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This thesis presents a framework for inter-agent communication, represented and partially implemented with default reasoning. I focus on the limited goal of determining the meaning for a Hearer-agent of an utterance ω by a Speaker-agent, in terms of the beliefs of the interlocutors. This meaning is generally more than just the explicit propositional contents of ω, and more than just the Speaker's goal to convey her belief that ω. One way of determining this meaning is to let the Hearer take stock of the implicit components of the Speaker's utterances. Among the implicit components of the meaning of ω, I show in particular how to derive certain of its presuppositions with a set of default schemata using a framework for default reasoning. More information can be extracted from the communications channel between interlocutors by adopting a normative model of inter-agent communication, and using this model to explain or 'make sense' of the Speaker's utterances. I construct such a model expressed in terms of a set of default principles of communication using the same framework for default reasoning. The task of deriving the meaning of an utterance is similar to the job required of a user-interface, where the user is the Speaker-agent, and the interface itself is the Hearer-agent. The goal of a user-interface as Hearer is to make maximal use of the data moving along the communications channel between user and application. The result is an integrated theory of normative, inter-agent communications expressed within an ontologically and logically minimal framework. This work demonstrates the development and application of a methodology for the use of default reasoning. The implementation of the theory is also presented, along with a discussion of its applicability to practical user-interfacing. A view emerges of user-modelling as a component of a user-interface. / Science, Faculty of / Computer Science, Department of / Graduate

Orientador: Itala Maria Loffredo D'Ottaviano / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T15:04:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Almeida_EdgarLuisBezerrade_M.pdf: 946200 bytes, checksum: e8e316a3ee7420c8d7f45a751651a436 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Esta Dissertação apresenta uma definição de lógica abstrata e caracteriza alguns sistemas lógicos bastante conhecidos na literatura como casos particulares desta. Em especial, mostramos que a lógica de primeira ordem, lógica de segunda ordem, lógica com o operador Q1 de Mostowski e a lógica infinitária L!1! são casos particulares de lógicas abstratas. Mais que isso, mostramos que tais lógicas são regulares. Na análise de cada uma das lógicas acima citadas, mostramos o comportamento das mesmas com relação às propriedades de Löwenheim-Skolem e compacidade enumerável, resultados estes centrais à teoria de modelos. Nossa análise permite-nos constatar que, dentre os quatro casos apresentados, o único que goza de ambas as propriedades é a lógica de primeira ordem; as demais falham em uma, na outra ou em ambas as propriedades. Mostramos que isso não é mera coincidência, mas sim um resultado profundo, que estabelece fronteiras bem delimitadas à lógica de primeira ordem, conhecido como primeiro teorema de Lindström: se uma lógica é regular, ao menos tão expressiva quanto à lógica de primeira ordem e satisfaz ambas as propriedades citadas, então esta é equivalente a lógica de primeira ordem. Realizamos uma prova cuidadosa do teorema, em que cada ideia e cada estratégia de prova é estabelecida criteriosamente. Com seu trabalho, Lindström inaugurou um novo e profícuo campo de estudo, a teoria abstrata de modelos que estabelece, com relação a diversas combinações de propriedades de sistemas lógicos, uma estratificação entre lógicas. Apresentamos um outro exemplo de tal estratificação através de uma versão modal do teorema de Lindström, versão esta que caracteriza a lógica modal básica como maximal quanto a bissimilaridade e compacidade. Encerramos esta Dissertação com algumas considerações acerca da influência do primeiro teorema de Lindström / Abstract: This thesis presents the definition of abstract logic and features some quite logical systems presented in the literature as particular cases of this. In particular, we show that first-order logic, second-order logic, the logic with Mostowski's operator Q1 and the infinitary logic L!1! are specific systems of abstract logic. Moreover, we show that such logics are regular. In the analysis of each above mentioned logical systems we analyses his performance with regard to the properties of compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem, results that have important role in model theory. Our analysis allows us to conclude that among the four cases, the only one who enjoys both properties is the first-order logic, and all others fail in one, other or both properties. We show that this is not mere coincidence, but rather a deep, well-defined boundaries establishing the first-order logic, known as first Lindström's theorem: a regular logic that is at least as expressive as first-order logic and satisfies both properties mentioned, then this is equivalent to first-order logic. We conducted a thorough proof of the theorem, in which each idea and each proof strategy is carefully established. With his work Lindström inaugurated a new and fruitful field of study, the abstract model theory, which establishes with respect to different combinations of properties of logical systems, stratification between logical. Here is another example of such stratification through one of the theorem of modal version Lindström, which characterizes this version of the logic basic modal such as maximal bissimimulation and compactness. We conclude the thesis with some considerations about the influence of the Lindström's theorem / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia