Within the span of less than a decade, Russian teachers have lived through the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of Communist rule, the emergence of a free market economy and levels of inflation which have pushed much of the population into poverty. Restrictive government poliies have been replaced with an infrastructure often described as corrupt and infeffective. New laws on education now allow for innovative curriculums and methodology, but economic restrictions have limited much possiblity for change. The purpose of this descriptive study is to examine the perceptions of Moscow educators regarding public educaion and society in Russia. Selected teachers were surveyed and interviewed about their perceptions of recent soical, political and economic changes within Russia; communism and the future of communism in Russia; democracy in Russia; schooling, students and teachers in general in Moscow; the creditation and training of educators in Russia; their responsibilities as educators in Russia; and the future of their individual professional lives. The study discusses the context of education and schooling in Moscow, provides data from a Likert type quesitonnaire and personal interviews, discusses the quantitative and qualitative data and uses a one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with teachers' age as the variable. Major findings include teachers' perceptions that the political and economic changes in Russia are "inevitable." Teachers' lives continue to be restricted, however, that restriction is dictated by economics as opposed to political repression. The fall of the communist state is considered desirable and teachers are unsure if the communist party will ever again form the government of Russia. Teachers do not consider themselves to be "free" or Russia to be a true democracy, and most are undecided if Russia will become a true democracy in their lifetime. As well, the quality of public education is seen to have suffered since the end of the Soviet state with severe underfunding limiting the opportunities for innovative practice. Teachers, however, believe that educators in Russia are well- prepared to be professional teachers in post-communist Russia. They also believe that teachers are responsible for fostering a sense of Russian nationalism and instilling proper values in students. They have an important role to play in shaping Russian society in the future and are optimistic about the future of the teaching profession and the role they will play in determing that future. / 1 v. (various pagings) ; 29 cm.

The concepts of power and state - particularly embedded in the idea of the Great Power, with a geopolitical perspective and a profoundly aggressive character - are tantamount in importance to the Russia's elite political ideology. However, the existence of different emphases within such a political ideology, ranging from the active-obstructive to the passive stances, brings into question the factors of variation that might be responsible for the elite's level of determination to pursue these concepts over an internal or foreign policy development. In addressing this query, two tasks are set: descriptive - involving a survey of the content of Russian aggressive political ideology over different periods in history; and explanatory - determining circumstances that might account for the empowerment of one or other option of Russian aggressive political ideology. Therefore, the thesis includes a comparison of historical periods with similar relevance to the Russian state. The concern here is in relation to shifting factors of variations of aggressive political ideology acting in the space-frame of one state, but in different time-frame. Resting on these frames the thesis explores the shaping of the Russian elite's defining principles of state internal and foreign policy development and traces the factors of variation responsible for the empowerment of one or other particular form of the aggressive political ideology. The factors of variation discussed in the thesis are different in nature and intensity. The primary impetus for variation in the form that aggressive political ideology would take is determined by the factor of national distress. Other factors (regime volatility, political and economic motivations, information dissemination, and challenges within the international system) are responsible for the depth and extent to which aggressive ideology is going to resonate. No factor could create the variation by itself. The argument is that a specific set of factors is required to create the conditions for variations in the form the aggressive political ideology would take and to determine whether aggressive ideology would generate or not an obstructive political decision.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "June 2002." AD-A404 622. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 293-308). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 2001. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 1995. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 268-280).

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Hy Rothstein. Includes bibliographical references (p. 99-107). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Villanova University, 2007. / Political Science Dept. Includes bibliographical references.

viii, 89 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / This thesis examines how social and economic factors shape the behavior of Russian journalists. Although the state does not practice legal censorship today, Western experts compare Russian media with the Soviet period, and Russia is commonly ranked in the bottom 10% of all countries in terms of press freedom. While scholars identify free press as a necessary condition for a democratic society, Russian media are influenced by flak directed at editors and reporters, which results in self-censorship. The central question is: What is the relationship between the ownership structure ofthe media, a reporter's experience, and the occurrence of self-censorship? A random sample of40 journalists was drawn from ten prominent national newspapers. Interviews focused on instances when reporters had been asked to remove facts critical of the government. The data show that self-censorship is significant in Russian journalism; it comes both from the editors and from the journalists themselves. / Committee in Charge: Dr. Caleb Southworth, Chair; Dr. Julie Hessler; Dr. Carol Silverman