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Understanding the concept of God's pathos in Hosea : one of the keys for the religious and socio-political transformation of the Sub-Saharan part of Africa since 1960.Nsiku, Edouard Kitoko. January 2002 (has links)
This thesis has been written at a time when sub-Saharan African people are facing great religious and socio--political challenges in their history. These challenges have been such since 1960. Many questions regarding identity, religion and socio-political situations have been raised. This includes questions relating to God and the oppressive religious and socio-political leadership class and the oppressed people of sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed this thesis tries to face the question of God's pathos, making connections or looking for resemblance between Hosea's time and the religious and socio-political situations of sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore the main purpose is not to go back to the large already explored debate about the question of God's pathos over centuries, but to see how God's, Hosea's and sub-Saharan African people's pathos interact each with other, and how such an interaction could be used for the religious and socio-political transformations of the sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of methodology, we introduce a new paradigm called tautegory in place of the typical allegorical, holistic, literal, typological, inculturation or liberation approaches used by most of African scholars. This new paradigm warrants the creation of a new theological framework. We think this new framework could correspond to sub-Saharan culture. This new paradigm could also be used to throw new light on how to resolve some theological contradictions that classic theism has brought through the missionaries' work in the sub-Saharan African context. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2002. / funding from the African Theological Initiative, Prof Kwame Bediako, Dr. Anthony Balcomb and Dr. Andreia Solomon.
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God's nhm ("comfort") as the unfolding of God's promise in four Old Testament historical passages / David Lee BeakleyBeakley, David Lee January 2014 (has links)
God expresses Himself with emotions. This is well attested in Scripture, with
statements of love (1Jn 4:8), anger (Ex 4:14), and delight (Isa 62:4). But the real
question is not whether God has emotions, but what is the source of those emotions.
If God emotes in the context of our suffering, and our suffering is not abated, does this
mean that God is impotent or indifferent? Both possibilities yield a frightening
conclusion. Rightly understanding the character and nature of God in this regard is
paramount.
For the past two thousand years, the prevailing doctrine was that God was in some
way impassible, in that He is without passions or emotions with respect to his creation.
This means that God does not change his feelings or thoughts about events on the
earth. Even though certain passages called the “divine repentance” passages in the
Old Testament (Ge 6:6-7; Ex 32:12-14; 1Sa 15:11, 35; Nu 23:19) appeared to
contradict God’s impassibility, this was solved through the idea of anthropopathism,
that is, the belief that God describes Himself with emotional terms.
Prior to 1930, most of the English Bible renderings of the divine repentance passages
preferred the word “repent,” because the prevailing theology was rooted in the
impassibility of God, and these passages were deemed to be anthropopathic. But with
the doctrine of God’s impassibility now in question, English Bible translations began
to reflect the view that God actually reacts to our suffering with strong emotion. Words
such as “sorry,” “grief,” “regret,” and even “changed his mind” were now used to
describe the reaction of God whenever God appeared to be disappointed with his
creation, or worse, if He was disappointed with his own plan.
The purpose of this study is to provide an exegetical solution to the problem of God’s
response in the divine repentance passages in four Old Testament historical texts.
These passages are labelled as such because of the use of the Hebrew verb ~xn
which describe God as “sorry” or “repenting.” For those who hold to God’s full
immutability, the preferred view through the ages was that the Hebrew ~xn was to be
taken as anthropopathically. This study will want to explore the possibilities of an
alternative view for the Hebrew ~xn in the divine repentance passages which allow for
God’s passibility while holding to his full immutability. Specifically, this study not only
strives to answer the question “Does God repent?”, but through a sound methodology also wants to answer the larger question of the source of God’s emotion when his
judgment or grace is in view.
The methodology followed in this study is two-fold. First, it is biblical-theological,
meaning that it utilises a whole-Bible theology, and following the work of Walter Kaiser
and James Hamilton, posits that the Old Testament contains a theme or centre of
grace within judgment. At the Fall in Ge 3, God simultaneously introduced judgment
and grace into the world. That judgment and grace has never left. As one looks
through the Bible, these are the two unbroken strands that weave their way through
every chapter and every book.
In addition, this study is also an exegetical study, and follows the grammaticalhistorical-
lexical-syntactical methodology of Walter Kaiser. God disclosed Himself
objectively through the words of a book. This book records actual historical events,
as well as specific declarations and commands from God Himself. It is necessary that
the words of this book be correctly understood in their context so that a correct
understanding of God will result.
Using this methodology, this study will explore the meaning of God’s ~xn in each divine
repentance passage. The lexical study will be combined with the biblical-theological
approach of a theme or centre of “grace within judgment” that flows through the Old
Testament.
Because of this, is it possible that God, who is fully immutable, provide us everything
that we need to navigate a world of sin, suffering and uncertainty? The answer could
very well be in the understanding of God’s ~xn in light of our suffering and sin. / PhD (Old Testament), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the false dilemma of nineteenth century German atheismGould, James B. January 1992 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1992. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 232-235).
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When bad things happen to innocent people open theism and the problem of evil /Larsen, James R. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [56]-68).
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The inconsistency of John Sanders' open theism with aspects of evangelical bibliologyOdom, Stuart A. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Th. M.)--Capital Bible Seminary, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 95-101).
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The inconsistency of John Sanders' open theism with aspects of evangelical bibliologyOdom, Stuart A. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Th. M.)--Capital Bible Seminary, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 95-101).
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Understanding reality : exploring the interaction between theology and science, with special reference to a theistic presupposition to certain worldviewsPretorius, Mark 29 April 2009 (has links)
The question of reality has traditionally been answered from two broad and separate perspectives, namely natural science and theology. However, in recent times, there has been a growing realism and humility about the limits of the two disciplines, specifically in their pursuit of understanding what makes up reality. Indeed, many are openly speaking about “a new convergence” in the disciplines, opening the way to new insights and understandings about reality. Because of this, many now see both disciplines as complementary ways of seeking to understand reality. As such, this research shows that there is justification to combine science and theology to further the general understanding of what makes up reality. However, the problem expressed, is that even though both disciplines accept their limits, both disciplines have conflicting world-views on what makes up reality. Nevertheless, the research shows that there is commonality, i.e. both study reality from a creation or natural viewpoint, although each differs on the method to use. Natural science basis its findings on empirically verifiable data, whereas theology, basis its findings on revelation and the “Wirkungsgeschichte” thereof. Unfortunately, this research shows that the problem does not end there. Within the two disciplines there is what one could call supplementary-worldviews, meaning, each discipline has multiple world-views within its structures. Taking this into account, the research examines these various world-views, and then suggests a suitable solution to the difficulty of finding pluralism among these views. The research begins with a clear understanding of what the different views consist of. It achieves success by setting up a common frame of reference between each view presented, and then researches each one individually, and where fitting, complementarity sought and explored. The research puts forth that one can only come to a reasonably clear understanding of what makes up reality, if one understands the beliefs and views of each on this. The research further examines world-views such as the open-theism argument for determinism, Darwin’s evolutionary theory, and the different views about the end result of humanity and creation. It also examines God’s providence and how one would connect it to miracles, prayer, personhood and sin. The objective being to show that other than a theistic world-view, none of the alternative views give satisfactory answers to these questions, and neither do they give answers to the purpose for creation and humanity? The research also shows and argues that evil in this present world must not be thought of as something God willingly planned as an instrument of human punishment and education, but rather as something He allows because of human freedom. The research also asks questions such as “What is the Final End of Everything”, a question that science and theology have been trying to answer ever since humanity became aware of its own existence. The research further expresses that as technology has increased, many of the issues surrounding eschatology have become obscure, and difficult to deal with. The research points out that at times, eschatology has become a topic of debate, resulting in accusations and acrimony among scholars. Yet the research shows that the Bible is clear about what the end entails, whether that is towards the believer or non-believer. The research also makes a determination that any view that contradicts itself or destroys itself in the process or act of affirming itself, is self-defeating and false and only theism is actually undeniable. Thus, it is established throughout this work, that theism offers an argument with the undeniable premise that leads one to recognise the existence of an infinitely perfect and powerful Being, who has a purpose for humanity and creation. Indeed, the research shows that any world-view that cannot prove to be true simply based on the premise that it is non-contradictory, must be false. Finally, the research proposes and confidently states, that by implication, this would mean that theism, the only remaining non-contradictory world-view, would be true by the process of falsification of other alternate views, even in today’s scientific and technocratic age. B27/eo / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Practical Theology / unrestricted
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Pentecost, process, and power: A Critical Comparison of Concursus in Operational Pentecostal-Charismatic Theology and Philosophical Process-Relational TheologyReichard, Joshua David January 2010 (has links)
Doctor Theologiae - DTh / This doctoral thesis comprises a critical comparison of the theme of concursus, the way in which God and humanity interact, in the Pentecostal-Charismatic and Process-Relational traditions. The comparison is literature-based; similarities and differences in the theological literature of each tradition are compared in order to determine the extent of compatibilities and incompatibilities. The hypothesis is
that similarities in the literature sufficiently leverage differences. The first chapter includes a statement of the problem, namely that the global expansion of the Pentecostal-Charismatic movements necessitates interaction with more academically and philosophically oriented theological traditions such as Process- Relational theology. The second chapter comprises an historical survey of the Pentecostal-Charismatic movements, including key dogmas and practices. Chapter three comprises an historical survey of Process-Relational theology, including its
philosophical, metaphysical, and scientific orientations. Seminal Process- Relational theists such as Whitehead, Hartshorne, and Cobb are surveyed. Chapter four consists of a broad historical survey of the theological theme of concursus, including the notions of causation, free will, and determinism in both philosophy and theology. Further, the fourth chapter includesa broad historical survey of pneumatology, which is framed as the basis for a comparison of concursus. Chapters five and six comprise surveys of concursus in the Pentecostal-
Charismatic and Process-Relational traditions respectively. Chapter seven entails an extensive analysis of differences and synthesis of similarities between the Pentecostal-Charismatic and Process-Relational notions of concursus. Four differences and four similarities are identified. Differences and similarities are ranked and compared for compatibility. Ultimately, the research question is answered affirmatively and conditionally: yes, according to the literature of both traditions, similarities sufficiently leverage differences, but socio-linguistic barriers may obstruct meaningful mutual transformation. Chapter eight concludes with a brief exploration of ecclesial and social implications.
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A Pneumatological Vision of God: The Holy Spirit and Classical Theism's Doctrine of the Divine AttributesGabriel, Andrew K. 22 January 2010 (has links)
<p> Historically, pneumatology has had little influence on the Christian doctrine of God. In particular, although Christians throughout the ages have defended the deity of the Spirit, they have not adequately taken the economic activity of the Spirit into consideration when formulating the doctrine of the divine attributes. In an effort to correct the historical lack of influence that pneumatology has had on the doctrine of the divine attributes, this book advocates and explores the potential of a pneumatological approach to the doctrine of the divine attributes by presenting pneumatological revisions to classical theism. The thesis of this book is that a pneumatological approach to the doctrine of God recovers an emphasis on divine immanence, which has been marginalized by classical theism's imbalance toward divine transcendence. After the introductory chapter, chapter two illustrates how classical theism neglects the doctrine of the Trinity (and pneumatology in particular) in its formulation of the doctrine of the divine attributes and how classical theism privileges divine transcendence. Chapter three provides a review of how process theologians, evangelical theologians, and trinitarian theologians critique and revise classical theism and displays how contemporary theologians have only begun to develop a pneumatological approach to the doctrine of the divine attributes. Chapter four continues by recommending a pneumatological approach to the divine attributes. The remainder of the book illustrates how pneumatology provides a way to revise the classical accounts of divine impassibility, immutability, and omnipotence. In contrast to classical conclusions regarding these doctrines, pneumatological perspectives on the doctrine of the divine attributes portray God as suffering, changing his presence, and exercising his omnipotence kenotically.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
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Skeptical Theism, God, and EvidencePerry C Hendricks (13955019) 13 October 2022 (has links)
<p>Skeptical theism is an important position (or set of positions) that—if true—has significant implications in the philosophy of religion regarding the epistemic status of theism and atheism. Broadly speaking, skeptical theists are theists who are skeptical about the ability of humans to discern, by certain methods, the probability of God permitting certain states of affairs. In this dissertation, I argue in favor of two types of skeptical theism and consider their implications. In Chapter 1, I explain two types of skeptical theism—Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism—and argue in favor of each position. I consider numerous objections to these views, arguing that they all fail. This, however, only matters if these positions have a significant upshot. Accordingly, in Chapter 2, I argue that Axiological and Deontological Skeptical Theism undermine both axiological and deontological ‘noseeum’ arguments from evil, the equiprobability argument from evil, and both axiological and deontological Humean arguments from evil. So, the upshot of Axiological and Deontological Skeptical Theism is significant. Chapter 3 considers whether Axiological and Deontological Skeptical Theism result in too much skepticism: I consider whether these views provide a defeater for our commonsense beliefs. In doing so, I consider numerous types of defeaters, arguing that neither Axiological nor Deontological Skeptical Theism provide such defeaters. In Chapter 4, I consider whether one can consistently accept both Axiological and Deontological Skeptical Theism while making predictions about how God would act—a crucial aspect of theodicy and natural theology. I argue that there are two ways that one can do so: one way involving intuition and another way involving metaethics. The way involving intuition is, I argue, narrowsince it will have a limited scope. By contrast, the way involving metaethics, I argue, has a broad scope. Finally, Chapter 5 considers the so-called commonsense problem of evil. Some philosophers have argued that the commonsense problem of evil is untouched by all types of skeptical theism. I argue that the traditional commonsense problem of evil fails, but that a revamped version of it poses more of a threat. However, I claim that the revamped argument ultimately fails as well</p>
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