This is a study of the development of post-war Iraq after the downfall of former President Saddam Hussein in 2003. The thesis examines the actions and consequences of the coalition led by the United States to facilitate the re-construction of Iraq as a democratic nation-state. The thesis examines the geo-political, economic and ideological motivations behind the US actions in Iraq in order to explain why the coalition plans to reconstruct the country along the lines of a democratic nation-state have failed so profoundly. The thesis develops a typology of policies that lead to successful nation-state building in post-authoritarian and post-conflict scenarios and applies this typology to the actual policies implemented by the US-led coalition after the fall of Saddam in 2003. The thesis illustrates that many of the policies implemented by the coalition undermined successful nation-state building. These policies failed to ensure the security and stability of Iraq after the invasion and thereby hampered economic development. Rather than re-defining Iraqi nationhood in democratic terms, the implemented policies enshrined ethno-sectarian divisions in the political landscape and in the social fabric of Iraq. The new Iraqi state lacked a stable constitutional and legal foundation and a functioning judiciary to ensure the rule of law. Finally, the political order established by the US-led coalition is marred by partisan conflicts and Kurdish independence tendencies which weaken the central government and the operation of its various departments and further threaten the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state. The thesis argues - based on evidence gathered through a nation-wide survey, in-depth interviews with influential stakeholders in the public sectors and other material - that Iraq after 2003 has become a failed state.

Cette thèse examine la « politique arabe » de la Turquie sous le règne du parti de la Justice et du Développement (AKP). Alors que pendant la majeure partie du XXème siècle la Turquie était désengagée du Moyen-Orient, les années 2000 voient une implication croissante d’Ankara dans son environnement régional arabe. Ainsi, cette thèse analyse le changement d’orientation qui a eu lieu en Turquie en matière de politique étrangère et de diplomatie à l’égard du Moyen-Orient. L’argument principal est que l’ouverture de la Turquie sur son environnement moyen-oriental est liée au phénomène de l’émergence : étant une puissance moyenne émergente en quête de statut, la Turquie de l’AKP trouve en le Moyen-Orient un champ de manœuvre indispensable pour son affirmation à l’échelle internationale. Nous avons examiné les outils et méthodes employés par la puissance moyenne émergente pour s’ériger en puissance régionale de son hinterland moyen-oriental, en particulier : le nouveau discours civilisationnel employé par l’élite au pouvoir, l’invention de «niches diplomatiques » comme la médiation et la diplomatie de la paix, le soft power comme outil de conquête des cœurs et des esprits, et la tentative de règlement de la question kurde. Toutefois, nous avons démontré que malgré le caractère «novateur » de ces instruments, le statut de la Turquie au Moyen-Orient reste fragile : d’une part, l’instabilité qui caractérise la région menace les acquis et les intérêts d’Ankara ; d’autre part, la Turquie souffre d’un « overachievement » ou d’un décalage entre ses ambitions de puissance et ses capacités et ressources réelles. Plus généralement, l’ « émergence» turque se heurte aux blocages du système international : la structure « oligarchique » de celui-ci empêche l’intégration des puissances moyennes en quête de statut et limite leur capacité d’influence dans le jeu de gouvernance mondiale. / This thesis examines the "Arab policy" of Turkey under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (JDP). While for most of the 20th century Turkey was disengaged from the Middle East, the beginning of the 21st century witnessed a growing involvement of Ankara in its Arab regional environment. Thus, this thesis analyzes the shift that took place in Turkey's foreign policy and diplomacy towards the Middle East. The main argument is that Turkey’s embrace of its Middle Eastern environment is linked to the phenomenon of “rising powers”: being a rising middle power in quest for status, Turkey has found in the Middle East a field maneuver necessary for its assertion on the international stage. The thesis examines the tools and methods used by Turkey to emerge as a regional power in its Middle Eastern hinterland, in particular: the use of a new civilizational discourse by the ruling elite, the recourse to "niche diplomacy" such as mediation and peace diplomacy, the use of soft power to win hearts and minds, and the attempts to solve the Kurdish question. However, it shows that despite the "innovative" character of these instruments, the status of Turkey in the Middle East remains fragile: on the one hand, the instability that characterizes the region jeopardizes the achievements and interests of Ankara; on the other hand, Turkey suffers from an "overachievement" or a gap between its ambitions and its power capabilities and real resources. More generally, Turkey’s quest for status is undermined by the structure of the international system: the "oligarchic" nature of the latter prevents the integration of middle powers and limits their capacity to play an effective role in global governance.