This thesis examines the relationship between moral experience and moral knowledge in contemporary analytic meta-ethics. It begins with a critical examination of the work of Michael Smith, notably his book The Moral Problem, which leaves out of consideration the notion of moral experience. I treat Smith as representative of those working within what I call "the traditional meta-ethical framework," which is characterized by the assumption that moral knowledge, if it exists, is available, in principle, from any perspective. Within that framework, Smith's philosophy stands out as a model of clarity and forceful argument. I consider and develop some objections to his program from within the traditional framework. However, the latter part of the thesis is critical of the framework itself. Against it, I argue that moral knowledge is only available from a certain perspective, namely, the perspective of the virtuous agent. It is by coming to perceive or see things from this perspective that the right things will matter to us. In other words, I argue that we cannot hope for the impartial body of knowledge promised by the traditional framework where the things that ought to matter are supposed to be capable of codification or otherwise understandable across perspectives. In this regard I examine a number of philosophers who are sympathetic to the idea of moral perception, notably, Jonathan Dancy, John McDowell, Iris Murdoch, and David Wiggins. Finally, I consider the recent debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell on the nature of perceptual experience in order to assess just how rich a notion of experience is required in order to make sense of moral knowledge based on moral perception.

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