This thesis is an articulation of how the principles of socially-engaged Buddhism, a spiritual practice rooted in the teachings of the historical Buddha that integrates Buddhist practice and social activism, can enrich and enhance contemporary educational practice. It discusses Buddhist epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, psychology, ethics, and practice and relates these things to holistic education, critical pedagogy, SEL, and global education. On the basis of the theoretical understanding represented by that discussion, it articulates several theoretical principles that can be practically applied to the practice of teaching and learning to make it resonate with the theory and approach of sociallyengaged Buddhism. In integrating the implications of Buddhist teachings and practices with teaching and learning practice, it draws from bell hooks’ notion of “engaged pedagogy” in order to articulate a transformational, liberatory, and progressive approach to teaching called “socially-engaged pedagogy.” Socially-engaged pedagogy represents the notion that teaching and learning can be a practical site for progressive social action designed to address the real problem of suffering, both in the present and in the future, as it manifests in the world, exemplified by stress, illness, violence, war, discrimination, oppression, exploitation, poverty, marginalization, and ecological degradation.

Sport in Canada is struggling to demonstrate that it is accountable, value-based, and socially responsible. Simultaneously, there is a growing consciousness among elite athletes to use the power and appeal of sport to affect meaningful social change. Through in-depth interviews, I sought to understand which values and experiences motivated 15 elite Canadian athletes to become involved in social and political activities. I employed a grounded theory approach to analyze interview data and to develop the Athlete Social Responsibility (ASR) framework. My results show that ASR is grounded in identity and existential development. The research participants indicated that, early in their careers, sport provided discipline, direction, and purpose, but through the maturation process, they indicated that becoming socially and politically active was instrumental to their personal development, performance, and continued participation in elite sport. They voiced frustration that the current sport system does little to encourage such engagement and offered a number of innovative ways in which the current system could adopt an ASR perspective. These ideas included: developing a resource to help athletes find their cause and link with related organizations, companies, or charities; helping athletes find ways to connect to their local communities; and restructuring the Canadian Athlete Assistance Program to include both performance and ASR criteria.

Resistance to rectifying local injustice and methods of addressing such resistance are often studied in terms of motivational barriers (e.g., system justification, Jost & Banaji, 2004). I propose that a cognitive mechanism called construal level may also play an important role. Construal level refers to whether people are thinking concretely or abstractly. For example, if considering the act of locking a door, one might construe the behavior as putting a key in a lock (a concrete construal) or as securing a house (an abstract construal). Construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998) states that people think concretely about near events and thinking concretely makes people more concerned about feasibility (e.g., “Is it affordable?”), whereas thinking abstractly makes people more concerned about morality (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). Thus, inducing abstract thinking might increase support for addressing local injustice. I assessed this novel proposal in two experimental studies that focused on the lack of adequate water services in First Nations and included measures of social action as dependent variables. In Study 1 (n = 151 White Canadian undergraduates; 44% women), participants thought about either a local or distant injustice. I hypothesized participants would support the local injustice less as they would think more concretely and thus be more concerned with feasibility and less concerned with morality; no differences emerged (p’s > .36, d’s < .15). In Study 2 (n = 166 White Canadian undergraduates; 66% women), I directly manipulated construal level and had all participants consider a local injustice. People led to think abstractly (vs. concretely) were more supportive of addressing injustice because they were more morally outraged, experienced more empathy, and thought the problem was easier to solve, 95% CI = [0.22, 0.98]. Thus, the results suggest that induced abstract thinking may be an effective tool for achieving local social change.

Four concepts are considered in relation to the question: can an illuminating characterization of the social sciences be given in terms of one concept of a relatively natural kind of thing? Weber's concept of 'social action' provides neither a general characterization, nor an important partial account, or so I argue after examining its relation to collectivity concepts, to suicide studies, and to standard desiderata for scientific concepts. I next assess the notion of 'meaningful'action. Peter Winch claims that such action is always 'social' in some sense, because it involves rule-following and rules f presuppose' a social setting. I consider the nature of Winch's Wittgensteinian arguments about rules; two senses in which all action might be 'social' emerge; however, were 'social actions' in either sense the focus of a science, it would not therefore aptly be called a social science, the senses of 'social' here being too weak. I turn next to what I allege is Durkheim's basic notion of a 'social fact' , roughly, that of a way of acting which 'inheres in' and is 'produced by' a social group. I present a highly articulated reconstruction of this notion: a 'collective practice', Pr, of a social group, G, will "be a 'Durkheimian social phenomenon', according to this revised conception, if and only if either Pr or another collective practice of G provides members of G who conform to Pr with a 'basic' reason for so conforming. A central element in my account of collective practices is a notion of 'group common knowledge' derived from David Lewis. I finally undertake a detailed critique of David Lewis's account of conventions and of the 'co-ordination problems' Lewis claims underlie conventions; I argue for a kind of account different in form from Lewis's, in which conventions are not, and do not necessarily involve, 'regularities' in behaviour. The Durkheimian notion is judged the best joartial characterization of a social science considered. Its presupposition of the notion of a social group is, I argue, no flaw. I conclude with a general theory of 'socialness', and hence of social science, based on my judgements about the four concepts considered.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1975. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 153-156). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Thesis (D.Ed.)--University of Melbourne, Faculty of Education, 2003. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 194-200).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2008. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 384-398). Also available online in Scholars' Bank; and in ProQuest, free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2007. Graduate programme in Social and Political Thought. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 360-367). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004 & res_dat=xri:pqdiss & rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation & rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR32058.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Colorado, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 163-177).

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Queensland, 2003. / Includes bibliography.