本研究欲探討分析師推薦對管理當局所釋出資訊量之關聯性，當分析師越強力推薦公司時，公司的管理當局將願意提供較多的資訊給分析師做為預測的依據，則分析師對公司盈餘的預測也越準確。研究結果發現給予公司較佳推薦的分析師，預測準確性確實比給予公司較差推薦的分析師高。 之後再利用台灣證券暨期貨市場發展基金會設立的資訊揭露評鑑系統，探討資訊較為透明的公司，因為管理當局自願提供較多的資訊，即便分析師強力推薦，可能也無法得到額外的資訊，所以分析師推薦的效果應比資訊揭露較不透明的受評公司差。實證結果發現資訊揭露較透明的受評公司，分析師的推薦效果確實比資訊訊揭露較不透明的受評公司差。 / This thesis examines directly whether that managers provide more (less) information to analysts with more (less) favorable stock recommendations, based on the Barron et al. model (1998). Prior study documents the relative forecast accuracy of analysts before and after a recommendation issuance under the assumption that increases (decreases) in management-provided information will increase (decrease) analysts’ relative forecast accuracy. In contrast, this paper directly measure amount of information based on Barron et al. model (1998), and examine whether amount of information varies between pre- and post- a recommendation. Contrary to our prediction, the results show no significant difference in amount of information after and before recommendation issuance. However, we do find that analysts issuing more favorable recommendations experience a greater increase in their relative forecast accuracy compared with analysts with less favorable recommendations. In addition, we also find that the association is smaller for firms with higher information transparency than those with lower information transparency. The information transparency is measure by whether firms are listed in Taiwan Securities & Futures Information Center’s Information Disclosure and Transparence Ranking System (therefore TSFIC).