Afrikaans text / In die perswese van Suid-Afrika het Die Burger gedurende die dertiger- en veertigerjare ’n besondere plek beklee. A1 was dit nie ’n koerant met reusesirkulasiesyfers nie, is dit gerespekteer omdat dit onder meer ’n besonder bevoegde redaksie en bestuurspan gehad het. Die wyse waarop hy sy direkte teenstander, Die Suiderstem, in die stof laat byt het, lewer bewys van Die Burger se krag en invloed, veral in sy hinterland. Die Burger en die Nasionale Party van Kaapland se noue verbintenis het tot gevolg gehad dat hulle ’n gedugte span gevorm het. Die verbintenis, wat wedersydse voordele ingehou het, is grootliks versterk deur D.F. Malan se betrokkenheid by Die Burger. Die rol wat die twee redakteurs A.L. Geyer en PJA. Weber in die tydperk 1934 tot 1948 gespeel het, moet as van kardinale belang beskou word. Veral die persoonlike ondersteuning wat hulle aan D.F. Malan gegee het in sy opbou van die Nasionale Party in die jare 1934 - 1948, het ’n deurslaggewende uitwerking op die Suid-Afrikaanse politieke geskiedenis gehad. Die rol wat Die Burger gedurende die koalisietydperk en daarna tydens samesmelting gespeel het, asook sy besonder noue verbintenis met sy lesers, het die koerant veral in Kaapland ’n baie belangrike politieke faktor gemaak. Dit het aan hom ook ’n besondere posisie van mag binne die Nasionale Party van Suid- Afrika laat inneem. Hierin het Geyer as redakteur, maar veral in sy persoonlike hoedanigheid, ’n groot rol gespeel. Die Burger se jarelange bydrae as kultuurbouer van die Afrikaanssprekendes het meegewerk dat die koerant as mede-skepper van die Nasionale Party se apartheidsfilosofie opgetree het. Die filosofie is beskou as die enigste wyse waarop die Afrikaanssprekende se kulturele en politieke regte beskerm en bestendig kon word. As praktiese instrument het dit veral ná 1939 ook meegehelp om die Nasionale Party aan bewind te bring in 1948. Die koerant het J.C. Smuts en die Verenigde Party gereeld aangeval en op alle gebiede aan die kaak probeer stel. Veral gedurende en na die Tweede Wereldoorlog het die koerant die Smuts-bewind as ’n onbevoegde regering aan sy lesers voorgehou, 'en het sekerlik sukses daarmee behaal. / During the nineteen thirties and forties the Afrikaans newspaper Die Burger occupied a prominent place within the ambience of the South African press. Without reaching large circulation figures, it achieved recognition and respect because - apart from other reasons - it commanded the skills of a very competent editorial staff and management team. The way in which it effectively ousted its main rival Die Suiderstem, is testimony of its power and influence, particularly in its hinterland. The close association between Die Burger and the Cape National Party represented a formidable joining of forces. This relationship, entailing mutual advantages, was sustained significantly by the involvement of Dr. D.F. Malan with Die Burger. Of cardinal importance also was the part played by two editors, A.L. Geyer and P.A. Weber, in the period 1934 to 1948. Their personal support of Dr. Malan in establishing and consolidating the National Party during the years 1934 to 1948 had a decisive influence on South African political history. The role assumed by Die Burger in the period of Coalition and Fusion, as well as the close bond it had established with its readership, made it a potent political force, particularly in the Cape Province. At the same time it gained for itself an important position of power within the National Party of South Africa. In all of this Geyer was a central figure - officially as editor, but more particularly also in a personal capacity. Die Burger's efforts over the years in advancing the cultural cause of Afrikaners led the paper to become a co-founder of the National Party's philosophy of apartheid. The implementation of this ideology was regarded as the only way in which the cultural and political rights of Afrikaners could be safeguarded and maintained. After 1939 the paper proved instrumental in bringing the National Party to power in the election of 1948. It regularly attacked General J.C. Smuts and his United Party on a wide political front, pointing out their shortcomings in various areas. Especially during and immediately after World War II it severely criticized the Smuts government for being incompetent, and it undoubtedly achieved political success with this strategy. / History / D. Litt. et Phil.

Afrikaans text / In die perswese van Suid-Afrika het Die Burger gedurende die dertiger- en veertigerjare ’n besondere plek beklee. A1 was dit nie ’n koerant met reusesirkulasiesyfers nie, is dit gerespekteer omdat dit onder meer ’n besonder bevoegde redaksie en bestuurspan gehad het. Die wyse waarop hy sy direkte teenstander, Die Suiderstem, in die stof laat byt het, lewer bewys van Die Burger se krag en invloed, veral in sy hinterland. Die Burger en die Nasionale Party van Kaapland se noue verbintenis het tot gevolg gehad dat hulle ’n gedugte span gevorm het. Die verbintenis, wat wedersydse voordele ingehou het, is grootliks versterk deur D.F. Malan se betrokkenheid by Die Burger. Die rol wat die twee redakteurs A.L. Geyer en PJA. Weber in die tydperk 1934 tot 1948 gespeel het, moet as van kardinale belang beskou word. Veral die persoonlike ondersteuning wat hulle aan D.F. Malan gegee het in sy opbou van die Nasionale Party in die jare 1934 - 1948, het ’n deurslaggewende uitwerking op die Suid-Afrikaanse politieke geskiedenis gehad. Die rol wat Die Burger gedurende die koalisietydperk en daarna tydens samesmelting gespeel het, asook sy besonder noue verbintenis met sy lesers, het die koerant veral in Kaapland ’n baie belangrike politieke faktor gemaak. Dit het aan hom ook ’n besondere posisie van mag binne die Nasionale Party van Suid- Afrika laat inneem. Hierin het Geyer as redakteur, maar veral in sy persoonlike hoedanigheid, ’n groot rol gespeel. Die Burger se jarelange bydrae as kultuurbouer van die Afrikaanssprekendes het meegewerk dat die koerant as mede-skepper van die Nasionale Party se apartheidsfilosofie opgetree het. Die filosofie is beskou as die enigste wyse waarop die Afrikaanssprekende se kulturele en politieke regte beskerm en bestendig kon word. As praktiese instrument het dit veral ná 1939 ook meegehelp om die Nasionale Party aan bewind te bring in 1948. Die koerant het J.C. Smuts en die Verenigde Party gereeld aangeval en op alle gebiede aan die kaak probeer stel. Veral gedurende en na die Tweede Wereldoorlog het die koerant die Smuts-bewind as ’n onbevoegde regering aan sy lesers voorgehou, 'en het sekerlik sukses daarmee behaal. / During the nineteen thirties and forties the Afrikaans newspaper Die Burger occupied a prominent place within the ambience of the South African press. Without reaching large circulation figures, it achieved recognition and respect because - apart from other reasons - it commanded the skills of a very competent editorial staff and management team. The way in which it effectively ousted its main rival Die Suiderstem, is testimony of its power and influence, particularly in its hinterland. The close association between Die Burger and the Cape National Party represented a formidable joining of forces. This relationship, entailing mutual advantages, was sustained significantly by the involvement of Dr. D.F. Malan with Die Burger. Of cardinal importance also was the part played by two editors, A.L. Geyer and P.A. Weber, in the period 1934 to 1948. Their personal support of Dr. Malan in establishing and consolidating the National Party during the years 1934 to 1948 had a decisive influence on South African political history. The role assumed by Die Burger in the period of Coalition and Fusion, as well as the close bond it had established with its readership, made it a potent political force, particularly in the Cape Province. At the same time it gained for itself an important position of power within the National Party of South Africa. In all of this Geyer was a central figure - officially as editor, but more particularly also in a personal capacity. Die Burger's efforts over the years in advancing the cultural cause of Afrikaners led the paper to become a co-founder of the National Party's philosophy of apartheid. The implementation of this ideology was regarded as the only way in which the cultural and political rights of Afrikaners could be safeguarded and maintained. After 1939 the paper proved instrumental in bringing the National Party to power in the election of 1948. It regularly attacked General J.C. Smuts and his United Party on a wide political front, pointing out their shortcomings in various areas. Especially during and immediately after World War II it severely criticized the Smuts government for being incompetent, and it undoubtedly achieved political success with this strategy. / History / D. Litt. et Phil.

The written history of modern South Africa is limited by the moratorium on archival material common to' all contemporary research, and the present study is intended, in part, to help fill this gap. It has a two- fold design: first, to point out some of the anomalies in the relationship between administration and policy and secondly, to show the extent to which they are interdependent in Dr. D.L. Smit ' s career. In the process, I hope to clarify and to comment on some of the mechanics involved in Native Administration.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2006. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The use of military force to suppress internal unrest has been an integral part of South African history. The European colonisation of South Africa from 1652 was facilitated by the use of force. Boer commandos and British military regiments and volunteer units enforced the peace in outlying areas and fought against the indigenous population as did other colonial powers such as France in North Africa and Germany in German South West Africa, to name but a few. The period 1912 to 1945 is no exception, but with the difference that military force was used to suppress uprisings of white citizens as well. White industrial workers experienced this military suppression in 1907, 1913, 1914 and 1922 when they went on strike. Job insecurity and wages were the main causes of the strikes and militant actions from the strikers forced the government to use military force when the police failed to maintain law and order. Public reaction to the use of force was strong and the government, particularly Gen. J.C. Smuts, was severely criticised resulting in a defeat in the 1924 election. Over the period 1921 to 1932 indigenous populations in South Africa and South West Africa such as the Israelites (1921), the Bondelswarts (1922), the Rehoboth Basters (1925) and the Ukuambi (1932), were suppressed through punitive expeditions by the police and military forces of the Union of South Africa. The indigenous populations were a.o. grieved by the government’s implementation of branding laws, enforced indentured labour, dog and hut tax. The government’s prevailing racial policy of that time, manifested in a master and servant attitude towards the indigenous populations, exacerbated an existing grievance of restrictive political rights. The government reacted quickly and economically in suppressing any indigenous population’s protests involving militant action. Although the use of aeroplanes was criticised, it was a force multiplier and greatly assisted the small number of police and military forces deployed in minimising casualties on both sides. The government also had to suppress militant Afrikaner uprisings during the First and Second World Wars. In 1914 and 1915, prominent Afrikaner leaders and veterans of the Anglo-Boer War reacted militantly against the government’s participation in the First World War. Gen. L. Botha and Gen. Smuts were the architects of their suppression through quick mobilisation of the Active Citizen Force, using mostly Afrikaans speaking volunteers. The period between the two world wars saw the growth of the Afrikaners on a political, social and limited economical level. This gave rise to further dispute on political and social levels when the government once again opted to fight alongside Britain in the Second World War. Old animosities between the Afrikaners and British were relived and militant elements within Afrikaner society mobilised to impede this participation. The government resorted to using the Union Defence Forces and SA Police to facilitate internment, for spying and to guard strategic objectives in an effort to prevent sabotage and other serious damage to the war effort. Smuts received severe criticism from mostly Afrikaners who were against participation in the war, and the general public who had to suffer under the conditions of martial law. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die gebruik van militêre mag in die onderdrukking van interne onrus is ‘n algemene verskynsel in die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Sedert 1652 het die Europese koloniale besetting van Suid-Afrika gepaard gegaan met geweld. Boerekommando’s en Britse militêre regimente en vrywilligereenhede het die vrede in verafgeleë gebiede gehandhaaf en die plaaslike bevolkings onderwerp, net soos ander koloniale moondhede, byvoorbeeld, Frankryk in Noord-Afrika en Duitsland in Duits-Suidwes-Afrika gedoen het. Die periode van 1912 tot 1945 was geen uitsondering nie, maar met die verskil dat opstande ook onder die blanke bevolking onderdruk is. In 1907, 1913, 1914 en 1922 het die blanke industriële werkers sodanige onderdrukking ervaar. Werksonsekerheid en loongeskille was die dryfkrag agter die stakings en die stakers se militante optrede het die regering gedwing om militêre mag te gebruik om die opstande te onderdruk, nadat die polisie se pogings om wet en orde te handhaaf, misluk het. Die publiek was sterk gekant teen sulke hardhandige optrede en Genl. J.C. Smuts het veral onder kritiek deurgeloop, wat tot sy politieke nederlaag gelei het. Opstandige inheemse bevolkings in Suid-Afrika en Suidwes-Afrika soos die Israeliete (1921), die Bondelswarts (1922), die Rehoboth Basters (1925) en die Ukuambi (1932) het deurgeloop onder strafekspidisies van elemente van die Unie van Suid-Afrika se polisie en weermag. Die inheemse bevolking is gegrief deur die regering se implimentering van brandmerkwette, geforseerde kontrakarbeid, hut- en hondebelasting. Die regering se rassebeleid van die tyd het ‘n meester-en-onderdaan-houding teenoor die inheemse bevolkings geskep, wat die teer kwessie van beperkte politieke regte vererger het. Opstande deur inheemse bevolkings wat militant van aard was, is op ‘n vinnige en ekonomiese manier onderdruk, dog het skerp kritiek uitgelok. Die benutting van vliegtuie om die opstande te onderdruk was ‘n magsvermenigvuldiger wat die klein polisie- en weermag gehelp het om verliese tydens die onderdukking van opstande aan beide kante te beperk. Die regering het ook opstande van Afrikanergroepe tydens die Eerste en Tweede Wêreldoorlog onderdruk. In 1914-1915 het prominente Afrikanerleiers en veterane van die Anglo-Boereoorlog militant opgeruk teen die regering in verset oor die regering se deelname aan die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Genl. L. Botha en Genl. Smuts was die argitekte van die vinnige onderdrukking van die opstande deur die Aktiewe Burgermag op te roep en hoofsaaklik Afrikaanssprekende vrywilligers te gebruik. Die periode tussen die twee Wêreldoorloë is gekenmerk deur die groei van die Afrikaner op politieke, sosiale en in ‘n beperkte mate, ook ekonomiese gebied. Hieruit het verdere onenigheid op politieke en sosiale vlak onstaan toe die regering weer besluit het aand die kant van Brittanje tot die Tweede Wêreldoorlog toe te tree. Ou vyandighede tussen Afrikaans- en Engelssprekendes het herleef en militante elemente binne die Afrikanersamelewing het gemobiliseer om die deelname te belemmer. Die regering het die Unieverdedigingsmag en die SA Polisie gebruik vir internering, spioenering en die beveiliging van strategiese doelwitte teen sabotasie en ander aktiwiteite wat die oorlogsdeelname sou belemmer. Smuts het die meeste kritiek ontvang van Afrikaners wat gekant was teen die oorlog, asook die publiek in die algemeen wat gebuk gegaan het onder krygswet.