Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 124-130). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 254-266).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-132).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Münster, 2005.

This thesis intends to provide an argument in favour of private participation in the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an area of the world trading system most visible to but also most removed from the influence of private actors. Private participation is understood as the direct and formal involvement of non-governmental actors in dispute resolution. It will distinguish between passive and active participation, the former addressing the flow of information from the WTO to civil society (understood as the community of all Member societies affected by the world trading system), while the later is concerned with issues of access and standing. As first step, I will develop an analytical framework for international dispute settlement systems based on the three elements of actors, material scope and procedures, as well as the underlying theoretical conceptions for each element. After having given an overview of the relevant features of the world trading system and its dispute resolutions mechanisms as set forth in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) of the WTO, I continue by subsuming the DSU under the analytical framework. Based on the position of the DSU within the analytical framework, I will submit an argument in favour of private participation, drawing particularly from the international relations theory of liberalism. Parting from realist-institutionalist assumptions predominant in public international law, liberalism places the individual at the center of international and WTO law, opening the latter for new categories of international actors. Finally, taking into account the liberal reliance on individual rights and democratic participation, I will suggest models to implement private participation in WTO dispute settlement. My aim is to promote meaningful involvement of private actors whose interests and objectives are affected by the world trading system, with varying procedural roles reflecting their relation to the WTO's trade regime, ranging form passive participation, to party status, to amici curiae. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, December 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Tübingen, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [348]-368) and index.

The dissertation discusses the application of “Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)” of WTO to non-market economies (NMEs).  The difficulties of application of ASCM to NMEs mainly lie in two basic questions.  The first is how to separate the subsidy and government involvement in a NME.  The second is how perfect the market has to be in order to qualify as a benchmark to calculate subsidy margins. By focusing on WTO rules and substantial WTO cases, this dissertation analyzes the difficulties in application of ASCM to NMEs from seven perspectives in legal practice.  They are: (1) whether subsidies in public utility enterprises in China are actionable, because such subsidies as upstream subsidies pass benefits to export-oriented enterprises? (2) whether subsidies may continue after privatisation of state-owned companies? (3) whether the loans provided by state-owned banks in China are subsidies? (4) whether it is fair to evaluate the subsidies margins of the land use rights in China by using out-of-country benchmark? (5) tax-incentive subsidies in China; (6) the calculation of a subsidy margin in NMEs; and (7) whether currency manipulation constitutes a subsidy? The dissertation finds that the difficulties of application of ASCM to NMEs are due to a number of reasons.  First, the deficiencies of ASCM cannot explain the application of ASCM to NMEs; second, if applicable to NMEs, there are difficulties in defining a subsidy in NMEs and in calculating a subsidy margin in NMEs; third, the non-unification of assessment of a NME results in unfairness to China which faces different standards of evaluating a NME.  Even though China has been a market economy in some countries’ view, it is difficult to be recognised as a market economy by all countries.

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree M.Com. Development Theory and Policy in the faculty of Commerce, Law and Management at the University of the Witwayersrand, 2013 / This paper undertook qualitative research to determine the trade policy space for South Africa to implement its industrial policy action plan (Ipap). The South African economy was transformed from import substitution in the 1970s to export-orientation in the 1980s. The apartheid regime failed to develop coherent policies for industrialisation. In the 1990s, there was a deliberate government decision as articulated in the GEAR policy to liberalise the economy and with regard to trade this is associated with accession to the World Trade Organisation and commitments made thereof. In 2007, the country adopted the national industrial policy framework to guide its reindustrialisation efforts and subsequently various iterations of the Ipap. Therefore, given that a lot of policy space was lost when the country joined as the WTO as a developed country, the question is “does South Africa have enough policy space to use some of the instruments that were used by successful Asian countries to industrialise”. The WTO made some of these instruments illegal. To analyse policy space, the paper looked at the effect of WTO Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), on Government Procurement (GPA), as well as the tariff commitments. The study found that although SCM has made certain subsidies illegal, other kinds of subsidies are allowed such as those for economic development in disadvantaged regions and for rural development. Therefore, strategy and packaging of these subsidies for development is important. TRIMS was found to have significantly reduced policy space by making a number of instruments on foreign direct investment illegal such as enforcing local content as well as export requirements. Since South Africa is not party to the GPA, it retains policy space to use government procurement to promote industrialisation in the country. In terms of tariffs commitment, the study found that there is no “water” between applied and bound rate for a number of critical sectors such as textile, clothing, footwear, and furniture. However, other important sectors such as automotive and automotive components and white goods still have “water” to increase tariff in future as necessary. Therefore, the study concluded that there is policy space to implement industrial policy in South Africa but this requires strategy and closer look at the WTO rules for flexibility.

This research comprehensively analyses how the CJEU and the WTO Tribunals interact with each other. The CJEU has refused to grant direct effect to the WTO's rulings based on unconvincing reasoning, but this has been deemed acceptable because it is necessary to preserve the scope of manoeuvre of the EU's political institutions, and the application of the consistent interpretation principle to the WTO's rulings could balance out the absence of direct effect. So far, the CJEU has cautiously applied the consistent interpretation principle to the WTO's rulings. While the CJEU has construed EU legislation in conformity with the DSB's reports, it did so without referring to such reports. In the future, the CJEU should regularly and explicitly interpret EU law in a manner that is consistent with the WTO's rulings. Moreover, the CJEU's case law reveals that the Nakajima exception's application has been limited, and transformed into a method of the consistent interpretation doctrine. Thus, the CJEU should apply the Nakajima exception in cases where the EU has amended its legislation to implement the WTO's rulings, and interpret the amended legislation consistently with the WTO's rulings. The absence of direct effect for WTO's rulings produces an excessive burden on the EU Member States and their citizens. Therefore, when the reasonable period of time has passed and the EU has not taken any action, or when the compliance panel announces that the amended legislation still infringes on WTO law, the CJEU should grant direct effect to the WTO's rulings. Moreover, WTO tribunals rarely refer to related CJEU judgments to support their decisions. Therefore, when WTO tribunals have to rule on a matter that the CJEU has already decided on and they agree with the decision, they should apply the consistent interpretation principle to the CJEU's decision.