This dissertation investigates the causes and consequences of a core value of democracy: the ability of citizens to change the balance of power amongst the political parties that represent them--a phenomenon known as electoral volatility. I first study causes, arguing that citizens support parties that successfully implement important policies during their time in office and reject those that do not. I advance previous work by testing the argument that institutions channel the sort of change that may occur. I argue that institutions act to moderate the prospects of opposition parties at election time, presenting two aspects of change: shifts in support for existing experienced parties and emerging support for new parties. I find, among other results, that mixed electoral systems provide opportunities for new parties that other systems impede. In the next analyses, I examine the effects of existing and new forms of electoral volatility on delays in bargaining over cabinet positions after elections. I contend that delays are conditioned by two factors: uncertainty regarding the preferences of potential government parties for certain posts and the complexity of rule sets and contextual situations. I advance a counter-intuitive argument: experienced parties should know the rules and their partners--hence complexity should not be a problem. Yet as these experienced parties seek to maximize the number of posts they hold, concessions should be difficult to achieve--thus formations should take longer. On the other hand, new parties should be inexperienced and should hold known preferences for particular cabinet posts. Veteran bargaining partners are likely to exploit this, satisfying new partners with less than they might cede otherwise and forming governments faster. My results, derived from quantitative analysis and field work in the state of Israel, support these arguments. Finally, I examine the effects of both electoral volatility and government formation delays on a critical source of income for modern democracies: the purchase of domestic businesses by foreign firms--a practice known as foreign direct investment (FDI). I test the argument that democratic political phenomena often considered abhorrent (such as volatile elections and lengthy government formations) can serve to attract investors by keeping governments and lawmakers out of the way. Among other interesting results, I find that new party volatility and legislative polarization can serve to increase FDI rather than reduce it. This dissertation provides important contributions to the understanding of democratic politics in several ways. First, it helps to explain why established parties succeed and why new parties emerge within democracies. Second, it advances the study of government formations by allowing for nuanced view of cabinet negotiations following elections. Finally, my work provides insights for scholars of both comparative politics and political economy as it connects democratic politics to an important tangible consequence: inflows of foreign direct investment. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2013. / March 25, 2013. / Economics, Elections, Government, Institutions, Voting / Includes bibliographical references. / Brad T. Gomez, Professor Directing Dissertation; Jill B. Quadagno, University Representative; Sona N. Golder, Committee Member; Eric A. Coleman, Committee Member; Christopher Reenock, Committee Member.

The main aim of this dissertation is to study the underlying competition between governments and terrorist organizations for support of the population. The government and the terrorist organization are locked in a struggle to win the hearts and minds of potential followers, and their weapons are to strike at each other or attempt to buy the support of the population. This dissertation investigates this battle and attempts to answer why governments so often respond with harsh, disproportional responses when these responses appear to strengthen the terrorist organization. While the terrorist organization may have an incentive to risk triggering a crushing and debilitating response from the government if this response increases their base mobilization rate, the question remains as to why the government responds with such an attack. This dissertation is structured in five chapters: (1) Introduction, summarizing the key insights from the 3 main papers; (2) Paper 01, investigating the role of uncertainty regarding the terrorist's resource level and the impact this uncertainty plays on the decision to respond with a discriminating or undiscriminating counterstrike; (3) Paper 02, addressing the role social services plays in strengthening the popular support of the terrorist organization; (4) Paper 03, adding more nuance to the previous arguments by allowing for the support of the terrorist organization to be heterogenous (consisting of both core and popular support) and endogenizing this support as a response to the actions of the terrorist organization and the government; (5) Conclusion, discussing the limitations of the project and a discussion of future research. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2013. / June 26, 2013. / club goods, counterterrorism, insurgency, provocation, social goods provision, terrorism / Includes bibliographical references. / David A. Siegel, Professor Co-Directing Dissertation; Will H. Moore, Professor Co-Directing Dissertation; David J. Cooper, University Representative; Mark Souva, Committee Member; Jens Großer, Committee Member.

This dissertation explores the role of earmarks, also known as pork projects, in several facets of American politics. After reviewing the changing history and various means of measuring earmark projects, I attempt to determine which Members of Congress are most adept at securing earmarks, and whether these projects affect electoral security. Second, this work departs from previous assumptions that pork projects are viewed equally by all recipients, given recipients are made aware of the projects at all. Third, this work challenges existing claims that contend a direct linkage between voter awareness of earmark projects and electoral support for an incumbent; instead, I argue for the role of media dissemination of this information. Finally, this project differentiates itself from the current literature by approaching the impact of earmarks not solely as a means to directly appeal to the majority of voters, but as a quid pro quo to be invoked by Members looking to shore up campaign support. Rather than contend that only voters reward incumbents for project dollars, this paper explores the impact of earmarks on campaign contributions provided by special interest groups. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2013. / June 18, 2013. / Behavior, Congress, Earmarks, Elections, Pork, Voting / Includes bibliographical references. / Cherie Maestas, Professor Directing Dissertation; Lance DeHaven-Smith, University Representative; Robert Jackson, Committee Member; Brad Gomez, Committee Member.

A debate has emerged over the impact that partisan local elections have on policy. While Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) found a null effect, Gerber and Hopkins (2011) find that the relationship is more complex. Gerber and Hopkins (2011), in their article `When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy" argue that partisan elections result in mayors who put forth policies influenced by their partisanship. Gerber and Hopkins find that in policy areas where there is less shared authority between cities and either state or federal government, partisanship influences the policies implemented by mayors. To build on the work of Gerber and Hopkins, I have modified a variable of the existing data set, margin of victory. I predict that mayors elected by smaller margins will be less inclined to implement partisan policies. The partisan policies these mayors do implement will be less extreme than those implemented by mayors elected by wider margins. / A Thesis submitted to the College of Social Sciences and Public Policy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science. / Summer Semester, 2013. / July 1, 2013. / local, mayor, partisanship, policy, politics, state / Includes bibliographical references. / Carol Weissert, Professor Directing Thesis; Charles Barilleaux, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member.

In this dissertation, I examine the selection of foreign policy advisors as part of a strategic decision-making process by the political leader. Among other things, I find that the hawkish foreign policy preferences of a state's political leadership (comprised of the political leader, foreign minister, and defense minister) have a negative effect on the likelihood that that state is targeted, and that inexperienced leaders are more likely to select foreign and defense ministers with hawkish foreign policy preferences. I also find that, all else being equal, leaders tend to select foreign and defense ministers with similar foreign policy preferences in order to maximize the probability with which they achieve their preferred policies. These findings were generated using original data on the personal characteristics of the foreign and defense ministers of 164 countries between 1950 and 2000. I also ran an original, web-based experiment in the U.S. and India that provided additional support for the theoretical arguments leading to my hypotheses. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2013. / June 14, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Mark A. Souva, Professor Directing Dissertation; Mark W. Horner, University Representative; Sean D. Ehrlich, Committee Member; Megan Shannon, Committee Member.

In this dissertation, I examine the causes and consequences of perceptions of politicians' character traits. I argue that character traits are best understood as reflections of particular moral foundations. Just as people vary in the moral foundations they endorse, they also vary in the character traits they use to evaluate politicians. As a result, individuals draw different trait inferences about politicians from the issue stances they take. For example, an issue stance that may signal compassion to a supporter of the policy may signal weakness to an opponent of the policy. However, the relationships between issue stances and character traits are not set in stone. I show that by justifying an issue stance in terms of a particular moral foundation, politicians are perceived as exemplifying the traits associated with that foundation. I also show that a politician's choice of which character traits to bolster holds important strategic implications. Politicians are perceived as more conservative when they bolster character traits associated with conservative rather than liberal moral foundations. Finally, I show that trait perceptions influence the types of rumors we are likely to believe about politicians. Overall, my dissertation provides a much needed theoretical framework for understanding character trait perceptions, and new insights into the strategic interplay between politicians and the public. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2013. / March 27, 2013. / character, ideology, moral, politicians, traits / Includes bibliographical references. / Jennifer Jerit, Professor Directing Dissertation; Art Raney, University Representative; Jason Barabas, Committee Member; Brad Gomez, Committee Member.

This dissertation consists of three essays that address the roles that political parties play in aggregating individual preferences into aggregate choices and the methods used to draw the inferences. The first essay addresses the many scholars who suggest proportional representation increases party mobilization by creating nationally competitive districts that give parties an incentive to mobilize everywhere. This chapter provides theoretical and empirical evidence that brings this claim into question. I propose, unlike earlier scholars, that the positive effect of district competitiveness on party mobilization efforts increases as electoral districts become more \textit{dis}proportional, arguing that disproportionality itself encourages mobilization and exaggerates the impact of competitiveness on mobilization. Game-theoretic predictions tested with individual-level survey data from national legislative elections show mobilization levels are much higher and that district competitiveness has a much larger positive effect on parties' mobilization efforts in single-member districts. Overall, the theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that proportional electoral rules give parties no strong incentive to mobilize anywhere. The second essay addresses a sizable literature in comparative electoral institutions that argues that proportional electoral rules lead to higher voter turnout. However, recent work finds little evidence that the effect generalizes beyond western Europe, and the theoretical arguments remain sparse, incomplete, and contradictory. Using a unique data set to resolve problems of omitted variable bias and methods recently introduced to political scientists to address model uncertainty and evaluate evidence both for and against null hypotheses, I find strong evidence that the proportionality of electoral rules exerts no meaningful effect on turnout or any of the theoretical mechanisms I test. The third essay uses an influential study of political parties to discuss methods of testing hypotheses. A substantial number of important hypotheses in political science suggest that potential explanatory variables should have no meaningful effect on an outcome of interest. Without testing these hypotheses, empirical evaluation of many theoretical arguments remains incomplete, but the political methodology literature has not offered a compelling approach. As a solution, I introduce a method for testing hypotheses of no meaningful effect that meets political scientists' conventional expectations for tests and can be easily implemented using already available software. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2013. / June 11, 2013. / political methodology, political parties / Includes bibliographical references. / Robert Jackson, Professor Co-Directing Dissertation; David A. Siegel, Professor Co-Directing Dissertation; Deb Sinha, University Representative; Jason Barabas, Committee Member.

In many countries legislators switch parties between elections. This raises normative concerns related to issues of representation and accountability. To date, the literature explains party switching almost exclusively in terms of the factors that lead a legislator to want to change party. However, this approach ignores the fact that we only observe party switching when a legislator wants to switch parties and when a party is willing to accept the legislator. In this dissertation, I present a formal model of party switching that recognizes the strategic nature of this two-way interaction. My model demonstrates that many of the factors commonly thought to influence party switching actually have opposing effects on the potential defecting legislator and potential target party. This helps to explain many of the inconsistent and conflicting results in the existing literature. Using original data from Brazil and Romania that I collected myself, as well as a new partial observability maximum likelihood model that I developed to specifically analyze party switching, I find strong support for my model's predictions. My large N quantitative analyses are supplemented by more qualitative evidence derived from interviews that I conducted with leading political figures in Romania during my field research. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2013. / July 5, 2013. / accountability, democratic representation, electoral rules, partial observability logit, party switching / Includes bibliographical references. / Matt Golder, Professor Co-Directing Thesis; Christopher Reenock, Professor Co-Directing Thesis; Irinel Chiorescu, University Representative; David A. Siegel, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member.

Among political scientists, there seems to be something of a faulty dilemma. Researchers are often labeled either behavioralists or institutionalists. That is, they study either the attitudes and actions of individuals or they study rules, organizations, and formal structures. This is a faulty dilemma, because institutions can not exist without individuals and individuals do not exist in an environment devoid of institutions. Further, organizations and government bodies are not monolithic entities blindly following instructions from a benevolent dictator. Politics, in a democratic society, is an inherently competitive enterprise. Candidates and parties compete for votes; groups fight for members, resources, and access; and lobbyists battle one another in pursuit of their policy goals. This necessitates a degree of strategic behavior. When deciding how and where to spend campaign funds, a candidate is not only trying to win new votes, but also defend existing supporters and force the opposition to spend money ineffectively. The same is true, when lobbyists decide how and on whom to spend money and effort. Choices are made, with the expectation that the opposition is also acting. However, democratic politics is also based upon cooperation. Parties, interest groups, and even government itself all exist as solutions to collective action problems. These problems exist at multiple levels. First, individuals need to work together, to create organizations and institutions. But then these groups interact with one another and encounter institutional collective action problems. These interactions can be adversarial, such as two political parties competing for power, but they can also be mutually beneficial. Groups may have aligned goals and greater opportunity for success, if cooperation can be achieved. Consider political parties in the United States. If a party formed for every bloc of voters, then there would be many parties competing in any given contest. Because, however, single member districts and plurality rule elections lead to a two-party system, compromise is needed. The Democratic and Republican parties exist, because subgroups recognize that they are stronger together than they are alone. If free and fair elections result (at least indirectly) in the implementation of policies that solve collective action problems, then the most successful competitor is able to determine the solution. In this sense, democratic politics is the process of competing to cooperate or cooperating to compete. This dissertation presents the results of three studies. Underlying each of the chapters is the logic of strategic resource allocation, under competition and cooperation. The first examines economic voting and competition over policy, using a laboratory experiment. The second extends the analysis, with questions placed on a nationally representative survey. Finally, the third chapter presents a laboratory experiment on competition, coordination, and cooperation in lobbying. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2013. / March 22, 2013. / Collective Action, Economic Voting, Experiments, Lobbying, Political Economy / Includes bibliographical references. / Jens Großer, Professor Co-Directing Thesis; John Scholz, Professor Co-Directing Thesis; Mark Isaac, University Representative; John Ryan, Committee Member; Eric Coleman, Committee Member.

This manuscript serves to reexamine previous literature regarding the use of different information environments to help guide the political decisions of the uninformed electorate. Sixteen years ago, Larry Bartels approached the issue of levels of whether varying levels of political knowledge influences the behavior of the electorate and their political decisions. This manuscript reevaluates the effects of high levels of political knowledge in efforts to determine whether the uninformed electorate would behave any differently if they had higher levels of political knowledge. The findings suggest null results; however, the implications of the broader question open up an avenue for dialogue about how a fully informed electorate would behave and whether this country is prepared for an informed electorate. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science. / Summer Semester, 2013. / July 1, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Brad T. Gomez, Professor Directing Thesis; Cherie Maestas, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member.