Thesis (M.A.)--Brandeis University, 2009. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on August 9, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1999. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-178). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1999. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-178). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 178-185).

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 86-93).

Thesis (M.A.) University of Missouri-Columbia, 2005. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (May 18, 2007) Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, 2006. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 123-132).

The development of autonomous social robots is still in its infancy, but there is no reason tothink that it will not continue. In fact, the robotics industry is growing rapidly. Since this trendis showing no signs of abating it is relevant to ask what type of relations we can have withthese machines. Is it for example possible to be friends with them? In this thesis I argue that it is unlikely that we will ever be able to be friends with robots. To believe otherwise is to be deceived, a trap it is all too easy to fall into since the efforts put on making social robots as human-like as possible and to make the human-robot interaction as smooth as possible are huge. But robots are not always what they seem. For instance, the capacity to enter into a friendship of one’s own volition is a core requirement for a relationship to be termed friendship. We also have a duty to act morally towards our friends, to treat them with due respect. To be able to do this we need to have self-knowledge, a sense of ourselves as persons in our own right. We do not have robots who display these capacities today, nor is it a given that we ever will. / Utvecklingen av autonoma sociala robotar är ännu i sin linda men det finns ingen anledning att tro att den inte kommer att fortsätta. Faktum är att robotindustrin växer kraftigt. Då denna trend inte visar några tecken på att avta är det relevant att fråga sig vilket slags relation vi kan ha till dessa maskiner. Är det t.ex. möjligt att bli vän med dem? I denna uppsats argumenterar jag för att det inte är troligt att vi någonsin kommer att kunna utveckla vänskap med en robot. Att tro något annat är en villfarelse, en fälla det är alltför lätt att falla i inte minst på grund av den möda som läggs ned på att göra robotarna så människoliknande som möjligt och robot-människa-interaktionen så smidig som möjligt. Men robotarna är inte alltid vad de verkar vara. Exempelvis är förmågan att kunna inleda ett vänskapsförhållande på eget bevåg engrundförutsättning för att relationen ska kunna klassas som vänskap. Vi har också en plikt att handla moraliskt gentemot våra vänner, att behandla dem med respekt. För att kunna göra detta måste vi ha självkännedom, en uppfattning om oss själva som personer i vår egen rätt. Robotar har inte dessa förmågor idag, och det är inte säkert att de någonsin kommer att besitta dem.

In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in