The liberalisation of domestic telecommunication (telecom) markets has become a worldwide trend. As a result, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), evolving from deliberations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has been heralded as the mechanism with which to effect telecom liberalisation domestically. For countries in Africa, the GATS instruments have been translated as a means to establish the principles required for an effective telecom industry supported by key institutions in policy, regulation and implementation. However, the analysis of relevant literature on telecom in Africa has tended to focus on technological developments based on current observable outcomes. This methodology is inadequate because it fails to account for the context-specific nature of the policy arena and framework shaping telecom outcomes. I argue that we must consider telecom outcomes by understanding the nature of political institutions domestically and their interaction with the international arena. To explicate this intersection of ideas, I draw on two seemingly independent theories, Neopatrimonialism and New Institutional Economics (NIE) with reference to the works of van de Walle (2001) and North (1990) respectively, to shed light on the nature of the Kenyan political context and the value of the GATS as an instrument that facilitates credibility and reduces opportunistic ex-post behaviour. It is contended in this study, that for the Kenyan Government, the value of the GATS accession lies in the legitimising role that it facilitates in accessing funds from the international community. This study thus highlights the inevitable tension that arises when domestic policy-reform goals are juxtaposed with international trade obligations undertaken through treaty accession and informed by a liberalisation agenda. A qualitative approach was used to collect the data and involved interviews and documentary analysis. The findings suggest that Kenya is partially in compliance with its GATS telecom commitments. However, this partial reform results from patrimonial tendencies in Kenya and is exacerbated by the need to attract hard currency through aid packages that dictate the nature of the policy process and the relationship between Kenya and the international community. In conclusion, even with policy reforms, state agents always find ways to maintain or create clientelist practises. Unless such reform is accompanied by political changes that provide checks and balances on institutions and state agents, reform policies on their own will not create an effective telecom sector. To truly evaluate telecom reform therefore, we must appreciate the context-specific nature of policy making.