The text investigates the history of the Canterbury Museum’s collection of Japanese ukiyo-e prints and paintings focusing mainly on four major contributors: Sir Joseph Kinsey (1852-1936), Frances May Bailey (c.1891-1967), Greggory Kane (1921-1978) and Ronald J Scarlett (1911-2002). The images are set in the context of the ‘floating world’ (ukiyo). The introduction examines the early directors of the Museum and how their interests and policies influenced the collections. The method of grading the prints and the process by which the data base was formed are explained. Chapter One examines the way New Zealand was influenced by a growing interest in Japan during the early twentieth century, the effects of Japanese activity in the Pacific and the way the collectors responded. It also looks at the local cultural context in which the collectors acquired and exhibited their works. Exhibitions of Japanese and Chinese art occurred in 1935 and 1952 in Christchurch; such events widened the knowledge and aesthetic appreciation of Asian art. Chapter Two considers the subjects, scope, and range of ukiyo-e art and the artists represented in the Museum’s collection. It looks at the condition of the images, how they were made, the formats used, and whether they were printed from original or recut blocks. Japanese Government censorship and works of particular interest are discussed. Comparisons are made with the Dunedin Public Art Gallery’s and Auckland Art Gallery’s collections. Works by major artists including Hiroshige (1797-1858), Hokusai (1760-1849), Eizan (1787-1867), Eishi (1756-1829), Chikanobu (1838-1912), Toyokuni I (1769-1825), Kunisada (1786-1864) and Kuniyoshi (1798-1861) are evaluated. By reconstructing the collections of Japanese art in the Museum, the chapter reveals the collectors’ diverse interests and individual preferences. The research presented in this discussion stems from an extensive study of the 427 images in the collection and is supported by an illustrated database of all the Museum’s ukiyo-e works.

Minorities have gained more civil rights with the cooperation of both major political parties in the United States, yet the actions of the Republican Party are often conflated with racism. This is partially the result of clashes in ideological visions, which explain the different political positions of partisans. However, during his 1980 run for the White House, a concerted effort was made to tie Ronald Reagan to racism, as he was accused of pandering to white Southerners. Therefore, this thesis also focuses on “Southern strategies” used by both the Republican and Democratic parties to exploit race, which have spilled into the new millennium.

To the extent that Tolkien's fantasy meets his own criteria for faL. ie as the "eucatastrophic " tale which points toward "Evangelium," the eschaton when God's plan in creation will be fulfilled and the effects of the fall overcome, Tolkien may be described as a gospel writer. That he intended his work to be read as "gospel," "the good news of the Kingdom of God," is suggested by its allusions to biblical and classical mythology, its linear view of history, its presentation as a compilation of received tradition. collected and translated by many hands from a wide variety of sources, by the location of Middle Earth in the distant past of our own world and by the author's attempt to create a world which comforms to familiar patterns of evolution. Less successful is his effort to provide his tale with a consistent Christian point of view. / Dans la mesure, cette oeuvre d'imagination repond aux crit6res de f6erie de Tolkien en tant que conte "eucatastrophic" qui montre le chemin vers "I'Evangelium", cette eschatalogie qui se situe au moment o0 la volontê de Dieu est accomplie et les effets de la chute sont surmontes, Tolkien peut etre. considers comme un auteur biblique. Le fait qu'il est voulu que son oeuvre soit lue en tant qu'"&angile", "la bonne nouvelle du Royaunie de Dieu" est suggêre par diffèrentes choses: les allusions faites a la mythologie biblique et classique, la vision linêaire de l'histoire, la presentation du texte en tant que compilation d'une tradition provenant de sources diverses, transmise, recueillie et traduite par diffèrentes personnes, la situation geographique dans "Middle earth"(l'empire du Milieu) dans un passé lointain, le fait que l'auteur ait essay6 de crêer un monde conforme au processus connu de l'êvolution. 10anmoins l'auteur n'a pas rêussi dans ce conte a maintenir un point de vue chrêtien. fr

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves: [108]-116)

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, August 2008.

Thesis (M.A.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Digital Rhetoric & Professional Writing, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Aug. 4, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 129-130). Also issued in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1993. / Also available in print.

Diss.--Universität Stuttgart, 1990. / Contient de nombreuses citations, traduites en allemand. Bibliogr. p. 251-262.

Estudamos dois argumentos de Ronald Dworkin contra a tese de que o direito é exclusivamente determinado por fatos sociais. De acordo com o primeiro, positivistas devem concluir que, se dois advogados estiverem usando diferentes critérios factuais para decidir se uma proposição de direito é verdadeira ou falsa, então cada um quer dizer algo distinto do que diz o outro quando afirma o que é o direito – i.e., não há desacordo genuíno entre os dois, pois estão falando de coisas diferentes. O segundo ataca uma visão reducionista da relação entre a tese das fontes e a tese da indeterminação do direito: se uma proposição jurídica x é verdadeira num sistema jurídico se, e somente se, corresponde a uma ‘fonte’, e se isso também vale para a negação de x, então é simples demonstrar que a ausência de uma fonte para x equivale a uma fonte para não-x - logo, o sistema é ou completo, ou inconsistente. As duas conclusões seriam inaceitáveis; portanto, o positivismo deveria ser abandonado em favor de uma concepção interpretativista do direito. Uma possível escapatória a esses argumentos é admitir uma separação o direito propriamente dito – um sistema de normas, para o qual as teses das fontes e da indeterminação são necessariamente verdadeiras – e o raciocínio jurídico, o qual é compatível com desacordos teóricos e a busca da resposta moralmente correta. Contudo, para Dworkin, o debate sobre o conceito de direito então se torna irrelevante (pois sua função era prática: investigar como os juízes devem decidir) e circular, já que os discordantes já assumem, ab ovo, uma certa relação entre direito e moral. Ao final, a disputa precisa ser decidida em função de qual a melhor filosofia prática. / We’ll study two arguments against the thesis that law is exclusively determined by social facts. According to the first, positivists must conclude that, if two lawyers use different factual criteria to decide if a legal proposition is true or false, then each means something distinct from the other when he says what is the law – i.e., there’s no genuine disagreement between them both, because they’re talking past each other. The second one attacks a reductionist view of the relationship between the source thesis and the indetermination thesis: if a legal proposition x is true in a legal system if, and only if, it corresponds to a source, and if it applies to x’s denial also, then it’s simple to show that the absence of a source for x is equivalent to a source for non-x – so, the system is either complete or inconsistent. The conclusion of both arguments is inacceptable; therefor, positivism must be abandoned in favor of an interpretive conception of law. One possible way out to these arguments is to admit a separation between law as properly understood – a system of norms, to which source and indetermination theses are necessarily true – and legal reasoning, which is compatible with theoretical disagreements and the search for a moral right answer. However, for Dworkin, the debate over the concept of law then becomes irrelevant (since its function was practical: to inquire over how judges should decide) and circular, since the debaters assume, ab ovo, some relationship between law and morality. In the end, the dispute has to be decided according with the best practical philosophy.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, Pós-Graduação Stricto Sensu em Direito, 2016. / Submitted by Albânia Cézar de Melo (albania@bce.unb.br) on 2016-06-13T13:45:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AnaLuizaNunezRamalho.pdf: 1263882 bytes, checksum: 27e49ecae4f9781ba1137a2520a2269f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Raquel Viana(raquelviana@bce.unb.br) on 2016-06-15T21:54:16Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AnaLuizaNunezRamalho.pdf: 1263882 bytes, checksum: 27e49ecae4f9781ba1137a2520a2269f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-15T21:54:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AnaLuizaNunezRamalho.pdf: 1263882 bytes, checksum: 27e49ecae4f9781ba1137a2520a2269f (MD5) / O Estado Democrático de Direito é exigência da própria sociedade democrática moderna, que construiu, para si, uma comunidade de princípios, orientada pelo reinado da igualdade. Não obstante o resquício insistente do positivismo jurídico, o atual paradigma moderno, insuflado pelo excesso do Estado Social, aprendeu a lição herdada pelo mito da perfeição científica, pela crença no método heurístico, incapaz de regular a indeterminação imanente ao Direito. Com a virada principiológica, ganham destaque dois filósofos do Direito contemporâneo: Robert Alexy e Ronald Dworkin. A partir da leitura que cada um deles realiza acerca das regras e dos princípios e do lugar que ocupam os direitos fundamentais no cenário jurídico, de suas possibilidades de restrição e da adoção de uma teoria interna ou externa, encontram-se distinções cruciais que convidam a caminhos distintos. Por um lado, percebe-se, em Alexy, o apego à aplicação de um direito metodológico, amparado na perquirição de fórmulas matemáticas para a garantia de certezas. A perspectiva axiológica dos direitos alexiana e o uso da técnica da ponderação e da máxima da proporcionalidade acabam por tratar o Direito como ordem concreta de valores passíveis de gradação, realizáveis, na maior medida do possível. Por outro lado, a perspectiva deontológica dos direitos, à luz da Justiça de ouriços, considera o valor como algo muito importante, passível de uma lógica binária, e não gradual. A unidade do valor forma um tecido que se interliga através dos fios argumentativos construídos pela teoria de Dworkin. Esses fios percorrem cada caso concreto, que exige um esforço interpretativo capaz de levar os direitos a sério, atendendo ao verdadeiro sentido de que o homem possui trunfos contra o Estado. Para isso, Dworkin sugere o reinado dos princípios da igual consideração e respeito, de onde fluem as liberdades, e do respeito às responsabilidades que cada cidadão possui para a escolha de questões essenciais – o respeito à independência ética. Nesse cenário, igualdade e liberdade se pressupõem, na medida em que, se uma liberdade é exigência da igualdade, então essa liberdade constitui um direito forte, um verdadeiro trunfo. Destarte, as liberdades são medidas pelo respeito à independência ética. Aborda-se a incômoda questão do discurso do ódio, defendendo-se que essa modalidade de expressão da liberdade encontra respaldo enquanto direito-trunfo pressuposto do igual tratamento e do respeito à independência ética. Assim, a teoria da liberdade dworkineana agasalha o direito dos detestáveis, e rechaça argumentos utilitaristas, que ilusoriamente contêm um matiz igualitário. Faz-se imperiosa a distinção entre argumentos de política e argumentos de princípio. O cenário jurídico brasileiro, no entanto, e, especialmente no emblemático caso Ellwanger, proíbe o discurso do ódio, por considerá-lo racista e discriminatório. Portanto, o contexto histórico-institucional optou por traçar a tênue linha divisória entre o discurso do ódio e as leis antidiscriminatórias um pouco antes do respeito à independência ética, um pouco antes da configuração real, fática, concreta e iminente de uma prática discriminatória. À luz da teoria dworkineana, isso configuraria um erro, pois o Estado censurou uma voz que tem direito à igualdade, e que merece respeito, ainda que detestável, ao menos que ela configurasse, além do plano das ideias impressas nas folhas de papel, um perigo grave, real, concreto e iminente. Vale refletir se nosso contexto está preparado para ressignificar a liberdade de expressão nos tempos de hoje. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The democratic rule of law is required by modern democratic society. This society has built a community of principles, guided by the reign of equality. Despite the persistence of legal positivism in some circles, the current legal scene has a new paradigm. It is a product of the lessons learned from the mistakes of the welfare state and the myth of scientific perfection (which is totally unfit to deal with law’s inherent indeterminacy). After this paradigm shift based on the idea of principles, two contemporary philosophers of law have gained preeminence: Robert Alexy and Ronald Dworkin. Each one of them has reached crucially different conclusions, based on distinctions concerning rules and principles, the role of fundamental rights in the legal landscape, and the adoption of the external or the internal theory of rights. On one side, Alexy strives to find certainty, based in mathematical formulas and attachment to a rigorous methodology. Alexy’s view and his use of balancing and proportionality assume that law is a system of values to be realized to the greatest extent possible, given the legal and factual possibilities. On the other side, the deontological view of rights, in light of a justice for hedgehogs, holds that values, because of their extreme importance, should be treated in a binary manner, and not in degrees. The unity of value constitutes a fabric that is intertwined with argumentative threads, just like in Dworkin’s theory. These threads encompass each concrete case, which requires an interpretative effort capable of taking rights seriously. That is the true meaning of an individual having trumps against the Government. That is why Dworkin proposes a reign of principles of equal respect and concern. Every citizen is empowered by liberties – also arising from his responsibilities – that demand respect for his ethical independence. In this context, equality and freedom presuppose one another, because, if a freedom is required by equality, then that freedom constitutes a strong right, a real trump. Therefore, freedoms are measured by the respect to ethical independence. The problem of hate speech can be settled in the following way: hate speech should be defended, because the freedom of speech is a right (and a trump) based on equal treatment and on the respect to one’s ethical independence. Thus, Dworkin’s theory of freedom protects the right of contemptible speech and sets aside utilitarian arguments, which only deceptively abide by equality. It is pivotal to differentiate arguments of policy and of principle. Nevertheless, the Brazilian legal systems, especially after the Ellwanger case, has banned hate speech, considering it racist and discriminating. Hence, the current legal system has chosen to draw a line between hate speech and anti-discrimination laws a little before ethical independence requires (a little before an actual and concrete act of discrimination takes place). In light of Dworkin’s theory, that would be a mistake, since the Government has censured an opinion that, notwithstanding its despicable nature, deserves respect, because of the right to equality. The only exception would be if, beyond the mere expression of ideas, a clear and present danger was imminent. It is necessary to consider if our current system is prepared to give a new meaning to freedom of speech today, one that is compatible with the idea of equal respect and concern.