Thesis (M.A.)--Rutgers University, 2009. / "Graduate Program in Women's and Gender Studies." Includes bibliographical references (p. 122-126).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2006. / Thesis directed by Don A. Howard for the Program in History and Philosophy of Science. "July 2006." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 251-269).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 158-165). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2002. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 158-165).

Thesis (M.A.)--Montana State University--Bozeman, 2006. / Typescript. Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Kirk Branch. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-87).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Illinois State University, 2005. / Title from title page screen, viewed September 27, 2006. Dissertation Committee: Ronald Strickland (chair), Victoria Harris, Janice Neuleib. Table of contents page gives incorrect page numbers. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 131-138) and abstract. Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-178).

How are beliefs about the nature of knowledge reflected and reproduced in language use? It is clear that some linguistic resources, e.g. the modal verbs may and must, indicate one’s epistemic stance with respect to a proposition, i.e. one’s judgement of how likely it is to be true. What is less clear is how the use of such resources relates to speakers’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge per se, i.e. their epistemic policies (Teller 2004). To investigate the putative relationship between epistemological variation and linguistic variation, I examine samples of written and spoken English from a community that is particularly epistemologically diverse: academia. I synthesize research on social epistemology, sociolinguistics, linguistic anthropology, and Academic English (AE) to propose an explanatory model of variability in the expression of epistemic stance. Then, using AE as a case study, I evaluate the predictions of this model both quantitatively via corpus analysis of research articles and regression modelling of interview data, as well as qualitatively via analysis of discursive practices in terms of experience-organizing frames (Goffman 1974) and the semiotic notion of indexicality (e.g. Irvine 2001), whereby ideological differences produce, and are reproduced by, linguistic differences. This research makes contributions to a number of fields. It questions the analytic validity of disciplinarity, providing support for a unifying theory of variation in AE based instead on an epistemologically principled analysis of institutional language use. The indexical basis of sociolinguistic research on language and belief/identity is problematized by attending to epistemological context; the ramifications of this will be explored in future research. I develop a linguistic metric of epistemic belief, offering a means of developing a quantitative social epistemology to complement that field’s highly articulated theoretical work. Applications beyond academia are possible in areas concerned with knowledge management and transfer, such as public health.

高基存. / 呈交日期: 2004年8月. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2005. / 參考文獻 (p. 181-188). / Cheng jiao ri qi: 2004 nian 8 yue. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in English. / Gao Jicun. / Lun wen (Zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2005. / Can kao wen xian (p. 181-188).

Medical decisions should be based on good evidence. But this does not mean that health care professionals should practice evidence-based medicine. This dissertation explores how these two positions come apart, why they come apart, and what we should do about it. I begin by answering the descriptive question, what are current standards of evidence in medicine? I then provide a detailed critique of these standards. Finally, I address the more difficult normative question, how should we determine standards of evidence in medicine? In medicine, standards of evidence have been established by the pervasive evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement. Until now, these standards have not been subjected to comprehensive philosophical scrutiny. I outline and defend a theory of knowledge – a version of Helen Longino’s Critical Contextual Empiricism (CCE) – which enables me to critically evaluate EBM. My version of CCE emphasizes the critical evaluation of background assumptions. In accordance with this, I identify and critically evaluate the three substantive assumptions underlying EBM. First, I argue that medicine should not be held to the restrictive definition of science assumed by proponents of EBM. Second, I argue that epidemiological evidence should not be the only “base” of medical decisions. Third, I argue that not only is the particular hierarchy of evidence assumed by EBM unjustified, but that any attempt to hierarchically rank research methods is incoherent and unjustifiably restricts medical knowledge. Current standards of evidence divert attention from many legitimate sources of evidence. This distorts medical research and practice. In the remainder of the dissertation I propose means for improving not only current standards of medical evidence but also the process of producing and defending future standards. On the basis of four CCE norms, I argue that we have reason to protect and promote those features of the medical community that facilitate diversity, transparency, and critical interaction. Only then can we ensure that the medical community retains its ability to produce evidence that is both rigorous and relevant to practice.