This study analyzes activist behavior of Supreme Court justices in 132 decisions which struck down congressional statutes as unconstitutional in 1789-1990. Analysis of the justices' activist rates and liberalism scores demonstrate that these votes are ideologically based. Integrated models containing personal attribute and case factor variables are constructed to explore the votes as activist behavior. The same models are also tested with a new dependent variable constructed to measure the nullification votes as liberal votes. The models which explain the votes as ideological responses better explain the votes than the models which explain the votes as activism or restraint. The attribute variables offer better explanation in the late 20th century models and the case factors offer better explanation in the early period models.

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The relationships among governmental institutions are some of the most studied phenomena in political science. Yet these complex interactions remain largely unexplained due to the difficult task of developing accurate measures that lead to quantifiable tests that enhance explanation and prediction. This work centers on the interactions of United States Supreme Court justices with other political actors. The goal of this dissertation is to better understand the relationship between the Supreme Court and its institutional environment. In short, I ask: What factors affect Supreme Court justices’ voting decisions? I approach this question from several different angles while making use of a unique dependent variable—Yearly Supreme Court justice ideal point. This variable is a variant of the ideal points calculated by Michael A. Bailey of Georgetown University (Bailey, 2007). My empirical models consider the effects of numerous independent variables on this dependent variable. One of the unique aspects of this study is that it considers the effects of a wide variety of factors purported to affect judicial behavior. There are four main theories of judicial decision-making, and my empirical analyses test notions exported from all of them. In designing and testing my models, I draw especially on the developing approach of new institutionalism—an approach to the study of judicial politics that emphasizes the influence of external, non-judicial political actors on judicial behavior. Ultimately this work will show what factors constrain the actions of Supreme Court justices and to what degree they do so. This research has many implications for larger theoretical concerns of political science, specifically formulating questions about the independence of the judiciary and contains relevant questions for democratic theory as well.

While rankings of presidents are quite common, rankings of Supreme Court justices are much rarer. Herein I produce one and make use of both to see if perceived greatness of one actor can effect perceptions of greatness for the other. This work examines those influences that indicate success for Supreme Court Justices by seeking to determine what the historically great justices have in common. I first develop a composite score of all the Supreme Court Justices based on the limited previous ranking research and relevant indictors to rank the Justices 1-112. Next, I examine potential indicators of such success; previous experience, personal characteristics, conformation vote, and most interestingly the perceived greatness of their appointing president. This research finds a direct relationship between perceptions of presidential greatness and perceptions of judicial quality. Overall the great Justices are statistically more likely to be appointed by a great president, consistent with the appointment literature that often describes an appointer-appointee relationship as a legacy impacting one.

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