La «petite corruption» est un élément important de la relation entre personnels de santé et patients dans les contextes propices aux actes de corruption. Ce phénomène bien étudié en Europe centrale et orientale sous le nom de «paiements informels» (PIs), est peu documenté en Afrique. Pour contribuer à combler cette lacune, cette thèse propose une série d'analyses sur certains aspects clés de ce problème dans le contexte africain. Dans le chapitre 1, nous montrons que les PIs sont concentrés sur les plus pauvres. Ils sont plus susceptibles d’avoir fait face à l'absence de médicaments, à l'absentéisme des médecins et à des longs temps d'attente dans leur hôpital public local, ce qui accroît la probabilité d'encourir des frais non officiels. Une analyse plus approfondie de l'influence des facteurs d'offre dans le chapitre 2 confirme que les longs temps d'attente, la gestion du personnel de santé (par exemple, le recours à la délégation de tâches) et la perception des personnels vis-à-vis de leur revenu jouent un rôle crucial. Le chapitre 3 met en évidence l’existence d’effets de pairs dans la survenue des PIs lors de la consultation, l’effet étant plus important chez les plus pauvres. Enfin, avec un modèle théorique dans le chapitre 4, nous montrons qu’à l'équilibre, les PIs sont plus élevés en salariat pur qu’avec une rémunération basée sur la production. Aussi, une augmentation du paiement unitaire dans ce dernier système fait baisser les PIs, alors qu'une augmentation du salaire a un effet contraire. Un système mixte (salaire + rémunération à la production) semble être approprié pour assurer la participation des médecins et les inciter à réduire la recherche de rente. / « Petty corruption » is an important feature of the relationship between health workers and patients in settings that allow corrupt acts to happen. It has been well studied in Central and Eastern Europe under the term « informal payments » (IPs), but little has been done in Africa. To contribute in filling this gap in the literature, this thesis proposes a series of analyses to better understand some key aspects of this issue in the African context. In chapter 1, we show that the occurrence of IPs is concentrated on the poorest individuals. They are more likely to report having faced the lack of medicines, absenteeism of doctors and long waiting times in their local hospital, and these factors significantly increase the probability of incurring unofficial fees. In chapter 2, a deeper analysis of the influence of supply factors confirms that long waiting times, the management of the health workforce (e.g. using task shifting) and health workers’ perception vis-à-vis their earnings play a crucial role. In chapter 3, we highlight the existence of peer effects in the occurrence of IPs during consultation for HIV care, with a higher effect for the poorest patients. Finally, with a theoretical model in chapter 4, we show that at the equilibrium, the level of IPs is higher when the physician is paid by salary compared to output-based remuneration. Also, an increase of the unit payment in the later system leads to a reduction of IPs, while an increase of salary has the contrary effect. A blended remuneration (mix of salary and output-based remuneration) appears to be appropriate to both ensure the participation of physicians and introduce incentives to reduce rent-seeking.

The term 'populist radical right parties' often occurs in media, among experts or as a frequently discussed topic. The topic related to a rise of such of political parties in Europe is parallelly linked to the context of growing number of immigrants. The aim of this work is to clarify reasons of the origin and long-term success of two populist radical right parties. The work analyzes and consequently compares the existence of the Swedish Democrats and the Norwegian Progress Party. Even though Sweden and Norway share several historical and cultural features, situation around selected political parties is apparently different. Norway's Progress Party succeeded in an election of 1973 already. Nowadays it can be listed among Norwegian strongest political parties. On the other hand, the populist radical right party, Swedish Democrats, entered the political scene in 2002 only. The starting point of the time research frame for this thesis is defined as the breakthrough of the Progress Party in 1973 with Anders Lange in lead. The core of the thesis is based on the concept of supply and demand according to which independent variables are categorized. The main purpose of the work is to determine the key factor, which leads to the success of selected political parties and analyze their development.