This thesis investigates Plato's analogy between virtue and crafts, a comparison made extensively in the early dialogues. I first detail the model of technical knowledge that Plato uses as a paradigm of knowledge. An application of this model shows the inadequacies in some claims to know or to teach virtue. Applying the model to the Socratic dictum, 'Virtue is knowledge' enables us to understand what such knowledge is about. Such knowledge is identified as 'self-knowledge' and is the product of philosophy. Philosophy is thus revealed as the craft of virtue, directed at the good of individuals. One problematic aspect of the analogy between virtue and crafts is the possibility of misuse. Virtue conceived as self-knowledge enables Plato to explain both why such a craft cannot be misused and why it alone can be the basis for benefiting others.

This inquiry suggests a new epistemological foundation for understanding and discernment in biomedical ethics. This foundation, based on Aristotle's phronesis or practical wisdom, contains elements of the lived human experience which are seen as essential aspects of ethical, as well as medical, deliberation. The Aristotelian intellectual virtues of theoria and phronesis, used as "ideal types" of rationality, provide epistemological prejudices that structure two distinct ways of thinking. With this distinction, an alternative to certain dominant trends within biomedical ethics arises as phronesis provides more human centered prejudices for understanding. In conclusion, we shall see, using the doctrine of informed consent, that a phronetic rationality allows different, more humane meanings to come into being. Phronesis, it will be argued, provides a mode of rationality which promotes compassion and engagement in both ethics and medicine and consequently, is the more appropriate way of thinking in these important human practices.

ABSTRACT A MISCONSTRUAL OF EVIDENTIALISM: ALVIN PLANTINGA AND BELIEF IN GOD Aydin, S&uuml / leyman Ph.D., Department of Philosophy Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Gr&uuml / nberg August 2004, 183 pages The evidentialist objection to belief in God is the claim that theists do not have sufficient evidence for the existence of God, therefore are they irresponsible to continue holding their belief in God in the face of insufficient evidence. Alvin Plantinga assumes that evidentialism, being a dogma characterized by classical foundationalism which itself has a faulty picture of rationality, should be set aside altogether in the assessment of epistemic status of belief in God. Behind Plantinga&rsquo / s assumption is the suggestion that the epistemic status of belief in God has been misinterpreted by philosophers, since the vast majority of religious epistemologists have remained within the evidentialist tradition. In my evaluation of Plantinga&rsquo / s assumption, I undertake two tasks: First, I seek to clarify his presumption that classical foundationalism had a faulty picture of rationality: I attempt to show that the insufficiency of classical foundationalism is not as problematic as Plantinga assumes. Secondly, I analyze and evaluate evidentialism in a larger perspective to show that: (1) evidentialism is a broader category than classical foundationalism, (2) evidentialism can not be put aside completely in any epistemological enterprise. I conclude that Plantinga&rsquo / s argument for belief in God is based on a faulty assumption, and I argue that evidentialism can best be seen to be a &ldquo / demand of clarity&rdquo / with regard to knowledge claims which on no grounds can legitimately be escaped altogether.

In this thesis the quiddity of knowledge in Kant&#039 / s critical philosophy has been investigated within the historical context of the problem. In order to illustrate the origins of the subject-matter of the dissertation, the historical background of Kant&#039 / s views on the theory of knowledge has been researched too. As a result of this research, it is concluded that Kant did not invent a new philosophical problem, but he tried to improve a decisive solution for one of the oldest question of history of philosophy i.e., &ldquo / How is synthetic a priori knowledge is possible?&rdquo / The theoretical dimension of Kant&#039 / s theory of knowledge is reserved for this purpose. The above mentioned question is not new neither for us nor for Kant, but his answer and his philosophical stand have clearly revolutionary meaning both for us and for him. This thesis claims that his stand-point not only leads to an original epoch for the theory of knowledge, but creates a serious possibility for a new ontology explicating the quiddity of knowledge.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the problems that use of idealizations in science leads to. Idealizations are simplifications and therefore false descriptions of how actual objects behave. Presence of idealizations in scientific theories is the reason for the problems in our understanding of confirmation of theories and also of scientific explanations. Nevertheless, idealizations are ubiquitous especially in natural sciences. Scientists have to employ idealizations because of the complexity of the real world and our limited capacity of computation. The roots of the methodology of modern science are in Cartesian philosophy. I propose that Descartes also employed idealizations in his theory of motion in the universe. Idealized worlds can be regarded as simplifications of the real world. Scientific theories are literally false but they are true in the possible worlds which are similar to the real world. Models provide the connections between idealized laws and the real world. Construction of models of the actual world is based upon idealizations which are indispensable in the theoretical sciences. Theories can be indirectly confirmed by models denoting different aspects of the phenomena.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-82).

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- Unviersity of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury, 1999. / Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 275-287).

Thesis (Revise). / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Freiburg im Breisgau, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-253) and indexes.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 156 p.; also includes graphics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-156). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center