The specific purpose of this study will be: (1) to find what factors determine the amount of pay that executives in twenty-five Texas companies receive, and how personal factors are ranked in setting their salaries; (2) to determine present and proposed utilization of formal job evaluation methods among the twenty-five Texas companies in setting executive salaries; (3) to find which methods of remuneration are used for executives of different levels in the twenty-five Texas companies; (4) to determine who has the final responsibility for the administration of executive salaries in the twenty-five Texas companies; and (5) to determine the means used in appraising executive merit or worth in determining salary adjustments while an individual remains in the same position.

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Mak, Ka Kui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 41-48). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese.

Zhang Yanfeng. / Thesis submitted in: November 2004. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-147). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / List of Tables and Figures --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Pay-by-position System: Incentive Reform at the Case University / Chapter 2.1 --- Background of the Pay-by-position Scheme --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Chronology of the Incentive Change --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Institutional Characteristics of the Pay-by-position System --- p.11 / Chapter 2.4 --- Summary --- p.16 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Analytical Framework and Literature Review / Chapter 3.1 --- A Brief Introduction to the Theory of Tournament --- p.21 / Chapter 3.2 --- A Simple Model of Homogeneous Two-contestant Tournament --- p.22 / Chapter 3.3 --- Implications under Multi-contestant and Multi-position-level Situation --- p.26 / Chapter 3.4 --- Status Quo of Existing Research --- p.28 / Chapter 3.5 --- Summary --- p.30 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Empirical Models and Hypotheses / Chapter 4.1 --- Measurement of Key Variables --- p.33 / Chapter 4.2 --- Incentive Effect on Teaching --- p.41 / Chapter 4.3 --- Incentive Effect on Research --- p.48 / Chapter 4.4 --- Sorting Role of the Pay-by-position System --- p.54 / Chapter 4.5 --- Summary --- p.56 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Data Presentation and a Preliminary Analysis / Chapter 5.1 --- Survey and Data Processing --- p.57 / Chapter 5.2 --- Description of Data --- p.61 / Chapter 5.3 --- A Preliminary Probe into Data --- p.68 / Chapter 5.4 --- Summary --- p.74 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Empirical Analysis and Estimation results / Chapter 6.1 --- Incentive Effect on Teaching - Evidence from the Full Instructor Sample --- p.99 / Chapter 6.2 --- Incentive Effect on Research - Evidence from the Selected Sample of Responsible Professors --- p.106 / Chapter 6.3 --- Sorting Role of the Pay-by-position System - Ordered Probit Estimation --- p.114 / Chapter 6.4 --- Summary --- p.116 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.140 / References --- p.144

The effective schools research has repeatedly concluded that effective schools are characterized by effective administrators. The desire, then, of local school boards to improve administrator performance has emerged, based upon the assumption that as building principal performance improves, so does teacher performance, and ultimately, student performance. Merit pay has received a great deal of attention in education recently as a means to motivate administrators towards improved performance. Merit pay is supported by the "physical-economic" school of thought which believes that individuals are "economically motivated". In contrast, the "work itself" or "job satisfaction" school of thought believes that individuals are best motivated by factors which affect job meaningfulness. Merit pay is viewed as a "hygiene" factor which may decrease job "dissatisfaction" but does not necessarily result in increased motivation. This dissertation compared the "physical-economic" concept of altered compensation rates or merit pay, to the "job satisfaction" or "work itself" concept of increased job meaningfulness as a means to motivate principals towards improved performance. When given a list of incentives, principals were asked to choose between merit pay and other type incentives. Of the 312 principals surveyed, 244 responded for a 78% return rate with the following results: 28% preference for merit pay at the 5% level; 47% preference for merit pay at the 10% level; 63% preference for merit pay at the 15% level; and, 68% preference at the 20% level. Frequencies tallied and percents derived indicated a consistent preference for merit pay at the 15% and 20% levels irrespective of demographics. These results would seem to indicate that "work meaningfulness" incentives are desirable to principals, but when paired against ever increasing levels of "potential monetary compensation", they lose their attractiveness. Even though merit pay received a popular response from the principals surveyed at the higher levels offered, merit pay's track record is so poor as to suggest that better measurement methods need to be devised before such a program is initiated. According to the literature reviewed, it is doubtful that such an objective and equitable means of measurement is feasible without interfering in a principal's daily routine, thus reducing the principal's effectiveness.

Newly listed firms have a short history of stock value, and may initially not rely on stock price information in incentive contracting as much as seasoned firms. In this thesis, I examine managerial incentive contracts in newly listed firms by comparing CEO compensation between IPO firms and seasoned firms. For IPOs listed on NYSE from 1993 to 2001, a matching sample of seasoned firms was obtained according to criteria in industry, size and book-to-market ratio. By examining the multi-dimensions of CEO incentives, including cash compensation, option grants, stock ownership, and dismissal for the first six years after listing, I document significant differences between IPOs and seasoned firms. I find that while the sensitivity of short-term incentive pay to shareholder return is lower in IPOs than in seasoned firms, long-term incentives from CEO stock ownership are significantly more important in newly listed firms. Moreover, although CEO turnover in an IPO firm is lower, it depends on both stock-price return and accounting performance. These IPO-seasoned differences diminish over time and disappear in three to five years. My findings suggest that to motivate the manager of a newly listed firm, the board avoids short-term uncertainty associated with new stocks while emphasizing the role of shareholder value in the long run. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Master / Master of Philosophy

This thesis consists of two essays in corporate finance, one on newly listed firms’ post-IPO activities as acquisition targets and the other on corporate executive compensation. In the first essay, I examine a large sample of U.S. newly listed firms to analyze their likelihood of becoming a takeover target. I find that 27 percent of newly listed firms are acquired within five years after the IPO, which is compared with the seasoned-firm counterpart of 17 percent. This difference is economically large, statistically significant, and robust to various firm and market characteristics controls. Several recent studies have reported newly listed firms’ active activities as an acquirer. Contributing to this literature, my finding further identifies an active role of IPO firms as a takeover target. My finding is consistent with the presumed motivation of firms’ going public for a “double-exit” strategy: To sell the shares through a takeover after the company goes public. Economic rationales for this strategy include advantages from auctioning off a minority stake to dispersed shareholders and more efficient bargaining in takeover negotiations due to increased share liquidity and reduced uncertainty after the IPO. Therefore, going public can be an optimal first step in the process of selling a company. In further support of this motivation, I find that IPO firms, as an acquisition target, receive higher takeover premiums than do comparable privately held targets and seasoned target firms. In conclusion, my findings are consistent with the double-exit strategy predicted by theory, suggesting that IPOs facilitate subsequent sales of the companies and that the strategy is economically justified. In the second essay, I study executive compensation under the Japanese corporate governance system. In March 2010, the Japanese regulator enacted the first legislation regarding the disclosure of director compensation to named individuals. With access to the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, I document comprehensive evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of CEO compensation. My findings reveal Japanese practices in CEO pay that differ from the well-known Anglo-American model in significant ways. Its distinct features include base salary dominance and unusually low levels of pay and pay variation. I also identify significant impacts on the compensation system of corporate governance and U.S. influence factors, such as keiretsu groups, financial institutions, US-style compensation committees, and cross-listing on US stock exchanges. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

This thesis is comprised of three essays dealing with outside directors. The first essay addresses the signaling role that outside directors play. This is a role that is especially important for entrepreneurial firms, and has been relatively neglected in corporate governance research. The primary contribution of this chapter is in developing an analytical model and predictive framework on which future empirical and analytical research on directors' signaling role can be based. This chapter also contributes to the signaling theory literature by deriving a new type of equilibrium — the "stochastic separating equilibrium" — which may well be applicable in a broader set of models that incorporate signaling through middlemen. This equilibrium has an important realistic feature in that it permits the coexistence of both high and low quality firms in equilibrium. In the second study, I address directors' monitoring role. This essay examines whether a systematic relationship exists between a board's composition and discrete strategic decisions of a firm, which have been addressed in the literature as involving potential conflicting interests between managers and shareholders. To explore this question, I conducted seven meta-analyses of relevant strategic decisions, on which I could obtain data. The results provide evidence for the presence of systematic relationships between a board's composition and five out of the seven strategies examined. Interestingly, these systematic relationships provide only limited support to the predictions of agency theory, which is the predominant rational behind this line of research. In the third essay, I examine the effects of outside directors' stock-based compensation on one indicator of board monitoring effectiveness: firms' research and development (R&D) intensity. The results suggest that both the percentage of stock-based compensation and the proportion of stock options within it are positively related to firms' R & D expenditures. Moreover, stock-based compensation moderates the relationship between board composition and R & D intensity. These results highlight the need to reevaluate previous findings that addressed the effects of board composition on both firm performance and firm strategic decisions.

This thesis analyses the public sector pay reforms, earnings inequality and the gender wage gap in the UK between 1991 and 1996. The aim is to examine the relationships between the pay reforms and the level of earnings inequality, and between the level of earnings inequality and the gender pay gap. The analysis employs British Household Panel Survey data to distinguish the magnitudes of earning inequality and the gender pay gap in 1991 and 1996, and then utilises decomposition techniques in order to distinguish the determinants of these gaps. These decompositions, developed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, and Blau and Kahn, show the magnitude of the effects of the changing characteristics of the workforces in the different sectors and the prices paid for, the returns to, these characteristics, both observed and unobserved. These techniques are employed to reveal the link between the public sector pay reforms, and sub sectors, and also the link between changes in the level of residual earnings inequality and changes in the gender pay gap. Hypothetical earnings distributions, are constructed to show how the level of earning inequality and the gender pay gap would be affected in both the public sector and the economy as a whole, if by 1996 the public sector reforms had caused public and private sector returns to converge. In this way, the degree to which the public sector pay reforms may have affected the level of earnings inequality and the gender pay gap in the public sector is revealed.