, and sentience when comparing beings of the same species. The dissertation is rights-oriented and reasons are given why this approach was adopted in favour of a virtue-oriented one. It is argued that a rights-oriented approach is more precise. / Philosophy, Practical and Systemic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

University of Macau / Faculty of Law

This dissertation deals with the moral permissibility of abortion. It is argued that abortion is morally justifiable when the pregnancy is a result of rape (but only during the first trimester of pregnancy), when the pregnancy threatens the woman's life or long-term health, or when tests indicate to a high degree of scientific certainty that the foetus will be abnormal to such an extent, so as never to be capable of acquiring any human characteristics other than basic biological properties. Potential is adopted as a suitable criterion by which a being acquires a serious right to life. Rationality is examined closely, but shown to be inadequate since it leads to inconsistencies and does not accord with our general belief and sentiments. It is argued that all living beings have some right to life, but that sentient beings have more moral standing than nonsentient ones. Potential is argued to be the suitable comparison criterion when comparing beings of different species, and sentience when comparing beings of the same species. The dissertation is rights-oriented and reasons are given why this approach was adopted in favour of a virtue-oriented one. It is argued that a rights-oriented approach is more precise. / Philosophy, Practical and Systemic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

Resumé The right to life and the capital punishment Death penalty or capital punishment, or extreme penalty, is a punishment that assumes killing (or execution) of condemned person for a criminal offence provided it is possible to impose this sentence in accordance with the criminal law in force. At former times these crimes were called capital or hanging crimes. With regard to its definitiveness (impossibility of any redress after its execution) it is very controversial punishment. Its supporters argue that it is the sole just sentence for homicide and other felonies, that it excludes recurrence and it has significant deterrent (preventive) effects. On the other hand, the opponents allege not only moral arguments concerning the right of each person to life but they also mention the danger of judicial error which is incorrigible in this case. Furthermore, the objectors point out that the death sentence is not so intimidating. In addition, the costs of the execution use to be more expensive than life imprisonment. Since 1970s the capital punishment has been gradually cancelled in the majority of European and South American countries. Some states of the USA and the People's Republic of China are among countries that still make practise of the death penalty. I deal with the capital sentence in the first part...

A demand for requested death in the human society seems to be increasing nowadays. In some countries, there has been such an institue legitimized. However, this demand is not usually accepted by the branches of state power. The main argument against the right for assisted life ending is often appointed as, what is so called, right for life. These are the appointments in international and national documents, which gurantee opportunity of human beeings' lives, as a unique organism. This appointment first appears in Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is then used in every other document dealing with basic human rights. Because of some sort of unclear thoughts, when deeper analysing right for life, it is possible to contest and disagree with an interpretation of above mentioned institute and its place of shield against positive efforts of setting the human's right of a decision, how and when to end the life. The problem seems to lie right in the creation of such an institue - which interpretation have had people, who have been creating original document, on their minds? Another unclear thoughts seem to appear in the effort of setting a subject and the content of the mentioned right. The main point is, if the right-for-lifeholder is a human after or before the birth and if before, when...