Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, the Supreme Court ruled that students have speech rights in the school environment unless the speech causes or is likely to cause 1) a substantial disruption, or 2) interferes with the rights of others. The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving school officials' authority to regulate electronically-delivered derogatory student speech, and no uniform standard currently exists for determining when school authorities can discipline students for such speech when it occurs off campus without violating students' First Amendment rights. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine 19 federal and state court decisions in which school authorities were sued for disciplining students for electronically delivered, derogatory speech. Eighteen of these cases involved student speech that demeaned or defamed school teachers or administrators. Only one involved speech that demeaned another student. Each case was analyzed to identify significant factors in court holdings to provide a basis for the construction of a uniform legal standard for determining when school authorities can discipline students for this type of speech. The full application of Tinker's first and second prongs will provide school officials the authority needed to address this growing problem while still protecting legitimate off-campus student cyber expression. Predictions of future court holdings and policy recommendations are included.