Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania. / Bibliography: p. 319-325.

Thesis (M.A.)--Silpakorn University, 1987. / In Thai; abstract also in English. Added t.p.: The tax collection in Lanna, 1884-1902. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-105). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania. / Bibliography: p. 319-325.

Uppsala universitet, 1780, Thesis (doctoral). / Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 12049.0. - OCLC, 24298775. - Reproduction of original from Kress Library of Business and Economics, Harvard University.

Thesis (M.A.)--Silpakorn University, 1987. / In Thai; abstract also in English. Added t.p.: The tax collection in Lanna, 1884-1902. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-105).

Thesis (doctoral)--Uppsala universitet, 1780. / Reproduction of original from Kress Library of Business and Economics, Harvard University. Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 12049.0.

Thesis (M. S.)--Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. / Committee Chair: Silva, Emilson; Committee Member: Kilic, Rehim; Committee Member: Li, Haizheng.

This thesis looks at legal mechanisms allowing the non-collection of tax debts in the tax systems of Canada and the United States. The goal is to shed light on the choices made in Canada’s tax collection system by juxtaposing it with the American system. The comparison reveals differences in the ways in which the two jurisdictions allow taxpayers to participate in the tax system and differences in how the two jurisdictions choose to make decisions about the forgiveness of tax debts. Although Canada has generally rejected the idea of compromise within the tax system, there is a tax policy case to be made in favour of the compromise of tax debts in certain situations.

Is tax evasion political? How do fiscal politics change when a substantial share of taxpayers decide to shirk on their fiscal burden? In the economics literature, a well-established tradition of work has investigated the behavioral and institutional determinants of taxpaying, informing polices on how to improve compliance. However, existing work has remained conspicuously silent on the political fallout from tax noncompliance. The projects in this dissertation begin filling this gap. In the first paper, I turn to local tax politics and ask when local officials are better able to handle subnational taxation in a high-evasion environment. Exploring the Italian case, I show that mayors born in the town are better suited for tax governance, increasing enforcement, tax rates, and revenue. In my second project, I move to national tax politics and investigate the impact of information about tax cheating by the rich on public preferences for taxing the rich. Leveraging an original survey experiment conducted in Italy, I document a negative impact of perceived cheating by the rich on demand for tax progressivity. Finally, in the third study, I flip the question and ask whether tax enforcement can impact revealed public preference for redistribution. With three empirical case studies in Italy, Slovakia, and Australia, I argue and provide evidence for a twin dynamic. When enforcement is successful and popular, individuals display greater propensity for redistribution. This is the case in Italy, where an electorally-popular crackdown on property-tax evasion causes increases in donations to local public-benefit non-profit initiatives. By contrast, when enforcement is not perceived as successful or causes backlash by taxpayers, I document opposite reaction. In Slovakia, where enforcement is not perceived as credible, publicized audits against local businesses lead to decreases in local charitable donations. Similarly, in Australia, crackdowns against tax-avoidance schemes in the summer of 1998 caused widespread protests and led to electoral shifts in favor of a regressive tax reform in the October 1998 election. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation conclusively demonstrate that tax evasion is indeed political. Enforcement and noncompliance at both national and subnational level have deep political roots and implications for the broader politics of the fiscal contract, potentially upholding or stymieing the prospects of redistribution.

This thesis analyses the ratchet effect in the context of the performance scheme implemented by Brazilian tax collection in 1988 to reward tax officials for their effort in collecting taxes and uncovering tax violations, using panel data for 110 tax agencies from August 1989 to April 1993 and employing the GMM-system estimator. The estimates suggest the presence of ratchet effect, i.e., the more the tax officials do today, the more the tax officials are asked to do in the future. This result endangers the credibility of the Brazilian tax authority's incentive program as an incentive system.