Throughout the Cold War, many publicly influential and socially committed scientists participated in a wide array of efforts to push U.S. foreign policy toward nuclear disarmament. Some of these scientists, such as Linus Pauling and Carl Sagan, relied on their credibility as respected public authorities to sway public opinion against nuclear weapons. Other scientists, such as Eugene Rabinowitch, quietly pursued informal, quasi-diplomatic methods. Still others, such as Hans Bethe, George Kistiakowsky, and Jerome Wiesner, worked within the government to restrain the arms race. Though rarely working in concert, all these scientists operated under the notion that their scientific expertise enabled them to articulate convincing and objective reasons for nuclear disarmament. But the U.S. government went to great lengths to neutralize these scientific arguments against nuclear weapons with a wide array of tactics all aimed at undermining their scientific credibility. Some scientists who offered moral reasons to end the arms race found their loyalty questioned by the state. When prodisarmament scientists offered strictly technical reasons to oppose to nuclear weapons, the government responded by promoting the equally technical objections to disarmament held by pronuclear scientists. At still other times, the government attempted to co-opt the arguments of its scientific challengers. In addition, scientists’ professional identity as objective and apolitical experts hampered scientific antinuclear activism. From the beginning of the Cold War to the 1980s, scientists continuously challenged nuclear weapons in a variety of ways; the government likewise continuously reshaped its responses to meet this challenge, and in so doing crafted a method of scientific containment. Thus the result of this incessant struggle was the consistent defeat of scientists’ dissent. By the time the Cold War ended, it did so on terms unrelated to scientists and nuclear weapons. / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 300-311).

In order to understand how policies are made, analysts need to be able to explain and describe the policy making process. This is a complex task due to the variety and complexity of policy making environments. The difficulty lies in accounting for the multiple actors who come and go, differing preferences, and impending problems and solutions sets which vary by policy environment. Therefore, there is a need to approach the understanding of policy processes from several different theoretical perspectives to aid in evaluating the multifaceted variations which ultimately affect policy making. An improved description of processes can lead to more accurate predictions of possible future policies, improved advocacy efforts, and enhanced problem solving. Two policy process frameworks, the Multiple Stream Framework (MSF) and the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, were applied to a recent significant change in science policy. An understanding is developed to explain how federal science funding survived within the highly controversial and costly American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The volatile and unpredictable nature of science policy lends itself well to the MSF, while the more static IAD is less useful to explain how and why the funds stayed in the bill. This is telling about the scope and adaptability of the two frameworks, where each may be better suited for different policy environments. The MSF being more appropriate for unstable and capricious policy issues and the IAD better matched for policy issues which have a somewhat more stable environment.

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished