Networking has shown to benefit SMEs in terms of increasing resource acquisition and knowledge transfer, two vital components in SME growth and survival. However, previous research has indicated that SME network management is largely determined by the strategic orientation of the firm, which in turn, is influenced by the owner/manager. Third party involvement has moreover been suggested to positively influence networking participation by facilitating the overall networking process for SMEs. In the present study, the moderating effect of non-profit, municipal third party involvement, on the relationship between firm growth orientation and network intensity and range, is thus examined.

Title: Using Carrots to Bring Peace? Negotiation and Third Party Involvement Author: Martina Klimesova 284 p. (+references and appendices) March 2011 How to make peace? This dissertation answers what impact third party incentives have on peace negotiation, more specifically on negotiation strategies in internal armed conflicts based on self-determination grievances. This study further assesses when the ripest time for the employment of incentives is, and in what way external incentives have an impact on possible negotiation asymmetries. Incentives in the following negotiation processes were analyzed: GoSL-LTTE in Sri Lanka (Eelam, 2002-03; 2006), GoI-GAM in Indonesia (Aceh, 2000-03; 2005), and the GRP-MILF in the Philippines (Mindanao, 2001-08). The findings indicate that those third party incentives which are linked to the core conflict issues are most likely to have some impact on the negotiation, but that committed pro-process leadership by the conflicting parties is also a necessity. The research also indicated that third parties have only limited options in employing incentives that can have an impact on the core conflict issues; and that, in any case, they are rarely willing to pursue such options. Committed strong leadership, presence of ripeness (far more frequently stipulated by an MHS than MEO),...

Pourquoi les négociations de paix échouent-elles? Pour répondre à cette question, ce mémoire synthétise la littérature sur les théories de la négociation et l’intervention de tierces parties dans les conflits intra-étatiques. À l’aide de la méthode de l’étude de cas, j’applique ce cadre théorique au troisième cycle de négociations de paix entre la Turquie et le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan, qui s’est tenu de la fin décembre 2012 à Juillet 2015. Le modèle de négociation de guerre met l’accent sur les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible qui mènent à l’échec de négociations. Les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible sont habituellement plus aigus dans les conflits intra-étatiques. Car il est plus difficile d’obtenir les informations sur les capacités militaires des groupes armés non-étatiques (GANE) et il y a généralement de grandes asymétries de pouvoir entre les États et les GANE. Cette étude de cas apporte ainsi quatre contributions à la compréhension du sujet. Premièrement, lors d’un processus de paix, les deux parties impliquées peuvent consciemment faire des choix qui ne leur permettront pas d’atteindre leurs objectifs. Deuxièmement, ces choix résultent des mesures mal-conçues dans les pratiques de négociation et/ou l’absence de tierce partie qui rétablirait l’équilibre relatif de pouvoir et qui le maintiendrait pendant les négociations de paix. En fin de compte, cela accentue les problèmes d’engagement crédible. Troisièmement, les changements exogènes perturbateurs en matière des capacités relatives, en particulier en faveur des GANE, peuvent produire les problèmes d’information asymétrique. Quatrièmement, certains conflits ne se prêtent pas à l’intervention de tierce partie. Il peut être très difficile ou lourd de conséquence pour les tierces parties de rétablir l’équilibre relatif des pouvoirs. / Why do peace negotiations fail? Answering this question, this dissertation synthesizes the literature on bargaining theory and third party involvement in intrastate conflicts. Using qualitative case study methods, I employ this theoretical framework to the third round of the peace talks between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which was held between December 2012 and July 2015. Bargaining model of war highlights the problems of information asymmetries and credible commitment that lead to bargaining failures. Information asymmetries and commitment problems are usually more severe in intrastate conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the military capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and there tends to be larger power asymmetries between states and NSAGs. The case highlights four sets of implications. First, both sides in a peace process can willingly make choices that fail to achieve the ends to which they aspired. Second, these choices result from ill-designed measures in bargaining practices and/or the lack of a third party that would redress the relative balance of power and maintain it during the peace talks. This ultimately intensifies the problems of credible commitment. Third, disruptive exogenous shifts in relative capabilities, especially in favor of the NSAG, may produce asymmetric information problems. Fourth, some conflicts do not lend themselves to third-party involvement, as it may be too difficult or costly for third parties to redress the relative balance of power.