Even with the end of the Cold War, the question, Were the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an action-reaction arms race? remains important and controversial. The bulk of empirical mathematical arms race research suggests that the US and USSR were not so engaged. Indeed, most such research into the matter suggests that US arms acquisitions were driven overwhelmingly by internal or domestic forces, as were Soviet arms acquisitions. Given the longstanding political, economic and military rivalry, between the US and USSR, the finding that they were not engaged in an arms race is perplexing. This is particularly so with respect to nuclear weapons acquisitions. Orthodox nuclear deterrence theory clearly posits that the attempt by each side to maintain a balance of nuclear forces with the other and hence deter the other from launching a first-strike should result in an action-reaction nuclear arms race. Why, then, does the overwhelming mass of quantitative research suggest that the opposite was true, in practice, in the US-Soviet case? The problem, in part, has been that researchers have been using underspecified mathematical models of action-reaction arms race interaction. The most famous of these models is Richardson’s 1960 action-reaction model. Researchers have long been aware that Richardson’s model is underspecified and as such that it may not be capable of revealing the true nature of US-Soviet military interaction. Since the late 1960s, arms race researchers have attempted to move beyond Richardson’s simple arms race specification. Several new approaches to arms race analysis have subsequently emerged: the game theoretic approach, the economic (stock adjustment) approach, and the expectations (adaptive, extrapolative, and rational) approach. Taken individually, neither of these approaches has, however, yielded much fruit. In this dissertation, the game, stock adjustment, and rational expectations approaches were combined for the first time into a single, more comprehensive, analytical approach and a new action-reaction arms race model was derived, which we have named the GSR Model. In addition, it was argued that a new approach was needed for testing arms race models. Arms races are generally seen as competitions of total armed versus total armed might. Arms race models have, accordingly, been tested against data on states’ annual military expenditures. We argued instead that an arms race is made of several subraces, the object of each subrace being a specific weapons system and a specific counter weapons system, deployed by an opponent and designed to thwart the former’s political and military effect. Models should, then, be tested for each subrace in a given arms race, that is, against data on weapons system-counter weapons system deployment levels. Time frames for the analysis of a given weapons system-counter weapons system competition should be set to accord with the period in which those systems were dominant in the military calculations of the competing states. In effect, we have specified an alternative approach to mathematical arms race analysis, the micro approach to mathematical arms race analysis. The GSR Model was tested against data on annual US and Soviet strategic nuclear warhead deployment levels, — specifically, those onboard ICBMs (1960-71) and submarines (1972-87). The GSR model was also tested against annual US-Soviet aggregate strategic nuclear warhead deployment data (ICBM, SLBM and bomber based totals), 1967-84. Estimates of the GSR model suggest that the US and USSR were in fact engaged in an action-reaction arms race over submarine launched nuclear warheads. Regression analysis also indicates that the US and USSR strongly interacted, asymmetrically, over ICBM based nuclear warheads. There appears to have been no interaction over aggregate warhead deployments. Finally, the implications of these findings for the maintenance of a stable nuclear deterrent were discussed.

Even with the end of the Cold War, the question, Were the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in an action-reaction arms race? remains important and controversial. The bulk of empirical mathematical arms race research suggests that the US and USSR were not so engaged. Indeed, most such research into the matter suggests that US arms acquisitions were driven overwhelmingly by internal or domestic forces, as were Soviet arms acquisitions. Given the longstanding political, economic and military rivalry, between the US and USSR, the finding that they were not engaged in an arms race is perplexing. This is particularly so with respect to nuclear weapons acquisitions. Orthodox nuclear deterrence theory clearly posits that the attempt by each side to maintain a balance of nuclear forces with the other and hence deter the other from launching a first-strike should result in an action-reaction nuclear arms race. Why, then, does the overwhelming mass of quantitative research suggest that the opposite was true, in practice, in the US-Soviet case? The problem, in part, has been that researchers have been using underspecified mathematical models of action-reaction arms race interaction. The most famous of these models is Richardson’s 1960 action-reaction model. Researchers have long been aware that Richardson’s model is underspecified and as such that it may not be capable of revealing the true nature of US-Soviet military interaction. Since the late 1960s, arms race researchers have attempted to move beyond Richardson’s simple arms race specification. Several new approaches to arms race analysis have subsequently emerged: the game theoretic approach, the economic (stock adjustment) approach, and the expectations (adaptive, extrapolative, and rational) approach. Taken individually, neither of these approaches has, however, yielded much fruit. In this dissertation, the game, stock adjustment, and rational expectations approaches were combined for the first time into a single, more comprehensive, analytical approach and a new action-reaction arms race model was derived, which we have named the GSR Model. In addition, it was argued that a new approach was needed for testing arms race models. Arms races are generally seen as competitions of total armed versus total armed might. Arms race models have, accordingly, been tested against data on states’ annual military expenditures. We argued instead that an arms race is made of several subraces, the object of each subrace being a specific weapons system and a specific counter weapons system, deployed by an opponent and designed to thwart the former’s political and military effect. Models should, then, be tested for each subrace in a given arms race, that is, against data on weapons system-counter weapons system deployment levels. Time frames for the analysis of a given weapons system-counter weapons system competition should be set to accord with the period in which those systems were dominant in the military calculations of the competing states. In effect, we have specified an alternative approach to mathematical arms race analysis, the micro approach to mathematical arms race analysis. The GSR Model was tested against data on annual US and Soviet strategic nuclear warhead deployment levels, — specifically, those onboard ICBMs (1960-71) and submarines (1972-87). The GSR model was also tested against annual US-Soviet aggregate strategic nuclear warhead deployment data (ICBM, SLBM and bomber based totals), 1967-84. Estimates of the GSR model suggest that the US and USSR were in fact engaged in an action-reaction arms race over submarine launched nuclear warheads. Regression analysis also indicates that the US and USSR strongly interacted, asymmetrically, over ICBM based nuclear warheads. There appears to have been no interaction over aggregate warhead deployments. Finally, the implications of these findings for the maintenance of a stable nuclear deterrent were discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1985 W32 / Master of Arts

This study was designed to examine the relationships between the doctrines of Soviet air power and the changes in aviation capability affected through technological advancement. The Study was limited in scope to those changes in aviation technology which have had large scale application, and were examined from a historical perspective.The study was accomplished by dividing Soviet air power into five distinct segments based on existing Soviet administrative divisions. The divisions are as follows: Frontal Aviation, Strategic Aviation, Military Transport/Commercial Aviation, Air Defense Aviation and Naval Aviation. The growth of each segment and the development of its unique role within the structure of Soviet air power, from its earliest beginnings, was examined historically and analyzed for technologically induced change. When the effects of technological change extended across two or more segments of Soviet air power, each segment was analyzed on an individual basis. While the examination of the question failed to yield a clearly definable direct link between the advancements of Soviet aviation technology and the development of the doctrines of Soviet air power, it did reveal a positive correlation between the expansion of the role of Soviet air power and the advances made in aviation technology. Clearly the ability of the Soviet aviation industry to produce ever more capable aircraft has allowed the various segments of Soviet air power to develop ever more challenging doctrines.

No description available.

This is a study of the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR as they pertain to its war-readiness, as well as the degree to which these policies presumably opened the door to the European conflagration and, in 1941, to the Nazi-Soviet war. Topics to be discussed include: (1) the crash industrialization of the Soviet Union and industrial war preparations from 1928--41; (2) the development of Soviet military doctrine before and after 12 June 1937; (3) a critical re-examination of the popularly accepted reasons for the devolution of the Soviet armed forces; and (4) Soviet foreign policy from 1937--41. The chronological end of the paper (1941) is followed by a brief epilogue discussing the evident success of the Soviet industrialization program by reference to Soviet industrial performance during the Nazi-Soviet war. Furthermore, the epilogue will challenge the popular depiction of the German invasion as an effortless, seamless advance into the Soviet heartland.

No description available.