Side Channel Attacks (SCA) are a class of passive attacks on cryptosystems that exploit implementation characteristics of the system. Currently, a lot of research is focussed towards developing countermeasures to side channel attacks. In this thesis, we address two challenges that are an inherent part of the efficient implementation of SCA countermeasures. While designing a system, design choices made for enhancing the efficiency or performance of the system can also affect the side channel security of the system. The first challenge is that the effect of different design choices on the side channel resistance of a system is currently not well understood. It is important to understand these effects in order to develop systems that are both secure and efficient. A second problem with incorporating SCA countermeasures is the increased design complexity. It is often difficult and time consuming to integrate an SCA countermeasure in a larger system. In this thesis, we explore that above mentioned problems from the point of view of developing embedded software that is resistant to power based side channel attacks. Our first work is an evaluation of different software AES implementations, from the perspective of side channel resistance, that shows the effect of design choices on the security and performance of the implementation. Next we present work that identifies the problems that arise while designing software for a particular type of SCA resistant architecture - the Virtual Secure Circuit. We provide a solution in terms of a methodology that can be used for developing software for such a system - and also demonstrate that this methodology can be conveniently automated - leading to swifter and easier software development for side channel resistant designs. / Master of Science

No description available.

The proliferation of embedded systems into nearly every aspect of modern infrastructure and society has seen their deployment in such diverse roles as monitoring the power grid and processing commercial payments. Software intellectual property (SWIP) is a critical component of these increasingly complex systems and represents a significant investment to its developers. However, deeply immersed in their environment, embedded systems are difficult to secure. As a result, developers want to ensure that their SWIP is protected from being reverse engineered or stolen by unauthorized parties. Many techniques have been proposed to address the issue of SWIP protection for embedded systems. These range from secure memory components to complete shifts in processor architectures. While powerful, these approaches often require the development of systems from the ground up or the application of specialized and often expensive hardware components. As a result they are poorly suited to address the security concerns of legacy embedded systems or systems based on commodity components. This work explores the protection of SWIP on heavily constrained, legacy and commodity embedded systems. We accomplish this by evaluating a generic embedded system to identify the security concerns in the context of SWIP protection. The evaluation is applied to determine the limitations of a software only approach on a real world legacy embedded system that lacks any specialized security hardware features. We improve upon this system by developing a prototype system using only commodity components. Finally we propose a Portable Embedded Software Intellectual Property Security (PESIPS) system that can easily be deployed as a framework on both legacy and commodity systems. / Master of Science