<p>This licentiate thesis argues that a key to understanding the embodiment of cognition is the “sharing” of neural mechanisms between sensorimotor processes and higher-level cognitive processes as described by simulation theories. Simulation theories explain higher-level cognition as (partial) simulations or emulations of sensorimotor processes through the re-activation of neural circuitry also active in bodily perception, action, and emotion. This thesis develops the notion that simulation mechanisms have a particular representational function, as off-line representations, which contributes to the representation debate in embodied cognitive science. Based on empirical evidence from neuroscience, psychology and other disciplines as well as a review of existing simulation theories, the thesis describes three main mechanisms of simulation theories: re-activation, binding, and prediction. The possibility of using situated and embodied artificial agents to further understand and validate simulation as a mechanism of (higher-level) cognition is addressed through analysis and comparison of existing models. The thesis also presents some directions for further research on modeling simulation as well as the notion of embodied simulation as off-line representation.</p> / Report code: LiU-Tek-Lic-2007:21.

This licentiate thesis argues that a key to understanding the embodiment of cognition is the “sharing” of neural mechanisms between sensorimotor processes and higher-level cognitive processes as described by simulation theories. Simulation theories explain higher-level cognition as (partial) simulations or emulations of sensorimotor processes through the re-activation of neural circuitry also active in bodily perception, action, and emotion. This thesis develops the notion that simulation mechanisms have a particular representational function, as off-line representations, which contributes to the representation debate in embodied cognitive science. Based on empirical evidence from neuroscience, psychology and other disciplines as well as a review of existing simulation theories, the thesis describes three main mechanisms of simulation theories: re-activation, binding, and prediction. The possibility of using situated and embodied artificial agents to further understand and validate simulation as a mechanism of (higher-level) cognition is addressed through analysis and comparison of existing models. The thesis also presents some directions for further research on modeling simulation as well as the notion of embodied simulation as off-line representation. / <p>Report code: LiU-Tek-Lic-2007:21.</p>

How we approach a poem changes it. Recently, it has been suggested that one readerly approach - a bodily orientation characterised by distance, suspicion, and resistance - risks becoming reflexive, pre-conscious, and predominant. This use-oriented reading allows us to destabilise, denaturalise, dissect, defend, and define poetic texts through its manifestation in contemporary literary critique, yet it is coming to be regarded as the sole manner and mood of intelligent, intellectual engagement. In this thesis, I demonstrate the need to pluralise this attentive orientation, particularly when it comes to contemporary lyric poetry. I suggest how an overlooked mode of response might foster a more receptive mode of approach: the 'co-creative' response. Lyric poems mean to move us, and they come to mean by moving us. Recent 'simulation theories of language comprehension', from the field of cognitive neuroscience, provide empirical evidence that language processing is not a product of a-modal symbol manipulation but rather involves 'simulations' by certain classes of neurons in areas used for real-world action and perception. As habituation and abstraction increase, however, these embodied simulations 'streamline', becoming narrow schematic 'shadows' of once broad, qualitatively rich simulations. Poems, I suggest, seek to reverse this process by situationally novel variations of language, coming to mean in the broadly embodied sense in which real-world experiences 'mean'. Readers are asked to 'enact' the poem, to 'co-create' its meaning. Where critique traditionally requires that readers resist enactive participation in the aim of objective analysis, the co-creative response - a response 'in kind' by imitation, versioning, or hommage - asks readers to receive and carry forward the enactive unfolding of a poem with a composition of their own. I assert that, by thus responding with - rather than to - poems, we might foster an attentive stance of active receptivity, thereby coming to understand poems as the enactive phenomena they are.