This thesis looks at how the Scottish state, with a long coastline, got away with a minimal naval footprint in a period when European navies were becoming large permanent institutions. Increasingly, Scottish authorities did this by relying upon the English Royal Navy. This thesis hopes to go some way to filling the lacuna in the historiography of the Royal Navy in the seventeenth century regarding Scotland. The Royal Navy in Scotland is used as a prism through which Scottish and British state development in the period of the union of the crowns is looked at. From the standpoint of 1707 Scotland is generally seen as being an underdeveloped state. Explanations of why this was tend to point to the regal union as a cause due to the removal of key elements of statehood to London, in particular the state's 'monopoly of violence'. This thesis suggests that Scotland did not lose its monopoly of violence and that, instead of being a sign of the regal union's failure, underdevelopment actually indicates success. The Royal Navy shielded Scotland from much of the maritime insecurity which would generate demands to create a significant Scottish naval force. However, this relative success was not indicative of British development providing structures to allow the Royal Navy to react well to Scottish defence needs. Multiple monarchy was a poor organisational structure and AngloScottish communication on naval matters was either poor or non-existent. Instead, geopolitical and strategic factors meant that much Royal Naval provision principally aimed at English defence also helped Scotland. That these factors did not lead to equal protection against all types of maritime threats offers an alternative explanation for the maritime tensions between England and Scotland in the 1690s which Eric Graham identifies with the imposition of English mercantilism on Scotland.