The word "faith" is probably one of the most ambiguous words in the English language. It is used in different ways by different people at any given time to mean any number of feelings, actions or emotions. For some, faith is synonymous with religion, for others it represents belief and yet others use it to mean loyalty. Faith must have a meaning that is distinctly its own. Yet what is that meaning? Is there a way of defining faith that is understandable to all people? This paper strives to provide such a definition. In order to achieve this goal, the conceptions of faith as they are explained separately by Paul Tillich, John Hick and Robert Solomon are analyzed and combined with one another in order to formulate a universally applicable working definition of "faith". This paper seeks to provide readers with an understanding of what faith is, what it is not and how it functions in their lives and the lives of their fellow man. This is done in the hope of bringing about a recognition that faith is an active process employed by -all--people regardless of what their faith is directed toward. With this definition of "faith'', perhaps new and clearer lines of communication between the secular and spiritual communities can be opened.

Although philosopher Robert Solomon and rhetorician Kenneth Burke wrote in isolation from one another, they discuss similar concepts and ideas. Since its introduction in Burke's A Rhetoric of Motives, identification has always been important to rhetorical theory, and recent studies in emotion, such as Solomon's, provide new insight into modes of identification—that human beings can identify with one another on an emotional level. This paper places Solomon and Burke in conversation with one another, arguing that both terministic screens and emotions are ways of seeing, acting, engaging, and judging. Hence, terministic screens and emotions affect ethos, or character, both in a specific moment and over periods of time as they are cultivated through habit. Because emotions influence ethos, it is important for a speaker to cultivate the right emotions at the right time—Solomon's notion of emotional integrity. Emotional integrity facilitates Burkean identification between speaker and audience because it enables human beings to see the other as synecdochically related to themselves, a part of the whole. Hence, this paper ultimately argues that a speaker will improve his or her ethos by cultivating emotional integrity.

There have always been rogues who dared to go against the traditional "intellectual" writing style of science and academia, a style that seems bent on transcending the "merely personal." Those who take this risk are embracing the rhetorical tradition of pathos, one that goes as far back as Aristotle. Current academic trends support a genre devoid of pathos and lacking true ethos—a deviation from classic rhetoric, and one that supports the Cartesian split of mind-body dualism. Neurological studies done by Antonio Damasio and others suggest that a holistic view is a more accurate picture of how a human soul functions. Philosophy and psychology support this same perspective, proving that the opposite of logic is not emotion: the opposite of logic is illogic. By the same token, there are two types of emotion: reasonable emotion and unreasonable emotion, one good, the other bad. There are dangers when emotion is left on its own, but there are equal dangers when logic is left on its own; so it is crucial that the two be united. Changing the academic super-genre and inviting pathos back will require writers to pursue, to an extent, divergent thinking.