The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the relationship between the Sino-Soviet conflict and contemporary events in Indochina. I have yet to find a satisfactory analysis of this relationship. Of course there have been innumerable specialized books on related subjects, (such as the Sino-Soviet conflict, or Soviet and Chinese aid and trade policies with Indochina) but as far as I can gather, no study has focused on the Sino-Soviet conflict and its relationship with the Indochina countries of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia). By the very nature of the topic, I am forced to place limitations on the scope of this paper. Firstly, by necessity, it will concentrate on events which have occurred in Indochina, since the United States withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. This I hope will prevent the paper from becoming a long winded narrative, Secondly, I have tried to place this study into a broader analytical framework, consequently I have placed little emphasis on describing events. A final caveat is necessary. The outside observer is often tempted to impose a great deal of rationality - or his own notion of what is rational - on a foreign policy process, which, in reality, may be marked by ambiguity, contradictions and idiosyncracies. I have tried to guard against this by allowing different notions of rationality and by a blending of different rationality concepts that characterize the countries dealt with, (former President Thieu of South Vietnam for example, consulted his horoscope so as to make better policy decisions; his astrologer was a high ranking intelligence officer, a former head of the South Vietnamese Central Intelligence Agency.) 1. 1. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke. "Strategies of Survival the foreign policy dilemmas of smaller Asia States" 1st Edition St. Lucia. Queensland 1978 page IX.