This paper considers empirically whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993-2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states' preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf, the Shapley-Shubik, and other power indices, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates point to significant differences in member states' preferences, which often translate into significant differences of empirical (versus theoretical) power under individual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries' ideal points as the bloc size grows. Interestingly, this result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variant differs from the theoretical one both under individual and bloc voting. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This paper investigates whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993- 2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states' preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates indicate significant differences between member states' preferences, which often translate into significant differences between empirical and theoretical power under individual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries' ideal points as the bloc size grows. This result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variants differ from the theoretical one, both under individual and bloc voting. (authors' abstract)

Dans cette thèse, j’explore les modèles de prise de décision basés sur des préférences multiples. Dans la première partie de la thèse, j’analyse certaines des implications de l’adoption des préférences multiples en économie et de différentes façons dont elles peuvent être conceptualisées et utilisées dans ce domaine. En particulier, je révise certaines des conséquences positives et normatives des préférences sur des préférences (chapitre 1), la distinction comportementale entre des modèles de préférences uniques et des modèles de préférences multiples (chapitre 2), et j’introduis un nouveau cadre de choix avec le temps dans lequel les modèles de préférences multiples peuvent être plus facilement caractérisés (chapitre 3). La deuxième partie de la thèse est con- sacrée à l’analyse théorique et empirique du comportement économique qui peut être représenté comme s’il résulte de la prise de décision avec des préférences multiples. En particulier, je construis un modèle pour étudier les effets des préférences multiples sur le comportement politique (chapitre 4) et je mène une étude expérimentale pour distinguer les différentes motivations derrière une potentielle valeur intrinsèque du droit de décision (chapitre 5). / In this thesis I explore decision making models based on multiple preferences. In the first part of the thesis, I analyze some of the implications of adopting multiple preferences in economics and different ways in which they can be conceptualized and used within this field. In particular, I review some of the positive and normative consequences of preferences over preferences (Chapter 1), the behavioral (in)distinguishability of the single and multiple preferences models (Chapter 2), and introduce a new framework of choice with time in which models of changing preferences can be more easily characterized (Chapter 3). The second part of the thesis is devoted to the theoretical and empirical analysis of economic meaningful behavior that can be represented as if it is the result of decision making with multiple preferences. In particular, I build a model to study the effects of multiple preferences to political behavior (Chapter 4), and run an experimental study to distinguish different motivations behind a potential intrinsic value of holding a decision right (Chapter 5).