吳俊華. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學部. / Manuscript (cops. 2 & 3 reprint copies) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 156-159. / Wu Junhua. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue bu.

Habilitationsschrift--Göttingen. / Bibliography: p. [329]-333.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1968. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

I propose to analyse referring, the typical function of proper names and definite descriptions, in terms of speakers' intentions rather than in terms of the meanings of words. Grice's theory of meaning explains how a speaker can mean something simply by making an utterance with the proper sort of intention, and I attempt to apply this theory of meaning to referring. I see two related reasons for thinking a Gricean theory of reference correct. First, I try to show that our speech practice is such as to demand a Gricean-type theory; we simply do depend rather often on hearers' recognition of speakers' intentions to achieve reference. Second, the causal theory of proper names, which I investigate in Chapter 5. seems to demand a Gricean theory of reference. In Chapter 1, I am concerned with whole utterance meaning, and with the problem of going from occasional meaning to conventional meaning. Lewis' analysis of convention is deployed in a way which I think vindicates Grice's hope that conventional or timeless meaning may be analyzed in terms of occasional meaning. In Chapter 2, I attempt to extend the Gricean program to parts of utterances. That is, I argue that an utterance may have meaningful parts and grammatical structure entirely without benefit of convention. Primitive cases of referring and predicating can arise at this pre-conventional level, and here certainly referring is to be explained by a Gricean theory. Chapter 3 contains the body of my argument for a Gricean theory of reference. I try to show that our referring practice is in fact one which depends on the characteristic form of the Gricean intention: the speaker, by his utterance, intends that the hearer shall be affected in some way, intending this to come about at least in part by hearers' recognition of speakers' intentions. The first three section of Chapter 3 are devoted to arguing for the Gricean character of reference, and the remaining two to developing suitable epistemic foundations for such a theory. If a speaker's intention is primary, the meanings of the words he uses are (with qualifications) secondary, so we must be able to explain how a speaker is connected with the object of his reference in some way which does not essentially involve his being able to say something true about that object. I use Kaplan's theory of relational belief, with .its emphasis on the causal element in a belief, to provide this connection. Having a relational belief about an object connects one with it, and allows one to have an intention directed towards it. Chapter ^ is a criticism of the standard theory of reference with Searle and Strawson cast as its defenders. Chapter 5 is a presentation and elaboration of the 'causal' or the 'historical explanation' theory of names, the new theory of names which, I claim, requires a Gricean theory of reference. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

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published_or_final_version / abstract / Humanities / Master / Master of Philosophy

Yeung, Wang Chun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-117). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Declarations / Acknowledgements / Table of Contents / Introduction --- p.1 / PART I FROM MIXED TRUTHS TO TWO-DIMENSIONALISM / Chapter Chapter One: --- "Rigidity, Descriptivism, and Direct Reference" / Chapter 1.1. --- Meaning and Reference --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2. --- Rigidity and the Dusk of Descriptivism --- p.13 / Chapter 1.3. --- Different Theories of Reference --- p.22 / Chapter 1.4. --- Apriority and Necessity --- p.32 / Chapter Chapter Two: --- Two-Dimensionalism / Chapter 2.1. --- Possible-World Semantics --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2. --- Two-Dimensional Semantics --- p.43 / Chapter 2.3. --- Variety of Two-Dimensionalism --- p.48 / PART II TWO-DIMENSIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS / Chapter Chapter Three: --- The Argument from Ignorance and Error / Chapter 3.1. --- A-Intension and Associated Properties --- p.59 / Chapter 3.2. --- The Argument from Ignorance and Error --- p.65 / Chapter 3.3. --- The a Priori Argument --- p.73 / Chapter Chapter Four: --- The Argument from Variability / Chapter 4.1. --- Associated Properties and Meanings --- p.88 / Chapter 4.2. --- A-Intension and Understanding --- p.90 / Chapter 4.3. --- A-Intension and Communication --- p.97 / CONCLUDING REMARKS --- p.109 / BIBLOGRAPHY --- p.112

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A generalized inclusion (g.i.) frame consists of a set of points (or "worlds") W and an assignment of a binary relation Rw on W to each point w in W. generalized inclusion frames whose Rw are partial orders are called comparison frames. Conditional logics of various comparative notions, for example, Lewis's V-logic of comparative possibility and utilitarian accounts of conditional obligation, model the dyadic modal operator > on comparison frames according to (what amounts to) the following truth condition: oc>13"holds at w" if every point in the truth set of a bears Rw to some point where holds. In this essay I provide a relational frame theory which embraces both accessibility semantics and g.i. semantics as special cases. This goal is achieved via a philosophically significant generalization of universal strict implication which does not assume accessibility as a primitive. Within this very general setting, I provide the first axiomatization of the dyadic modal logic corresponding to the class of all g.i. frames. Various correspondences between dyadic logics and first order definable subclasses of the class of g.i. frames are established. Finally, some general model constructions are developed which allow uniform completeness proofs for important sublogics of Lewis' V.