This thesis traces the evolution of Arab nationalism in Syria from 1908 to 1920. It attempts to determine when Arab nationalism was accepted as the primary focus of political 1oya1ty by the Syrian Arabs during this period and what reasons prompted the Syrian Arabs to support Arab nationa1ism. It was found that during the years from 1908 to 1918 Arab nationa1sim as a po1itica1 force came into being in Syria and was embraced by a few Syrian Arabs. At this time, however, the majority of Syrian Arabs of all classes rejected Arab nationalism and maintained their po1itica1 allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. In 1918 with the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalism in Syria was accepted by most Syrian Arabs as the only ideological alternative now avai1ab1e by which to maintain and protect their traditional interests and to build a new po1itical community.

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Why do some regimes enjoy more autonomy than others when taking foreign policy and alignment choices? How does the organization of state-society relations constrain or enable a regime's freedom to take foreign policy and alignment choices? What explains the overlap between the domestic and external security spheres of some states, but not others? Finally, how do the foreign policy and alignment choices of some regimes have domestic political origins, uses, and implications? / This study explores these theoretical questions through a comparative examination of the impact of the organization of state-society relations (the independent variable) on regime autonomy in taking foreign policy and alignment choices (the dependent variable) in King Hussein's Jordan and Hafiz al-Asad's Syria. In contrast to Jordan's overlapping security terrains, and the domestic political origins, uses, and implications of many of the Hashemite regime's foreign policy and alignment choices, in Asad's Syria these choices are responses to shifts in the external geopolitical environment. This study offers an explanation of the discrepancy between the Syrian regime's ability to ignore domestic constraints on foreign policy and alignment choices, due to its preoccupation with external sources of threat, compared to its Jordanian counterpart's inability to do so and, consequently, its preoccupation on many occasions with strictly domestic sources of threat. / This study bridges comparative politics and international relations theorizing, inviting a methodological shift away from the hitherto dominant neorealist tendency in the latter field, which anchors foreign policy and alignment choices in primarily external considerations and objectives. Borrowing from the literature on corporatism, populism, and historical institutionalism, this study also supplies a more rigorous methodology for investigating the relationship between the domestic structures of nondemocratic states and their foreign policy and alignment choices. More than a revision of neorealist theorizing, and in contrast to idiosyncratic, domestic structure, or constructivist approaches to the study of state behavior, this study contends that a contextual and historical analysis of the organization of state-society relations explains why regime autonomy to take foreign policy and alignment choices may be constrained in some states but not in others. Furthermore, and against neorealism's insistence on the external origins of foreign policy and alignment choices, this study also argues that on many occasions these choices have domestic political origins, uses, and implications. The implications of these conclusions on the study of Arab politics, and on the quest for a first-cut theory of state behavior, are also assessed.

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This PhD thesis compares Egypt and Syria’s authoritarian political systems. While the tendency in social science political research treats Egypt and Syria as similarly authoritarian, this research emphasizes differences between the two systems with special reference to institutions and co-optation. Rather than reducibly understanding Egypt and Syria as sharing similar histories, institutional arrangements, or ascribing to the oft-repeated convention that “Syria is Egypt but 10 years behind,” this thesis focuses on how events and individual histories shaped each states current institutional strengthens and weaknesses. Specifically, it explains the how varying institutional politicization or de-politicization affects each state’s capabilities for co-opting elite and non-elite individuals. Beginning with a theoretical framework that considers the limited utility of democratization and transition theoretical approaches, the work underscores the persistence and durability of authoritarianism. Chapter two details the politicized institutional divergence between Egypt and Syria that began in the 1970s. Chapter three and four examines how institutional politicization or de-politicization affects elite and non-elite individual co-optation in Egypt and Syria. Chapter five discusses the study’s general conclusions and theoretical implications. This thesis’s argument is that Egypt and Syria co-opt elites and non-elites differently because of the varying degrees of institutional politicization in each governance system. Rather than view one country as more politically developed than the other, this work argues that Syria’s political institutions are more politicized than their Egyptian counterparts. Syria’s political arena is, thus, described as politicized-patrimonialism. Syria’s politicized-patrimonial arena produces uneven co-optation of elites and non-elites as they are diffused through competing institutions. Conversely, the Egyptian political arena remains highly personalized as weak institutions and individuals are manipulated and molded according to the president’s ruling clique. This is referred to as personalized-patrimonialism. As a consequence, Egypt’s political establishment demonstrates more flexibility in ad hoc altering and adapting its arena depending on the emergence of crises. This study’s theoretical implications suggest that, contrary to modernization and democratization theory’s adage that institutions lead to a political development, politicized institutions within a patrimonial order actually hinder regime adaptation because consensus is harder to achieve and maintain. It is within this context that Egypt’s de-politicized institutional framework advantages its top political elite. In this reading of Egyptian and Syrian politics, Egypt’s personalized political arena is more adaptable than Syria’s. These conclusions do not indicate that political reform is a process underway in either state.

This thesis explores the dynamics involved in shaping the Anglo-Syrian relationship. It argues that to understand UK relations towards Syria over the past century, they have to be viewed in the broader context of British policy on Middle East regional issues, and wider foreign policy priorities. With no direct interests invested in Syria, it is both Britain's continued involvement in Middle East affairs and Syria's standing as a key regional power that assures a continuing relationship. Consequently, the stance of leading UK politicians on the issues of post-World War regional order, international terrorism, military interventionism, arms sales, dictatorship and democratisation have circumscribed UK policy options in relation to Syria. Using the tools of Neoclassical realism this study considers British foreign policy behaviour, in terms of Britain's attempt to mobilize the power to protect its interests. It reviews Britain's international behaviour in part by how it is affected by changes in the international system, as Britain has declined from being a great imperial power, to a European power. Alliances are a key tool Britain has used to manage its decline, and this study identifies the impact that this has had on Anglo-Syrian relations with particular reference to the US and EU. Finally, it demonstrates that understanding how the foreign policy process works in Britain is key to understanding its international behaviour. In this it takes into account elite perceptions both of what these interests are and how best Britain can achieve them. This adds a layer of understanding as to why foreign policy outcomes do not always conform with what would be predicted purely in terms of the pursuit of the national interest.

Humanitarian intervention has long been a secondary or tertiary concern in a security driven international system. Since NATO's intervention during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 there have been significant developments in both the language and form of humanitarian intervention as a matter of international law. The events in Kosovo sparked debate about how to handle humanitarian crisis in the future and thus humanitarian intervention evolved into a redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility and the Responsibility to Protect. The Responsibility to Protect has had a number of opportunities to continue to evolve and assert itself in an international legal context throughout the ensuing years since the Kosovo intervention. The purpose of this research is to explore the moral, legal and practical implications of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Classical and contemporary theories of international relations and moral philosophy are applied in the context of the Responsibility to Protect and its effect upon the international system and specific states to cultivate a sense of the development of the norm and different actors' attitudes towards it. A literature review is conducted to show the practical and conceptual issues inherent in the framework of the Responsibility to Protect. The norm is then applied to the cases of Kosovo, Libya, and Syria to assess its effect in practice and determine its origins. The analysis of these case studies leads to a number of conclusions regarding its effectiveness and future application. The case studies chosen for this research are Kosovo, Libya, and Syria. The case of Kosovo helps to establish a humanitarian intervention framework, the need for redefinition, and the beginning of the Responsibility to Protect. Libya shows the first strong case for the positive application of the Responsibility to Protect in a practical sense. The non-intervention in Syria shows the difficult political issues involved in intervention and presents uncertainty as to the positive develop of the norm. These cases clearly show the myriad of practical challenges to RtoP that are borne out the theoretical, moral issues embedded in its philosophy. The conclusion drawn from the literature review and subsequent case studies is that the current efforts to assert the Responsibility to Protect are aimed at the wrong areas of international law and states, and that the norm is not developing positively in a linear pattern. To successfully promote its acceptance the Responsibility to Protect must build institutional linkages to make intervention more cost effective, exercise the regional options available to promote and ensure the legitimacy of intervention, and assure the acceptance of RtoP by the major powers in the Security Council.