The legal position of asylum seekers in South African social security system is more nuanced as a result of their transitional stay or status in the country. Asylum seekers may often be present in South Africa for a quite a long time but their social security entitlement is more restricted, and similar to that of temporary residents. For example, asylum seekers’ social security position is completely different from that of refugees. Refugees enjoy the same social security treatment similarly to South African citizens and permanent residents. Refugees qualify for the constitutionally entrenched right to have access to social security, including appropriate social assistance. Refugees also qualify for other socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The exclusion of asylum seekers occurs despite the fact they are one of the vulnerable groups of noncitizens. Such exclusion forces asylum seekers to live under precarious conditions. It is fundamentally accepted that the drafters of the Constitution included the right to have access to social security, in order to ensure that everyone, irrespective of nationality and citizenship enjoys an acceptable standard of living. It is also fundamentally accepted that the right to have access to social security contained in section 27(1)(c) is limited by section 27(2) of the Constitution. Section 27(2) requires the State to take reasonable legislative measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to have access to social security. The South African courts had on several occasions confirmed that the content of section 27(1)(c) is limited by section 27(2) of the Constitution and that the state cannot implement the right to have access to social security on demand. It had also been confirmed that the right to have access to social security is enforceable. This means the beneficiaries of this right may seek recourse from the courts of law when they are not satisfied about the progress relating to the implementation of the programmes relevant to the right to have access to social security. The right to have access to social security is also limited by section 36(1) of the Constitution. In the international arena, the right to have access to social security is recognised as the entitlement of everyone, but in some instances differential treatment can be made by the states. Such differential treatment should serve the legitimate state objective and all noncitizens should be treated equally.

Après la déclaration de guerre du président mexicain de la période 2006-2012 contre le narcotrafic, l’Etat s’est vu confronté à une véritable crise de sécurité. L’Etat ne disposait pas des moyens techniques personnels et législatifs pour faire face au crime organisé, ce qui provoqua des affrontements violents sur tout le territoire national, affectant la population. Suite à l’échec des structures chargées de garantir la sécurité, le Mexique cherche à redéfinir sa politique en matière de sécurité intérieure. Le cadre des compétences des autorités des trois niveaux de la structure mexicaine et les lois actuelles en matière de sécurité complexifient la problématique. Pourquoi l’Etat mexicain a t’il été incapable de garantir la sécurité de sa population et de maîtriser son territoire dans certaines régions ? L’objectif principal de cette thèse est d’analyser le cadre juridique opérationnel et institutionnel du Mexique et contribuer ainsi à la création d’un système de sécurité innovant, efficace et permanent ; en d’autres termes, un système de sécurité qui articule au mieux les différents niveaux de la structure législative et institutionnelle mexicaine. / After the Mexican President for the period 2006-2012 declared war against drug trafficking, the State faced a severe security crisis

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-08-11T13:20:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniele de Mattos Carreira.pdf: 813025 bytes, checksum: 214a4311d029cae70eb923a0f668d42f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-11T13:20:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniele de Mattos Carreira.pdf: 813025 bytes, checksum: 214a4311d029cae70eb923a0f668d42f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-22 / This paper conducts a study on the jurisprudential disagreement on social rights, starting, therefore, from the interpretation of the rule. With thesis and antithesis, bringing de advantages and disadvantages of jurisprudential divergence, it seeks to reach the synthesis, in the conclusion, stating what would be more advantageous to the effectiveness of social security rights / presente trabalho realiza um estudo sobre a divergência jurisprudencial em matéria de direito social, partindo-se, para tanto, da interpretação da norma. Com tese e antítese, trazendo as vantagens e desvantagens da divergência jurisprudencial, busca-se alcançar a síntese, na conclusão, com o que seria mais vantajoso à efetividade dos direitos previdenciários

In the period 2004-2007, the highest courts of Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada handed down judgments on the legality of the indefinite detention of non-citizens, specifically non-citizens subject to a removal order whose removal was frustrated. Each of the governments claimed that its intention to remove the non-citizens if and when it became viable to do so sufficed to establish that their detention fell within an ‘immigration’ exception to non-citizens’ rights. The cases thus raised fundamental questions about the relationship between non-citizens’ rights and governments’ power to control national borders. I argue that the indefinite detention of a non-citizen subject to a removal order is illegal. The detention of a non-citizen subject to a removal order is lawful if it can be justified as a proportionate measure to effect his or her removal. Indefinite detention fails this proportionality test and as such is an unlawful violation of a non-citizen’s rights. I develop my argument through case studies from the three jurisdictions. I argue that the law of all three jurisdictions contained ample resources to support a ruling that indefinite detention was unlawful. The question then arises as to why this view did not prevail in every jurisdiction. I demonstrate that, taking into account variations in legal frameworks and doctrines, a judge’s response to indefinite detention is at base determined by his or her answer to the question ‘does a non-citizen, against whom a valid removal order has been made, retain a right to liberty?’ The judge’s answer to this question flows through his or her adjudication on the scope of ‘immigration’ exceptions to legal protections of the personal liberty of non-citizens considered in the case studies. I consider the best justification for the view that a removal order revokes a non-citizen’s right to liberty, provided by John Finnis. I argue that it rests on questionable understandings of citizenship, and in operation inevitably undermines the values of community solidarity it seeks to promote.

In the period 2004-2007, the highest courts of Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada handed down judgments on the legality of the indefinite detention of non-citizens, specifically non-citizens subject to a removal order whose removal was frustrated. Each of the governments claimed that its intention to remove the non-citizens if and when it became viable to do so sufficed to establish that their detention fell within an ‘immigration’ exception to non-citizens’ rights. The cases thus raised fundamental questions about the relationship between non-citizens’ rights and governments’ power to control national borders. I argue that the indefinite detention of a non-citizen subject to a removal order is illegal. The detention of a non-citizen subject to a removal order is lawful if it can be justified as a proportionate measure to effect his or her removal. Indefinite detention fails this proportionality test and as such is an unlawful violation of a non-citizen’s rights. I develop my argument through case studies from the three jurisdictions. I argue that the law of all three jurisdictions contained ample resources to support a ruling that indefinite detention was unlawful. The question then arises as to why this view did not prevail in every jurisdiction. I demonstrate that, taking into account variations in legal frameworks and doctrines, a judge’s response to indefinite detention is at base determined by his or her answer to the question ‘does a non-citizen, against whom a valid removal order has been made, retain a right to liberty?’ The judge’s answer to this question flows through his or her adjudication on the scope of ‘immigration’ exceptions to legal protections of the personal liberty of non-citizens considered in the case studies. I consider the best justification for the view that a removal order revokes a non-citizen’s right to liberty, provided by John Finnis. I argue that it rests on questionable understandings of citizenship, and in operation inevitably undermines the values of community solidarity it seeks to promote.

Thesis (M. Soc. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1986.

After more than ten years from its initiation by the Canadian delegation in 1988, the UNIDROIT's legal reform in the area of international security and leasing interests in mobile equipment reached its final stage of discussion at the international level. A Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (" Convention") and a Preliminary Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment ("Protocol") present an evolution of the international security law and the aircraft finance law in particular. The "Convention", as applied through the "Protocol", particularly aims at economic benefits for the aviation industry, which has to cope with considerable financing difficulties due to the uncoordinated national security laws. This thesis addresses legal and economic issues behind the UNIDROIT proposal. / The texts of the "Convention" and the " Protocol" as reviewed by the Drafting Committee of the First Joint Session (Rome, 1--12 February 1999), are attached in the Appendix. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Canadian airport authorities benefit from the right to seize and detain aircraft where airport charges remain unpaid. By objective measures, this right constitutes a preferred non-consensual right or interest that takes priority under Canadian law over all competing rights and interests in the aircraft subject to seizure and detention, including, for example, the interests of an owner, lessor or secured creditor. In this manner, airport authorities may recover outstanding user fees from both the airlines themselves and from the aircraft owners or lessors. / The Unidroit Convention attempts to harmonise the law applicable to aircraft finance transactions. As such, it targets private law rights. However, its breadth and scope touch upon the statutory rights of third parties with non-consensual interests in aircraft, including those of airport authorities to seize and detain aircraft. / The interplay between the Unidroit regime and the seizure and detention rights of Canada's airport is the focus of this academic discourse. It demonstrates that even though this right, recourse and remedy is of fundamental importance to Canada's National Airports System and its transportation infrastructure generally, the Unidroit Convention could, if implemented as drafted, effectively compromise the ability of Canadian airports to seize and detain aircraft.

Univ., Diss.--Freiburg, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. 195 - 203.

Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1986. / Also available in print.