Thesis Ph.D.). / Written for the Dept. of Educational and Counselling Psychology. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2009/09/02). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--University of Georgia, 1990. / Directed by Allen B. Moore. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-92).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 1992. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 288-300).

Dissertation (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2009. / Directed by Prashant Palvia; submitted to the Dept. of Information Systems and Operations. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed May 13, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 290-303).

Thesis (Ed. D.)--University of Georgia, 1990. / Directed by Allen B. Moore. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-92).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in electronic version.

<p> Effective internal controls to protect government information technology (IT) investments are essential as annual deficits exceed $700 billion dollars, government shutdowns, and sequestrations are threatened. The purpose of this qualitative historical single-case study was to explore, analyze, and describe feedback collected by the United States Government Accountability Office as IT governance and control requirements were rationalized. Prior to publishing an updated Standard for Internal Control in the Federal Government, the federal register requested participants respond to a series of questions directed toward the 2013 Draft Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Four major themes emerged from within the 43 correspondents: (a) challenges exist with financial constraints and control documentation requirements, (b) the central oversight body must ensure that federal, state, county, departments, and agencies have shared understanding and objectives, (c) federal regulatory reform includes requirements identifying internal controls for both the Federal Government 2014 General Accountability Offices Standards and the 2013 Committee of Sponsoring Organization Standards, and (d) the implications of adapting a Standards for Internal Control publication to align with the Federal Government rather than adopting the publication. An efficient and effective approach to identify, integrate, and balance regulatory guidelines, stakeholders' concerns, and technical requirements for government leadership, contractors, and non-federal entity recommendations is proposed for assessment and development. This technique could provide government leadership a method to assess factors affecting or influencing proposed and/or existing regulatory control. Additionally, a conceptual historical narrative construct and a crosswalk between COSO and Federal Standards for Internal Control are included.</p>

<p> The purpose of this qualitative, multi-case study was to explain Tuckman&rsquo;s attributes within software development when using a collocated software designed methodology in a non-collocated setting. Agile is a software development methodology that is intended for use in a collocated setting; however, organizations are using it in a non-collocated setting, which is increasing the software errors in the final software product. The New Agile Process for Distributed Projects (NAPDiP) was developed to fix these software errors that arise when using Agile in a non-collocated setting but have not been effective. This research utilized Tuckman's team theory to explore the disparity related to why these errors still occur. The research question asked is how software development programmers explain Tuckman's attributes (i.e., forming, storming, norming, performing) on software development projects. The study adopted a qualitative model using nomothetic major and minor themes in the exploration of shared expressions of sentiments from participants. The study&rsquo;s population came from seven participants located in the United States and India who met the requirement of using the Agile development methodology and work for organizations on teams with a size of at least thirty individuals from various organizations. A total of seven participants reached saturation in this multi-case study supporting the research question explored. The findings of the research demonstrated that development teams do not meet all stages and attributes of Tuckman&rsquo;s team development. Future research should explore additional ways that software development teams satisfy a more significant number of Tuckman&rsquo;s team development stages.</p><p>

<p> The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NAIC) reports that "...preventing all insider threats is neither possible nor economically feasible..." because the threat is already behind perimeter defenses and often know exactly where vulnerabilities exist within organizations (Cline, 2016). The purpose of this research was to determine the prevalence of malicious and unintentional insider threats. Statistically, the numbers support the idea that insider threats are increasing and occurring more frequently. The true numbers, which only account for the incidents that were reported, may be higher than originally expected. The statistical numbers are likely to much higher because organizations fear reputational damage and client loss. Organizations give reasons such as not enough evidence for conviction or too hard to prove guilt. The result of the paper indicates that companies focus most of their resources on external threats and not the insider threat that is costlier to remediate and considered the most damaging of all threats. The research focuses on malicious and unintentional insider threats and how they are different. A 2018 Crowd Research Partners report found 90% of organizations believe they are vulnerable to insider attacks, while 53% of businesses confirmed they had experienced an insider threat in the past 12 months (Crowd Research Partners, 2017a). The insider threat is hard to manage because an organization not only need worry about their own employees they also must monitor and manage third-party vendors, partners, and contractors. However, with a combination of technical and nontechnical solutions, including an insider threat program, companies can detect, deter, prevent or at least reduce the impacts of insider threats. Abstract The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NAIC) reports that "...preventing all insider threats is neither possible nor economically feasible..." because the threat is already behind perimeter defenses and often know exactly where vulnerabilities exist within organizations (Cline, 2016). The purpose of this research was to determine the prevalence of malicious and unintentional insider threats. Statistically, the numbers support the idea that insider threats are increasing and occurring more frequently. The true numbers, which only account for the incidents that were reported, may be higher than originally expected. The statistical numbers are likely to much higher because organizations fear reputational damage and client loss. Organizations give reasons such as not enough evidence for conviction or too hard to prove guilt. The result of the paper indicates that companies focus most of their resources on external threats and not the insider threat that is costlier to remediate and considered the most damaging of all threats. The research focuses on malicious and unintentional insider threats and how they are different. A 2018 Crowd Research Partners report found 90% of organizations believe they are vulnerable to insider attacks, while 53% of businesses confirmed they had experienced an insider threat in the past 12 months (Crowd Research Partners, 2017a). The insider threat is hard to manage because an organization not only need worry about their own employees they also must monitor and manage third-party vendors, partners, and contractors. However, with a combination of technical and nontechnical solutions, including an insider threat program, companies can detect, deter, prevent or at least reduce the impacts of insider threats.</p><p>