Magister Artium - MA

This work makes no pretence at being a comprehensive account of the War of Ngcayecibi and its context in Cape and Imperial History. It omits all but passing reference to Imperial Policy, Frere's Federation plans, the Constitutional Crisis and the dismissal of the Molteno Ministry, all of which have been more than adequately covered elsewhere. Rather it concentrates on a study of the war in terms of black/white relations. The responses of the blacks to white pressures on their land and traditional society are examined, particularly those of Sarhili and the Gcaleka, for Sarhili, the gentlemanly but tragic Paramount Chief of the Xhosa, is the central figure in the canvas of black Ciskeian and Transkeian leaders of the time, and the War of Ngcayecibi is very much a Xhosa war. I have tried to avoid a conventional account of the military operations of the war, sketching only the broad outlines of military operations and concentrating on the strategies adopted by black and white forces, and the reasons for which various black chiefdoms or segments thereof participated in the war. Orthography. The matter of orthography is a tricky one, for Xhosa orthography has been recently overhauled and is not yet finalised. I have attempted with the aid of Mr Sidney Zotwana of the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University to adopt the most acceptable forms of Xhosa names. I have dropped the use of all prefixes since I felt their use would have been pedantic in what, after a11, is an English language thesis and since there is no chance of confusion between historical figures like Gcaleka and the amaGcaleka people. Sources. The documents printed in Cape an~ Imperial Blue-Books, especially the Cape Blue-Books, on Native Affairs for the years 1874-1884, and the correspondence in the Native Affairs Archive in the Government Archives in Cape Town, proved to be the most valuable official and semi-official sources. The Merriman and Molteno Papers in the South African Library in Cape Town were the most useful private papers consulted, though odd items in the Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, proved of use. The rash of memoirs published after the war were, with exceptions, singularly unilluminating. Most prominent amongst the exceptions was West W. Fynn: The'77 War ••• (East London, 1911), an account of the war written by the Clerk of the Resident to Sarhili. Although Fynn has a grudge against treatment he received from the Colonial Government at the time, and is not above dramatising his role, he was in an unparalle11ed position to observe the events leading up to the war and records much valuable information. The voluminous notebooks in Cory Library of the late Dr A.W. Burton, an amateur Border historian who had researched the war, were interesting but difficult to use because of an almost total lack of footnoting or reference to sources. J.R. Soga's two works, The South Eastern Bantu (Johannesburg, 1930) and The Ama-Xosa: Life and Customs (Lovedale, 1931) are well known and proved useful but, as will be seen, have to be treated with care. Of more modern works, J. Peires: "A History of the Xhosa c.1700-1835" if (unp. M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1976) proved invaluable as a background to Xhosa society and earlier Xhosa history. The works of Christopher Saunders, who has written much on topics related to the war, were indispensable. C.J. Schoeman: "Die Negende Grensbotsing" (unp. M.A. thesis, University of Port Elizabeth, 1976), the one general study of the war thus far written, covers military operations at great length and is a work very much in the mould of traditional Afrikaner Frontier Historiography.

Introductory: If the relations existing between the Native chiefs and the Colony which Sir George Grey found on his arrival are to be fully understood, a brief consideration of Cathcart’s policy and Frontier settlement is necessary. When Cathcart came out as Governor in 1852, he found the rebel chief Sandile, with associate chieftans’ and large bands of followers, still occupying their locations in the Amatola ranges. From this haunt no force had as yet been able to drive them. During the series of skirmishes known as the Eighth Kaffir War, their first crop of Indian corn was destroyed so early in the season as to allow of a second crop springing up. This unusual phenomenon inspired prophet Umlangeni to claim that he had worked a miracle. Fortunately later reverses and the expulsion of Sanailli from his mountain fastness discredited this thoughtful opportunist. Sandilli, as paramount chief of the Gaikas, might have held and influential position in the councils of the Kaffrarian chiefs, that he did not hold such a position, was due, in Charles Brownlee’s opinion, to his timid and suspicious nature and to the fact that his mental capacity was ‘hardly above mediocrity’. He was unable to fight owing to lameness, and he lacked ‘sufficient’ resciution and strength of mind to resist the evil influence of the bad advisers, nevertheless he could be obstinate and he never, to the end of his life, gave up on the idea of getting back to this old locations in the Amatolas. Macomo with some three thousand followers had likewise evaded all attempts to turn him out of this haunts in the mountain range. He, together with his associate the Tambookie chief Quesha, and diverse rebel Hotttentots, indulged in the frequent marauding forays into the surrounding country. Macomo was the eldest of Gaika’s sons and was “allowed by all to be the greatest politician and best warrior in Kaffraria’. During the minority of Sandilli Macomo had acted as his regent and had attained great influence over the tribe; this he afterwards lost for he moved to the neighbourhood of Fort Beaufort, where in a state of intoxication most of this time was passed. He had in Brownlee’s opinion, done more mischief in the war than any other chief. Great jealously was felt between Macomo and Sandilli, especially on the part of the former; this was shown through the cattle killing period in his efforts to involve Sandilli, while attempting to keep on the right side of the Government himself. Further south, indeed within the Colony itself, such petty chiefs as Seyolo and Botman, lurking in the Fish River bush, and the Keiskamma kloofs, rendered the main road dangerous, and even succeeded, for a time, in completely cutting the ling of communication between Kingwilliamstown and Grahamstown.