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Board structure and corporate performance: a comparision of agency theroy and stewardship theory.January 2001 (has links)
Jie Jenny Tian. / Thesis submitted in 2000. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-137). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Acknowledgements --- p.i / Abstract --- p.iii / Chapter CHAPTER 1. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER 2. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Agency Theory Approach to Corporate Governance --- p.4 / Chapter 2.2 --- Stewardship Theory Approach to Corporate Governance --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3 --- Research on Board of Directors: Prescriptions and Empirical Evidence --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Board Composition Studies --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Board Leadership Structure Studies --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.24 / Chapter CHAPTER 3. --- REFORM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CHINESE CASE --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1 --- China's Enterprise Reform: An Overview --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2 --- State as Shareholder: The State Assets Management System --- p.30 / Chapter 3.3 --- Asset Restructuring before IPO --- p.35 / Chapter 3.4 --- Corporate Governance Research in China: Theories and Empirical Evidence --- p.43 / Chapter 3.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.46 / Chapter CHAPTER 4. --- THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES --- p.47 / Chapter 4.1 --- Theoretical Background and Research Questions --- p.47 / Chapter 4.2 --- A New Approach to Understanding Board Composition in China --- p.51 / Chapter 4.3 --- Board Composition and Firm Performance --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Agency Theory Hypotheses --- p.57 / Independent Directors and Firm Performance --- p.57 / Affiliated Directors and Firm Performance --- p.59 / Board Size and Firm Performance --- p.61 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Stewardship Theory Hypotheses --- p.62 / Independent Directors and Firm Performance --- p.62 / Affiliated Directors and Firm Performance --- p.65 / Board Size and Firm Performance --- p.71 / Chapter 4.4 --- Board Leadership Structure and Firm Performance --- p.72 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Agency Theory Hypothesis --- p.72 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Stewardship Theory Hypothesis --- p.74 / Chapter 4.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.77 / Chapter CHAPTER 5. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.78 / Chapter 5.1 --- Sample Selection --- p.78 / Chapter 5.2 --- Variables and Measurement --- p.82 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Independent Variables (IVs) --- p.82 / Board Composition --- p.82 / Board Leadership Structure --- p.84 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Dependent Variables (DVs) --- p.84 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Control Variables --- p.86 / Chapter CHAPTER 6. --- RESULTS --- p.94 / Chapter 6.1 --- Results based on the Full Sample (N=203) --- p.94 / Chapter 6.2 --- Results based on the Streamlined Sample (N = 197) --- p.101 / Chapter CHAPTER 7. --- "DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION" --- p.107 / Chapter 7.1 --- Discussion --- p.107 / Chapter 7.2 --- Limitations --- p.116 / Chapter 7.3 --- Conclusion and Future Research Direction --- p.118 / References --- p.121
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The determinants of the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors: empirical evidence from china's listed firms.January 2008 (has links)
Lui, Kai Yin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 49-55). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Chinese Version --- p.ii / Acknowledgments --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 3 --- Research Hypothesis --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Institutional Setting --- p.8 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Monitoring Effectiveness of Independent Directors --- p.11 / Chapter 4 --- Methodology --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1 --- Negative Opinion Issuances --- p.15 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors --- p.17 / Chapter 4.3 --- Control Grouping Methods --- p.21 / Chapter 4.4 --- Board Structure --- p.23 / Chapter 4.5 --- Control Variables --- p.24 / Chapter 4.6 --- Regional Governance --- p.25 / Chapter 4.7 --- ST Companies --- p.27 / Chapter 5 --- Data --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1 --- Negative Opinion Issuance --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors --- p.30 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Treatment Group --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Control Group --- p.32 / Chapter 5.3 --- Board Structure --- p.32 / Chapter 5.4 --- Control Variables --- p.33 / Chapter 5.5 --- Regional Governance --- p.34 / Chapter 5.6 --- ST Companies --- p.34 / Chapter 6 --- Empirical Results --- p.36 / Chapter 6.1 --- Testing Means of Two Samples --- p.36 / Chapter 6.2 --- Event Study --- p.37 / Chapter 6.3 --- Logistic Regressions --- p.38 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- The Personal Characteristics of Independent Directors --- p.39 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Board Structure --- p.40 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- Regional Governance --- p.42 / Chapter 6.3.4 --- Pull Set of Variables --- p.43 / Chapter 6.4 --- Checking Robustness of Results by Using ST Companies --- p.46 / Chapter 7 --- Summary and Conclusion --- p.47 / References --- p.49 / Appendix --- p.56 / "Table 1: Negative Opinion Issuance, Descriptive Statistics" --- p.56 / "Table 2: Negative Opinion Issuance, by Categories" --- p.56 / Table 3: Sample Companies Location Distribution --- p.57 / "Table 4: Personal Characteristics, Descriptive Statistics I" --- p.58 / "Table 5: Personal Characteristics, Descriptive Statistics II" --- p.59 / Table 6: Board Structure and Control Variables: Descriptive Statistics --- p.60 / Table 7: Regional Governance Indices --- p.61 / "Table 8: ST companies, Descriptive Statistics" --- p.62 / Table 9: Negative Opinion Issuance and Company Status Changes --- p.62 / "Table 10: The Level of Negative Opinion Issuance, the Respective Com- panies and Independent Directors Involved" --- p.62 / "Table 11: Personal Characteristics (ST Companies), Descriptive Statistics I" --- p.63 / "Table 12: Personal Characteristics (ST Companies), Descriptive Statistics II" --- p.64 / "Table 13: Board Structure and Control Variables (ST Companies), De- scriptive Statistics" --- p.64 / "Table 14: Mean-Comparison t-test Between Control and Treatment Groups, Personal Characteristics and Board Structure" --- p.65 / "Table 15: Event Study, by Different Event Windows" --- p.66 / "Table 16: Event Study, by Different Categories of Negative Opinions" --- p.66 / Table 17: Logistic Regression - Treatment Group Only (n = 144) --- p.67 / Table 18: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Personal Characteristics Variables Only --- p.68 / Table 19: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Board Structure and Control Variables Only --- p.69 / Table 20: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). Regional Governance Only --- p.69 / Table 21: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). All Variables --- p.70 / Table 22: Conditional Logistic Regression - Treatment Group and Control Group Paired Together According to Companies (n = 273). All Variables --- p.71 / Table 23: Ordered Logistic Regression - ST companies (n = 352) --- p.72
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The composition of board of directors and its impact on corporate performance: an empirical analysis of Chinese listed firms.January 1998 (has links)
by Wang Xiao Ling. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-73). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgment --- p.ii / Table of Contents --- p.iii / List of Tables --- p.v / List of Figures --- p.vi / Chapter I --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Objective of the Study --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Outline of the Study --- p.4 / Chapter II --- Background --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- China's Enterprise Reform and the Development of Capital Markets --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Board of Directors in China --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Legislation on Board - The Company Law --- p.13 / Composition of the Board of Directors --- p.16 / Functions and Powers --- p.18 / Regulations and Requirements --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Board of Chengdu Brilliant Development Inc --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Difference between Board in China's Company Law and that in Hong Kong Company Ordinance --- p.24 / Chapter 2.3 --- Chapter Summary --- p.26 / Chapter III --- Literature Review --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1 --- Theoretical Background --- p.27 / Chapter 3.2 --- Empirical Studies --- p.30 / Takeover Evaluation --- p.30 / Management Buyout --- p.31 / Adoption of Poison Pills --- p.32 / CEO Turnover --- p.32 / Financial Performance --- p.33 / Chapter IV --- Testable Hypotheses --- p.35 / Chapter V --- Research Methodology --- p.37 / Chapter 5.1 --- Variables and Sample --- p.37 / Chapter 5.2 --- Empirical Results --- p.43 / Board Composition and Corporate Performance with Full Sample --- p.43 / Excluding IPO Firms --- p.51 / Insider Dominated Board and Outsider Dominated Board --- p.51 / Alternative Measures for Firm Performance --- p.55 / Cross-sectional Test --- p.58 / Financial Distress --- p.60 / Industry Classification --- p.62 / Chapter 5.3 --- Discussion --- p.64 / Chapter VI --- Conclusion and Implications --- p.67 / Chapter 6.1 --- Conclusion and Implications --- p.67 / Chapter 6.2 --- Suggestions for Further Research --- p.69 / Bibliography --- p.70 / Appendix Legislation on the Board (The Company Law in PRC) --- p.74
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