This is a research analysis on whether the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) balances the competing rights and interests of stakeholders affected by an affected transaction and fundamental transaction, and the remedial procedures triggered by these transactions. The new regime relating to fundamental transactions and affected transactions in the Act has, in practice, presented a number of legal questions, the answers to which are not readily apparent from the Act itself.1 These innovative provisions have also brought with them some fear and anxiety for a number of small and medium sized private companies as the administrative duties associated with the regulation of these transactions are fairly onerous and costly.2 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 aims:  “to provide for the incorporation, registration, organisation and management of companies, the capitalisation of profit companies, and the registration of offices of foreign companies carrying on business within the Republic;  to define the relationships between companies and their respective shareholders or members and directors;  to provide for equitable and efficient amalgamations, mergers and takeovers of companies;  to provide for efficient rescue of financially distressed companies; to provide appropriate legal redress for investors and third parties with respect to companies;  to establish a Companies and Intellectual Property Commission and a Takeover Regulation Panel to administer the requirements of the Act with respect to companies, to establish a Companies Tribunal to facilitate alternative dispute resolution and to review decisions of the Commission;  to establish a Financial Reporting Standards Council to advise on requirements for financial record-keeping and reporting by companies;  to repeal the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973), and make amendments to the Close Corporations Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984), as necessary to provide for a consistent and harmonious regime of business incorporation and regulation; and  to provide for matters connected therewith.” 3 The Act aims for a more flexible approach that has a balance between accountability and transparency, with less regulatory burden. / Mini Dissertation (LLM (Corporate Law))--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Mercantile Law / LLM (Corporate Law) / Unrestricted

Taking a sociological perspective on the market for corporate control this thesis calls into question financial capitalism with its preference for clear shareholder-value governance of the corporation. The institutional setting chosen to show this is Sweden, with its particularly shareholder friendly governance regime and its very active takeover market. To this is added three longitudinal case studies of cross-border hostile takeover processes during the sixth takeover wave in Europe. These reveal that the success of cross-border hostile bids has little to do with the theory of the market for corporate control, as a market where contests enable “good managers” to win over “bad managers”, with the overarching goal of enhancing wealth creation for society at large. Instead the most successful actors on a market for corporate control are those who best understand that market’s power dynamics – including the use of regulatory and moral arbitrage between different national frameworks and the leveraging of short-termism of institutional investors. The case studies are then analyzed in relation to the revised Swedish takeover rules of 2009. This shows that the revision did not address the problems detected, focusing instead on enhancing deal making and further limiting the board’s ability to work for long term value creation. As a whole this thesis calls for a development of a theory of a market for corporate control that in a more sustainable way will enable board of directors to focus on the corporation as value accretive entity. Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall has conducted her PhD work at the Stockholm School of Economics and is today a researcher
at the Center for Management and Organization at the Stockholm School of Economics Institute for Research (SIR). She has a background as a prize winning financial journalist for over 20 years and has co-authored three books about delicate issues in large Swedish corporations. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2012</p>

This dissertation contains four essays on various topics in the fields of corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay, entitled Corporate Governance and Ownership, presents an overview of the causes and consequences of, and possible remedies for, the separation of ownership and control in corporations. In particular, the essay addresses the costs and benefits of ownership concentration. A specific purpose is to put the role of ownership into perspective, while bringing the reader up to date with some recent developments. Essay number two, Shareholder Gains from Equity Private Placements: Evidence from the Stockholm Stock Exchange, contains an empirical investigation of the stockmarket’s reaction to announcements of equity private placements and rights issues. The essay sets out to test a range of hypotheses put forward in the literature. Extensive cross-sectional analyses of private placement discounts and abnormal returns are performed. The third essay is named Optimal Deterrence and Inducement of Take-overs: An analysis of Poison Pills and Dilution. This essay models how the ex ante wealth of shareholders could be increased with customized contractual provisions that affect takeover probabilities and premia. The proposed provisions resemble anti-takeover defense measures in the form of poison pill plans, and conversely, voluntary dilution schemes in the fashion prescribed by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1980). Finally, the fourth essay models the wealth effects of a particular takeover regulation, The Mandatory Bid Rule. This rule requires a potential bidder for a control position in a target firm to extend the offer to include any or all of the outstanding shares. Although the mandatory bid rule is aimed at the protection of minority shareholders, the essay argues that this regultion is not generally in the best interest of the shareholders. Each essay is self-contained and could, in principle, be read in any order chosen by the reader. However, for readers less familiar with the corporate finance literature, the first essay may also serve as a helpful introduction to the following three essays. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.