Solar Orbiter is a mission launched in 2020 that will take images closer than ever of the Sun. It has ten instruments on board, including The Spectrometer/Telescope for Imaging X-rays (STIX) and The Extreme Ultraviolet Imager (EUI). STIX is a hard X-ray imaging spectrometer which observes bremsstrahlung from the non-thermal accelerated electrons in the footpoints of solar flares and from thermal hot plasma in flare loops. EUI consists of three telescopes, including a Full Sun Imager which is a one-mirror telescope that observes the solar corona and chromosphere in extreme ultraviolet (EUV) wavelengths 174Å and 304Å, respectively.   The purpose of the project was to determine the alignment between STIX and EUI to better understand and improve the pointing of STIX. It is important to know the accuracy of the pointing before using the instruments for science. The alignment was studied by looking at the flare location of the two instruments for about 30 flares. The flare location was approximated to be the brightest pixel in the image. The aspect solution of STIX was applied and this was also compared to the flare seen by EUI. For some of the flares, also imaging data from the Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA) on board the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) was used to get a more detailed comparison. One flare was studied in more detail, using thermal and non-thermal emission seen by STIX, EUV emission seen by EUI 174Å and AIA 171Å as well as UV emission seen by AIA 1600Å. For four flares, the flare location was determined from the visible ribbons and loops instead of the brightest pixel. The methods of finding the flare location by brightest pixel and by looking at flare features were compared.   The average difference between the EUI and STIX flare location was within 12 arcseconds with a standard deviation between 18 and 42 arcseconds for the brightest pixel method. This difference has two main contributions: the accuracy of the STIX aspect solutions and the accuracy of identifying the common source features in EUV and X-rays. To increase the accuracy of finding common sources, four flares with well defined ribbons and loops were analyzed in detail. For these events, the accuracy of the STIX aspect system was determined to be better than 10.5 arcseconds. This is still significantly higher than the design requirements of being better than 4 arcsecs. Detailed analysis clearly showed that the method of determining the flare location by brightest pixel was not accurate enough to evaluate the STIX pointing. Further studies need to be done to improve the aspect solution.

Det säkerhetspolitiska läget i norra europa har stadigt försämrats sedan den ryska occupationen av Krim år 2014. Som ett resultat av detta ökar cyberattacker mot Sverige och resterande EU både i omfattning och frekvens. En av de största hoten är de cyberattacker som genomförs av aktörer som APT 28 och APT29 som har främmande staters stöd. Syftet med cyberattacker varierar stort dock är en av dessa åtkomsten till data/information. För att kunna uppnå det här målet måste aktören ha förmåga till att exfltrera data ur ett system eller nätverk. Det fnns fertalet metoder för att åstadkomma detta där en av metoderna är att exfltrera data över ett alternativt protokoll så som DNS-tunnling. Försvarsmakten nyttjar en rad olika system i syfte att uppnå sina mål och har särskilt utbildade enheter för att försvara dessa. Då varje användare indirekt bidrar till systemet och nätverkets säkerhet/skydd behöver samtliga användare ha en förståelse för hur deras användande påverkar systemet/nätverket. Skapandet av en DNS-tunnel ger användaren möjlighet att skicka ett protokolls (I det här fallet IPv4) data genom ett annat genom en process som heter inkapsling av data. Detta gör det svårare för system att automatiskt detektera illasinnad exfltration och således svårare att blokera trafken. Försvarsmakten bör regelbundet öva underrättelsefunktionerna i nyttjandet av STRIX och TAXII för att hantera hot i cyberdomänen och sprida dessa till övriga organisation. Detta skulle således möjliggöra för Cyberförsvaret att orientera resterande Försvarsmakt mer regelbundet och på så sätt även kunna anpassa de automatiska detektionsmetoder över tid för att bättre kunna fånga upp illasinnad exfltrering av data. Försvarsmakten bör utveckla underrättelsefunktionen så att den kan agera som en tolk mellan Cyberförsvaret och resterande Försvarsmakt. / The security in northern Europe has steadily become worse since the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014. As a result of this the frequency and magnitude of hostile cyberoperations targeting Sweden and the EU has increased. One of the biggest threats are the cyberoperations that are carried out by state sponsored actors such as APT28 and APT29. The Cyberattacks can have a wide range of objectives, one of them being the acquisition of data/information. In order to accomplish that objective an adversary would require a method to exfltrate the data from the system or network. There are however multiple different methods that can be used, one being exfltration through an alternate protocol such as DNS-tunneling. The Swedish armed forces use a variety of different systems in order to accomplish its missions/tasks. In order to be able to defend the systems from any malicious activity the Swedish armed forces have specially trained units tasked specifically with the defnece of the armed forces systems. This however is not enough as every user in a system is part of that systems defence. This means that every service member must have an understanding of what implications activities in the cyber domain have upon activities in the other domains. The creation of a DNS-tunnel enables a user to send data of one protocol (in this case IPv4 data) over the DNS protocol through the process of encapsulation. This makes it harder for automated processes to detect the malicious exfltration and subsequently block the traffic. The Swedish armed forces should regularly train its intelligence community in order to handle cyber threat intelligence according to STIX and TAXII. This should allow the cyber defnece to more readily share their intelligence with the rest of the armed forces and use the established intelligence community as a translator that can deduce the implications of the threats on the day to day activity of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Home guard.