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Perestroika, unlike previous attempts at economic reform, represents the beginning of a new era in post-war Soviet politics. If one were to categorize the major Soviet leaders since Stalin it would be more accurate to term Khrushchev a liberal Stalinist, Brezhnev a conservative Stalinist, and Gorbachev, may be properly classified as an anti-Stalinist. Gorbachev's accession to power represents the beginning of what might be termed post-post-Stalin reform. To illustrate the uniqueness of perestroika, this thesis is structured around a comparison of Gorbachev's economic, political, and social reforms with those of Nikita Khrushchev. A contrast with Khrushchev is necessary because it is impossible to determine the uniqueness of perestroika and to draw informed conclusions about Gorbachev unless the record of the first-post Stalin reformer is examined. Because Gorbachev and Khrushchev are both reformers, it is to be expected that they should share certain common objectives. But the similarities are far less significant than the differences. The differences between Gorbachev's and Khrushchev's approaches to reform are a function both of substantive policy differences and historical circumstance. Historical Context Khrushchev came to power at a time when the Soviet Union was weak relative to the United States. Externally, the most pressing need was for the Soviet Union to achieve military parity with the United States. Internally, Khrushchev's first years were ones of struggle for absolute leadership with other Politburo figures who had differing notions of reform. The world that Brezhnev and his successors bequeathed to Gorbachev bore little resemblance to the one which Stalin left to Khrushchev. By the time of Gorbachev's accession to power, the Soviet Union had become the military equal of the United States. Political Reform Khrushchev's main objective was to weaken the power of the bureaucracy largely in order to enhance his own personal power. Gorbachev's focus is less Stalin than it is the Stalinist system. The lack of subordination of political and economic reform to the pursuit of personal one-man rule marks perestzoika as a distinct improvement over de-Stalinization. Economic Reform In economic policy, Khrushchev followed Stalin's practice of meeting economic problems with administrative measures. Although Khrushchev made his reputation by denouncing Stalin's leadership, he did nothing to address the root of the Soviet Union's troubles—the Stalinist economic system. Perestroika is theoretically superior to de-Stalinization because Gorbachev eschews administrative tinkering in favour of economic change. Gorbachev has rediscovered the co-operative socialism and limited tolerance for free-enterprise of the 1920s. The implication of this return to 'Leninism' is an admission that the Stalinist system is a failure. CONCLUSION The essence of Khrushchev's reforms, and their subsequent failure, can be traced to his fixation with appearance over substance. For all of his 'liberal' reforms, Khrushchev is essentially a 'Stalinist' politician. Perestzoika is superior to de-Stalinization both because of historical circumstance and substantive philosophical differences. Gorbachev's return to Leninist principles effectively ends the period of reformed Stalinism. But the objective need for reform does imply its necessary success. There are many obstacles to effecting deep change in the Soviet Union, obstacles which cannot be surmounted soon. It cannot be expected that a people will cast off the habits of a lifetime. Nonetheless, Gorbachev's reforms are rigorous and potentially longlasting, as opposed to Khrushchev's 'administrative' changes which did not really address the flaws of the Soviet system. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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After having reached a level of influence unmatched by any other element of Soviet government under Stalin and Beria, the security organs of the Soviet Union proved difficult to tame. While it has been argued that the KGB was made subservient to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after the ascent of Khrushchev in the late 1950's, this essay will attempt to show that the security police apparatus was able to maintain a high level of prominence and even autonomy throughout the history of the Soviet Union and beyond. While it may have appeared that the organs were under constraints during periods of unchallenged leadership, the lack of a legislative definition of the KGB's role made the possibility of a coup or putsch a constant threat. During periods of instability, particularly those surrounding the succession struggles, the KGB was able to act independently and was highly influential as to the outcome of these contests. In the latter years of the Soviet era, efforts to alter the system in order to avoid the excesses of previous years revealed the organs to be highly adaptable and cognizant of the need to change to avoid being excluded from the political decision-making process. Through an assessment of the various succession struggles and efforts to place the organs within the confines of legality, the political power of the KGB may be better understood, and placed in a historical perspective side by side with its post-Soviet counterpart, which too is shown to have survived recent upheavals.

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Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) remains one of the most controversial figures in twentieth century history. There is no consensus about his character or historical achievements-as either thinker or actor. To Winston Churchill, writing in the 1930s, Trotsky was a 'cancer bacillus'. The Stalinist anathema placed on him is well-known. For Tony Cliff, a contemporary socialist writer, on the other hand, Trotsky was a 'man of genius'. Whatever assessment may be made about Trotsky, one of his lesser biographers and critics makes the point fairly enough that 'compared to his famous colleagues, Lenin and Stalin, Trotsky has been sorely neglected by historians and other scholars'. The upheaval in the USSR and its successor state system, and in Eastern Europe and China, since the mid-1980s, when CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev launched his programme of radical change under the sobriquets 'glasnost' and 'perestroika', has brought into the foreground once again the historical issues concerning the origins, character and consequences of the Stalinist system of 'totalitarian' political rule with its attendant hyper-centralised command economy. The whole experience of Stalinism has been, and no doubt will continue to be, subjected to intensive historical reconsideration as Russian scholars in particular seek to come to terms with the October Revolution and its legacy within the context of their national past. The publication of some of Trotsky's writings in Russian language editions and their circulation within the territories of the Russian Federation makes available an assessment and analysis of the Stalinist experience previously denied to the Russian reader. It is against this background that the author has written an historical review of Trotsky's major writings on the question of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. The approach adopted utilizes a combination of chronological exposition and analytical commentary, in the belief that both of these aspects of historical writing are necessary and valid. As Arthur Marwick has commented: '... if history without analysis is meaningless, without chronology it does not exist'. Marxist ideas have had a wide currency in the century and the contribution to the body of Marxist doctrine and theory by Leon Trotsky deserves closer attention. This study of Trotsky's attempt to make a Marxist analysis and assessment of the experience of Stalinism in the Soviet Union has been carried through in the belief that the examination of the critical and minority current within the broader mainstream of the international socialist movement has much to offer in contributing to our knowledge and understanding of the one of the most significant developments in twentieth century political history. A critical and historical assessment of Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism makes a contribution both to our appreciation of Trotsky's ideas and to our understanding of a phenomenon which looms large in any discussion of the broader contours of twentieth century history.

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This thesis had two related purposes: to compare, contrast and critique three scholars' views of the Soviet domestic reform process, and to use these analyses as the means by which to examine the emerging Soviet domestic reform program. The arguments of Stephen F. Cohen, Timothy J. Colton and Richard Pipes served as the primary subject matter of this thesis, with their individual views determined by a critical analysis of the writing which each has recently done on this subject. Investigated in particular was each individuals' interpretation of the reform process, its component parts and the kind of change that was expected to be involved in any new domestic reforms. The final chapter dealing with the contemporary Soviet situation relied upon as much primary source material as possible in an attempt to provide an accurate picture of the state of affairs within the country at this time. The results of my analysis indicate that Richard Pipes' interpretations and conclusions do not receive much support from either Soviet history or the contemporary situation within the country. His one dimensional view of Soviet elite interests and his "crisis/reform" theory of Soviet reform were found to be generally unsubstantiated. Stephen Cohen's arguments, on the other hand, received a good deal of support, especially with regards to his emphasis on the probability of moderate change and the existence of reformist and conservative constituencies within the Soviet Union, constituencies which do appear to have been involved in the domestic reform process. At the same time, however, the terminology which he employed to describe the reform process was found to be somewhat problematic. Timothy Colton's arguments, finally, were also found to have a good deal of efficacy, especially with respect to his view of the country's new generation of political leadership and the role that it would play in the reform process. In conclusion, the new domestic reform program itself was found to be indicative of generally moderate economic and political change, change that was embraced for the moat part by a good segment of the new leadership, but which had found significant resistance at the lower levels of the bureaucracy and among the working class. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate