Thesis (doctoral)--Christiani-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.

Univ., Diss.--Groningen, 2005.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Groningen, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-215) and index.

Auctions are a key economic mechanism for establishing the value of goods that have an uncertain price. In recent years, as a consequence of the ubiquitous emergence of technology, auctions can reach consumers, and as a result drive market prices, on a global scale. Collection of private information such as past trades exposes more information than desired by market participants. The leaked information can be statistically analyzed to provide auctioneers, or competitors, an advantage on future transactions. The need to preserve privacy has become a critical concern to reach an accepted level of fairness, and to provide market participants an environment in which they can bid a true valuation. This research is about possible mechanisms to carry out sealed-bid auctions in a distributed setting, and provides the reader with the challenges that currently persevere in the field. The first chapter offers an introduction to different kinds of auction, and to describe sealed-bid auction. The next chapter surveys the literature, and provides necessary theoretical background. Moving on to chapter 3, instead of solely focusing on theoretical aspects of sealed-bid auctions, this chapter dives into implementation details, and demonstrates through communication and computational analysis how different settings affect performance. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.S.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

This thesis examines the role of market micro-structure and communication in takeovers that involve shareholders' investment decisions and the selection of a takeover mechanism by a raider under asymmetric information. For this purpose, rational expectations equilibrium models are employed and examples are worked in detail. / In the context of market micro-structure, it is shown that there is a greater probability of success of a takeover when the shareholders are risk averse that when they are risk neutral, and the probability that a takeover succeeds is related non-positively to the fraction of shares held by the raider. / In order to study communication, two takeover mechanisms are studied which are tender offers and negotiated takeovers. A negotiated takeover allows for communication between the shareholders and the raider before any takeover announcement. It is shown that communication offsets partially the negative impact of risk aversion on the probability that a hostile takeover occurs.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [114]-118).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-137). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

No description available.

Univ., Diss.--Frankfurt (Main), 2004. / Literaturverz. S. 459 - 485.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1990.