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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
351

The protection of minority shareholders in the Chinese securities market. / CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection

January 2013 (has links)
在过去十年间里,中国立法机关及政府机关已制定颁布了大量新的法律法规。这些法律从数量和质量上而言,和过去相比都有了很大飞跃,公司法和证券法领域尤为如此。 法律从业人员数量的增多满足了人们多元化的法律需求。财经媒体的迅速发展使得大众对商业和市场运行、以及相关法律法规产生了更加深刻的认识。 然而,这些方面的改善并不意味着中国上市公司小股东保护也得到了相应的加强。 / 本文主要围绕以下三部分内容进行了探讨:1.中国现行法律下规制小股东保护的法律原则及规则;2.从政治环境的角度分析政治对部分规则形成的影响以及一些规则在实践中未能达到其立法旨意的原因;及3.小股东积极通过诉讼保护自身权利的现状及困境。作者评估了法律在小股东保护方面的实际效果,并分析中国的当代政治对法律达到其原本立法旨意的影响。虽然保护小股东及上市公司治理的法律框架已越来越全面,但实践中,小股东通过诉讼途径来有效实现自身权利却仍困境重重。本文认为,法院拒绝受理针对政治背景深厚的公司提起的诉讼、小股东面临的举证困难、法院收取的高额诉讼费用等因素都是小股东在实践中所要克服的障碍。 / 本文认为,影响众多中国上市公司治理的最大问题以及小股东通过诉讼途径保护自身权益的最大障碍正是党国体制对经济活动的干预,尤其是对于部分上市公司和法律程序的干预。为论证该观点,文本首先分析了党国是如何参与并影响中国上市公司的治理。文章发现,党组织在那些由国家直接或间接控股的上市公司发挥了重要的决策及监督作用。此外,文章还分析了民营性质的上市公司是如何受到地方政府的干预。文章认为,针对上市公司的政治干预消弱了法律治理的作用,同时也损害了小股东的合法权益。为了实现对小股东的保护,法律不但要保护小股东不受私权的侵犯(比如私人或私人实体对小股东作出的欺诈或不当行为),更重要的是保护小股东权利不受到来自党国体制默许、支持、甚至实际参与的行为的侵犯。 / In the past decade, China has experienced an exponential increase in the quantity and quality of new laws and regulations promulgated by the state and its agencies, especially in the area of company law and securities regulation. The legal profession grows and provides ever more diversified services to a public, whose awareness of business and market practices, as well as to some extent the legal rules and principles governing these, are being strengthened by the burgeoning financial media. Yet, these improvements do not necessarily translate into better protection for minority shareholders of Chinese listed companies. / This thesis discusses the legal rules and principles governing minority shareholders’ protection, the political realities that have shaped some of the rules and, as argued here, threaten to undermine some of the principles, and minority shareholders’ activism to enforce their rights through litigation. The author has sought to test how law functions in the area of minority shareholder protection and how political practice affects the functioning of law in this area. While the legal framework for minority shareholders’ protection and for the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies is becoming increasingly coherent and comprehensive, it is still very difficult for the minority shareholders of listed companies to enforce their rights through litigation. Barriers faced by minority shareholders include, but not limited to, the court’s reluctance to try cases against listed companies that have strong political connections, difficulties for minority shareholders to meet the burden of proof, and the high litigation fees collected by the courts. / This thesis argues that the most severe problem affecting the corporate governance of many Chinese listed companies and the main obstacle of minority shareholders’ litigations against the listed companies lie in the intervention of the Party-State with economic activities occurring in what is formally speaking the private economy - in particular, activities on the part of publicly listed companies - and the legal process. To establish this argument, the thesis discusses, firstly, the participation and intervention of the Party-State in the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. It finds that the Party committees play important decision-making and supervisory roles in listed companies controlled by the state and its agencies. Secondly, listed companies founded by private entrepreneurs are also under political influence from local governments. The political intervention of listed companies weakens the legal governance regime of Chinese listed companies and damages the interest of minority shareholders. The protection of minority shareholders requires a legal regime that could protect individual minority shareholders against not only private transgressions, such as fraud and misconduct on the part of private entities, but also, more importantly, the infringement of individual citizen’s rights committed with acquiescence, support or even participation from the Party-State and its agents. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Zhang, Yihong. / "November 2012." / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Acknowledgments --- p.viii / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / The organization of the thesis --- p.2 / A survey of China’s securities market --- p.6 / Investors: who are investors in China’s stock market? --- p.6 / Policy-driven market --- p.31 / Chapter Conclusion --- p.39 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Important Rights in Minority Shareholders Protection --- p.40 / Introduction --- p.40 / The conceptualization and typology of minority shareholders’ rights --- p.41 / The Principal shareholders’ rights in company law --- p.43 / Shareholders’ rights in relation to shareholders’ meetings --- p.44 / Shareholders’ rights in relation to inspection of company documents --- p.63 / Shareholders’ rights in relation to dividends --- p.71 / Chapter conclusion --- p.73 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Fiduciary duties and minority shareholders protection --- p.76 / Introduction --- p.76 / Fiduciary duties of directors, supervisors and other senior officers --- p.79 / Background --- p.79 / Duties of directors and managers before the 2005 Company Law revision --- p.81 / The insertion of fiduciary duties by the 2005 Company Law amendment --- p.85 / The legislative framework of fiduciary duties in the 2005 Company Law --- p.87 / Legal remedies for minority shareholders when directors and other senior officers breach their fiduciary duties --- p.92 / The Duties of controlling shareholders --- p.103 / Related Party Transactions and fiduciary duties of the controlling shareholders --- p.106 / Derivative lawsuits against the controlling shareholders --- p.107 / Conclusion --- p.109 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- The Party’s influence and control over the listed company --- p.112 / Introduction --- p.112 / Statutory basis for the Party’s involvement in Chinese listed companies --- p.115 / The constitutional basis for the Party’s policy towards the listed companies --- p.115 / The Company Law’s basis for the Party’s involvement in the listed companies --- p.119 / The Party Law’s basis for the Party’s involvement in the listed companies --- p.121 / Summary --- p.123 / The role of the Party in Chinese listed companies --- p.124 / Decision-making mechanisms --- p.127 / Supervision mechanisms --- p.146 / The Relationship between local government and listed companies --- p.170 / Chapter Conclusion --- p.177 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Analysis of minority shareholders protection cases --- p.179 / Introduction --- p.179 / The Representativeness of Northeastern Expressway --- p.181 / Materials and sources used for this case study --- p.183 / Structure of the case study --- p.185 / The financial packaging of the Northeastern Expressway --- p.187 / The corporate governance turmoil --- p.198 / Personnel appointment --- p.198 / Competition between local governments --- p.206 / Stage 1 The initial power struggle (1999-2001) --- p.208 / Stage 2 Zhang Xiaoguang’s reign (2001-2006) --- p.219 / Stage 3 Post Zhang Xiaoguang era (2006-2010) --- p.227 / The minority shareholders’ litigation --- p.233 / Chapter Conclusion --- p.239 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- State control of privately owned listed companies --- p.243 / Introduction --- p.243 / Historical review of privately owned listed companies --- p.250 / Pre-Republic: conditional recognition --- p.252 / Pre-reform: the road to illegitimacy --- p.253 / Post-reform: Private companies that were in the grey areas --- p.261 / The ‘red hat’ company --- p.271 / The Definition of the ‘red hat’ company --- p.272 / Vanke Co.: An exemplar of the ‘red hat’ companies --- p.274 / The predicaments of a ‘red hat’ company the case study of the Hubei Tianfa Group --- p.281 / The Kelong Case --- p.299 / Introduction --- p.300 / The issue of funding for minority shareholder’s litigation --- p.303 / Suspension of trial --- p.306 / Settlement --- p.309 / Ruling --- p.312 / Chapter Conclusion --- p.315 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.318 / Reference --- p.328 / Abbreviations --- p.340
352

Insider trading and stock volatility.

January 2004 (has links)
Tam,Tsz-Wa. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-109). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Insider Trading and Corporate Governance --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Insider Trading and Stock Volatility --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Objective of the Thesis Research --- p.4 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Review of Theoretical Literature --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Review of Empirical Literature --- p.18 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Insider Dealing Regulations in Hong Kong --- p.24 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Data --- p.27 / Chapter 4.1 --- Data Collection --- p.27 / Chapter 4.2 --- Summary Statistics of Insider Trading Data --- p.30 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Methodology --- p.31 / Chapter 5.1 --- Hypothesis --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2 --- Event Study --- p.32 / Chapter 5.3 --- Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Empirical Results: Event Study --- p.51 / Chapter 6.1 --- General Description of Results --- p.51 / Chapter 6.2 --- Volatility Change Immediately before Insider Trading --- p.53 / Chapter 6.3 --- Volatility Immediately before and after Insider Trading --- p.61 / Chapter 6.4 --- Volatility Change Immediately after Insider Trading --- p.67 / Chapter 6.5 --- Intermediate Term Volatility before and after Insider Trading --- p.72 / Chapter 6.6 --- Chapter Summary and Discussion --- p.79 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Empirical Results: Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis --- p.83 / Chapter 7.1 --- Volatility of Hang Seng Index Return --- p.83 / Chapter 7.2 --- Volatility of Market Value Weighted Index Return --- p.85 / Chapter 7.3 --- Volatility of Equal Weighted Index Return --- p.87 / Chapter 7.4 --- Aggregate Total Volatility --- p.89 / Chapter 7.5 --- Aggregate Abnormal Return Volatility --- p.91 / Chapter 7.6 --- Aggregate Firm Specific Volatility --- p.93 / Chapter 7.7 --- Chapter Summary and Discussion --- p.95 / Chapter Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.97 / Bibliography --- p.105
353

An empirical study of China's special treatment (ST) firms.

January 2006 (has links)
Liu Yajun. / Thesis submitted in: November 2005. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-93). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1: --- Introduction --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- ST Firms in China --- p.15 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- Sample Selection and Data Description --- p.22 / Chapter 3.1 --- Data sources --- p.22 / Chapter 3.2 --- Data description --- p.23 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- Methodology --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1 --- Event study for abnormal returns --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Definition and observation period --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Normal and abnormal returns --- p.31 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Models to determine the normal returns --- p.31 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- Market model estimation --- p.33 / Chapter 4.1.5 --- Statistical inference --- p.35 / Chapter 4.2 --- Models with discrete dependent variables --- p.37 / Chapter 4.3 --- Wilconxon rank test --- p.38 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- Results of Empirical Studies --- p.39 / Chapter 5.1 --- Market reaction to ST events-event study --- p.39 / Chapter 5.2 --- Relationship of the cumulative abnormal returns and restructuring activities --- p.44 / Chapter 5.3 --- Relationship of ST status and restructuring activities --- p.50 / Chapter 5.4 --- Operational performance pre and post Share- restructuring activities of ST firms --- p.54 / Chapter 5.5 --- Regression result of operational performance pre and post share- restructuring activities --- p.57 / Chapter Chapter 6: --- Conclusion --- p.59 / Tables --- p.64 / Appendix I: Special Treatment System in China's Stock Market --- p.87 / References --- p.89
354

Two essays in corporate finance. / CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection / ProQuest dissertations and theses

January 2006 (has links)
Part B examines the relationship between firm board quality and initial underpricing and the post-IPO performance of 73 H-share and Red-chip share firms from 1993 to 2000. I hypothesize that a high quality board can convey the firm's intrinsic value to the market, thereby reducing the information asymmetry in the firm. Therefore, IPOs of firms with higher management quality will be characterized by lower underpricing level and higher aftermarket long-term stock performance. The level of underpricing is 32% for the sample firms. My result shows that firms with more foreigners on board tend to have a lower IPO underpricing level. The aftermarket, long-term downward drift is confirmed relative to all of the six benchmarks used in this paper. More foreigners on board are positively related to the post-IPO long-term stock performance. In summary, the results show that the management quality of directors has a positive influence on long-term post-IPO stock performance. / This paper consists of two parts. Part A This paper investigates the determinants of the adoption of executive stock option plans in Japanese firms and measures the market reaction of executive stock option grants. I find that firms with larger size, and low leverage level are more likely to adopt executive stock options. I also find that keiretsu firms in Japan are less likely to adopt stock options. In those firms that grant stock options, firms with high liquidity and those operate in noisier environment tend to use more option incentives. Japanese firms exhibit significant abnormal stock returns about 0.4% of at the announcement day. / Zhang Ling. / "March 2006." / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-11, Section: A, page: 4287. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 162-169). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.
355

The operating performance of IPO firms: the case of Hong Kong.

January 1996 (has links)
by Ching Chi Keung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-91). / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.3 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Data --- p.17 / Chapter 4. --- Profile of IPOs in Hong Kong --- p.24 / Chapter 5. --- Methodology --- p.27 / Chapter 6. --- Results --- p.43 / Chapter 7. --- Comparison with the study in U. S --- p.57 / Chapter 8. --- Summary --- p.61 / Chapter 9. --- Tables --- p.64 / Chapter 10. --- Results of statistical test --- p.70 / Chapter 11. --- Charts --- p.72 / Chapter 12. --- Appendixes --- p.79 / Chapter 13. --- Reference --- p.89
356

An empirical research for studying the effects of options introduction on the underlying stocks in Hong Kong.

January 1997 (has links)
by Chan Pak Man, Lee Kim Wai. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Incldues bibliographical references (leaves 59-62). / ABSTRACT --- p.iii / TABLES OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / Chapter CHAPTER I --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Rationales of the Research --- p.1 / Outline of the Report --- p.3 / Chapter CHAPTER II --- BACKGROUND OF STOCK OPTIONS --- p.5 / Definition of a Stock Option --- p.5 / Differences from the Common Stock --- p.6 / Benefits of Stock Options --- p.6 / Overview of the Hong Kong Market --- p.8 / Chapter CHAPTER III --- OBJECTIVES --- p.9 / Chapter CHAPTER IV --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.11 / Theoretical Literature --- p.11 / Provision of investment choice --- p.11 / Efficient allocation of risk-bearing --- p.12 / Information efficiency --- p.13 / Destabilizing effect --- p.14 / Cross-effects --- p.14 / Empirical Evidence --- p.15 / Price effect --- p.15 / Volatility effect --- p.16 / Cross-effects on stocks --- p.18 / Chapter CHAPTER V --- METHODOLOGY --- p.20 / Data Collection --- p.20 / Statistical Analysis and Procedures --- p.21 / Chapter CHAPTER VI --- FINDINGS --- p.29 / Introduction Effects --- p.29 / Direct Price Effects (Options Listing) --- p.29 / Individual Stock Perspective --- p.29 / "Event Period (-20,+20)" --- p.29 / "Event Period (-10,+10)" --- p.31 / Average Excess Returns (Independent stocks) --- p.32 / "Event Period (-20,+20)" --- p.32 / "Event Period (-10,+10)" --- p.33 / Average Excess Returns (Equally-weighted portfolio) --- p.34 / "Event Period (-20,+20)" --- p.34 / "Event Period (-10,+10)" --- p.35 / Announcement Effects --- p.36 / Individual Stock Perspective --- p.36 / "Event Period (-20,+20)" --- p.36 / "Event Period (-10,+10)" --- p.38 / Average Excess Returns (Independent stocks) --- p.39 / "Event Period (-20,+20)" --- p.39 / "Event Period (-10,+10)" --- p.40 / Average Excess Returns (Equally-weighted portfolio) --- p.41 / Event Period (-20,+20) --- p.41 / "Event Period (-10,+10)" --- p.42 / Cross-effects --- p.43 / Volatility Effects --- p.45 / Chapter CHAPTER VI --- I DISCUSSION --- p.47 / Chapter CHAPTER VI --- II SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION --- p.53 / Chapter CHAPTER IX --- RECOMMENDATION --- p.57 / Chapter CHAPTER X --- BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.59 / Chapter CHAPTER XI --- APPENDIX A --- p.63 / Announcement Effect for 21 days windows --- p.63 / Announcement Effect for 41 days windows --- p.68 / Listing Effect for 21 days windows --- p.73 / Listing Effect for 41 days windows --- p.78 / APPENDIX B --- p.83 / Table 6.1 --- p.83 / Table 6.2.1 --- p.84 / Table 6.2.2 --- p.85 / Table 6.2.3 --- p.86 / Table 6.2.4 --- p.87 / Table 6.3.1 --- p.88 / Table 6.3.2 --- p.89 / Table 6.3.3 --- p.90 / Table 6.3.4 --- p.91 / Table 6.4.1 --- p.92 / Table 6.4.2 --- p.93 / Table 6.4.3 --- p.94 / Table6.4.4 --- p.95 / Table6.5 --- p.96
357

Underpricing of IPOs in Hong Kong: theories and empirical evidence.

January 1997 (has links)
by Cheong Mei Kin, Sung Shuk Ka. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-99). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.iv / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.v / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vii / LIST OF GRAPHS --- p.viii / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- REVIEW OF THEORY AND LITERATURE --- p.4 / Rock's Model (Adverse Selection) --- p.5 / Principal - Agent Model --- p.6 / Signalling Model --- p.8 / Heterodox Explanations --- p.11 / Ownership Structure --- p.16 / Chapter III. --- REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK IN HONG KONG --- p.18 / Initial Public Offering in Hong Kong: Procedures and Regulations --- p.18 / Underpricing of IPOs before the Merger of Hong Kong Stock Exchanges --- p.20 / P.McGuiness's Work --- p.21 / Chapter IV. --- DATA AND METHODOLOGY --- p.22 / Research Period and Data Description --- p.22 / Measures of Underpricing --- p.23 / Grouping of Data --- p.25 / Test for Rock's Model --- p.29 / Chapter V. --- RESULT AND DISCUSSION --- p.32 / Underpricing of IPOs in Hong Kong --- p.32 / Listing Methods and Underpricing of IPOs --- p.34 / Stock Groups and Underpricing of IPOs --- p.36 / Different Years of Underpricing Levels --- p.40 / Subscription Ratios and Underpricing --- p.44 / Capital Raising and Underpricing --- p.48 / Test of Rock's Model --- p.51 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSION --- p.56 / APPENDIX --- p.59 / Chapter 1. --- Warrant Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990- 1996) --- p.59 / Chapter 2. --- Listing Method Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990 -1996) --- p.60 / Chapter 3. --- Stock Group Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990-1996) --- p.63 / Chapter 4. --- Different Years of Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990- 1996) --- p.72 / Chapter 5. --- Subscription Ratio Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990- 1996) --- p.77 / Chapter 6. --- Amount of Capital Raised Effect On Underpricing Level Of IPOs (1990- 1996) --- p.81 / Chapter 7. --- Initial Public Offerings in Hong Kong (Jan. 1990 - Nov. 1996) --- p.84 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.94
358

Valuation of stock loans under exponential phase-type Lévy models.

January 2011 (has links)
Wong, Tat Wing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-55). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Problem Formulation --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Phase-type distribution --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- A generalization of the exponential distribution --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Properties of the phase-type distribution --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Phase-type jump diffusion model --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Jump diffusion model --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The stock price model --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Stock Loans --- p.10 / Chapter 3 --- General Properties of Stock Loans --- p.12 / Chapter 3.1 --- Preliminary results --- p.12 / Chapter 3.2 --- Characterization of the function V(x) --- p.15 / Chapter 4 --- Valuation / Chapter 4.1 --- Hyperexponential jumps --- p.25 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Solution of the linear system --- p.29 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Solution of the optimal exercise boundary --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2 --- Phase-type jumps --- p.33 / Chapter 4.3 --- The case for G'(1)≥ 0 --- p.36 / Chapter 5 --- Future Research Direction --- p.38 / Chapter 5.1 --- The fast mean-reverting stochastic volatility model --- p.38 / Chapter 5.2 --- Asymptotic expansion of stock loan --- p.39 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- The zeroth order term --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The first order term --- p.43 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.52 / Bibliography --- p.53
359

Survival analysis of listed firms in Hong Kong.

January 2007 (has links)
Li, Li. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 34-36). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter One --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter Two --- Methodology --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter Three --- Data --- p.9 / Chapter 3.1 --- Data Description --- p.9 / Chapter 3.2 --- Selection of Covariate --- p.13 / Chapter Chapter Four --- Empirical Analysis --- p.20 / Chapter 4.1 --- General Survival Analysis by Cox PH Model --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2 --- Competing Risk Analysis of Listed Firms --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3 --- Robustness Check --- p.28 / Chapter Chapter Five --- Conclusion --- p.30 / Appendix 1 --- p.32 / Appendix II --- p.33 / Reference --- p.34 / Tables --- p.37 / Figures --- p.58
360

Stock price synchronicity and insider trading: the evidence from China.

January 2011 (has links)
Zhang, Yujie. / "August 2011." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-56). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 摘要 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Institutional background and research hypotheses --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1 --- Rules and regulations in China --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Ownership structure and corporate governance in China --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3 --- Research hypothesis --- p.13 / Chapter 3. --- Construction of variables and model specification --- p.17 / Chapter 3.1 --- Stock return synchronicity (SYNCH) --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2 --- Insider trading --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3 --- Control variables --- p.21 / Chapter 3.4 --- Ownership structure and corporate governance indicators --- p.23 / Chapter 4. --- Descriptive statistics --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1 --- Insider trading --- p.31 / Chapter 4.2 --- Synchronicity --- p.34 / Chapter 4.3 --- Summary of all variables --- p.35 / Chapter 5. --- Regression analysis --- p.37 / Chapter 5.1 --- Effect of insider trading on stock price synchronicity --- p.37 / Chapter 5.2 --- Effect of insider trading by different identities on stock price synchronicity --- p.39 / Chapter 5.3 --- Effect of insider trading on stock price synchronicity under various corporate governance --- p.42 / Chapter 6. --- Robustness checks --- p.46 / Chapter 6.1 --- insider trading and industry-level return --- p.46 / Chapter 6.2 --- The effect of insider trading on industry vs. firm-specific earnings information --- p.47 / Chapter 7. --- Conclusions --- p.51 / References: --- p.53 / Appendix: Variable definitions: --- p.80

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